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SUMMARY 
Management of knowledge involved in the new product development (NPD) 
projects is critical to the success of firms competing in environments that require rapid 
innovation. Unfortunately, many firms lack an understanding of how to develop 
knowledge management (KM) strategies that drive successful outcomes. In this thesis I 
develop a rich and multifaceted understanding of how KM strategies drive successful 
NPD outcomes.  I examine KM strategies in the NPD domain at two different decision 
making levels of the firm. First I consider the KM strategies of a manager responsible for 
a single NPD project. Second, I consider KM at strategic level where a firm establishes 
strategies to transfer or share knowledge resources with a competitor. Each of these 
problems is summarized below. 
First, I consider the how the manager of a single NPD project should develop 
knowledge (knowledge acquisition) of its product and process design teams and 
integrate that knowledge (knowledge transfer) over time throughout the development 
project. Ultimately, the ability to develop and integrate knowledge drives the net revenue 
earned at the product release time. I show that two different dynamic KM strategies arise 
for the creation and transfer of knowledge of the product and process design teams: a 
delay strategy and a front-loading strategy. I characterize drivers of each strategy as well 
as drivers of the market entry time strategy. 
In contrast to the deterministic approach above, I introduce a related but 
stochastic model. In this formulation, the manager of a single NPD project focuses on 
maximizing expected net revenue which reflects the effectiveness of product 
development activities to meet market needs as well as the ability of process 
development activities to create efficient manufacturing processes. Also in contrast to 
the first model, I consider the effect of rework that occurs as a result of the KM activities. 
Again I find that the manager’s strategies for knowledge creation satisfy either the delay 
or front-loading strategy. However, the drivers of each strategy in this model are 
substantially different from those in the first model reflecting the stochastic nature of the 
decision making environment as well as the effect of rework. 
In a third model, I consider the strategic level question of how a firm engages in 
relationships with its competitor regarding the sharing or transfer of knowledge 
resources for NPD. I consider two cooperative mechanisms: knowledge transfer when 
both firms ultimately enter the market separately as competitors versus knowledge 
 xiii 
sharing when both firms enter the market together following the joint development of a 
new product. In this thesis, I develop the KM strategies followed by the firms for each 
cooperation mechanism. In addition, I analyze the impact of firm and market 
characteristics on firms decision to whether to cooperate or not, and other KM decisions.  
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
In today’s dynamic marketplace, knowledge is key to gaining and sustaining 
competitive advantage (Webber 1993). Knowledge is information combined with 
experience, context, interpretation and reflection and may be embodied in documents, 
organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms (Davenport et al. 1998). 
Knowledge management is defined as the ability to retain, develop, organize and utilize 
knowledge.   
Creation, utilization and management of knowledge is at the center of the new 
product development process (Clark and Fujimoto 1991). Firms pursuing NPD projects 
must know what they know and how to apply it in useful ways, and know what they don’t 
know and how to close these gaps (Pitt and MacVaugh 2008). KM strategies for NPD 
impact the time to market, product and process functionality, manufacturing costs, and 
the match between customer requirements and final product features (Mihm et al. 2003, 
Ulrich and Eppinger 2003). Therefore, in a highly competitive and environment with 
changing customer needs as well as rapid changes in the underlying product and 
process technologies, NPD success is directly impacted by the firm’s KM strategies 
(Lynn et al. 2000).  
While some knowledge relevant to NPD already exists within the firm, new 
knowledge is created as the development process unfolds (Adams et al. 1998). The 
existing knowledge stored or embedded in the minds of people, in archives, in existing 
products and in procedures and equipment, needs to be recognized, retrieved and made 
available to the NPD teams. New knowledge is created through various knowledge 
creation activities, such as problem solving, testing or experimentation, knowledge 
transfer/sharing within the firm or from the outside the firm. The new and existing 
knowledge needs to be integrated to ensure a spiral of continuous expansion and 
development/refinement of knowledge for future use in the NPD process (Soderquist 
2006, Nonaka and H. Takeuchi 1995).  
Although there is agreement of its importance, there is a lack of general 
understanding and recommendations regarding KM strategies for successful NPD 
(Hargadon and Fanelli 2002). This thesis develops a rich and multifaceted 
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understanding of how KM strategies drive successful NPD outcomes. The research 
addresses the integration of KM and NPD at different decision making levels of the firm. 
First I consider the KM strategies of a manager responsible for a single NPD project. 
This research integrates key factors from the largely separate literatures of KM and 
NPD. Second, I consider KM at strategic level where a firm establishes strategies to 
transfer or share knowledge resources with a competitor. This research on NPD also 
reflects themes in the literature on strategic management. From this research, we are 
better able to understand the unique nature of KM in the context of NPD.  
1.2 Knowledge Management for New Product Development Models 
Chapters 2 and 3 introduce two normative models that explore how to manage 
the levels of knowledge of the product and process design teams throughout the 
development of a single new product. The timing and extent of knowledge embedded by 
both teams during the NPD project determine the features and functionality of the new 
product and process and thereby drive (expected) net revenue.  
In chapter 2, we introduce a deterministic model to analyze the how the manager 
of a single NPD project should develop knowledge of its product and process design 
teams and integrate that knowledge over time throughout the development project. The 
manager determines the rates and directions of knowledge transfer (KT) between teams 
and the rates of knowledge acquisition (KA) for each team. The desirability of pursing KA 
and KT changes throughout the NPD project for a variety of reasons. For example, as 
market and technological uncertainties are resolved over time, NPD efforts may be more 
effective later in the project. Also, KT may be more effective following the buildup of 
knowledge of either the source or recipient through KA. Moreover, by deploying product 
and process knowledge early in the NPD project the manager may realize an earlier 
product launch relative to the competition. Ultimately, the ability to develop and integrate 
knowledge drives the net revenue earned at the product release time which reflects the 
tradeoff between seeking early market entry benefits versus delaying the product 
release to develop superior product and process capabilities. 
We simultaneously determine the optimal product launch time and the strategies 
for KA and KT throughout the NPD project. We provide conditions where the manager 
pursues a front-loading or a delay strategy for KT and KA. For example, if the initial 
levels of knowledge of both teams are high, (e.g. incremental development project), the 
manager initially pursues KA and KT at higher rates that decrease throughout the 
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development project (front-loading strategy). In contrast, if the initial levels of knowledge 
are low (e.g., “new-to-the-world” products) the manager pursues a delay strategy in 
which the peak efforts to increase knowledge occur later in the development project.  
Insights are given on the impact of additional benefits due to synergy or costs due to 
conflict associated with the simultaneous transfer of knowledge between the product and 
process design teams. Lastly, we explore forces that drive the optimal product launch 
time. 
In contrast to the deterministic approach in Chapter 2, we introduce a related but 
stochastic model in Chapter 3. The manager determines the knowledge development 
(KD) strategy for the product design team, which includes the pursuit of problem solving 
activities such as testing and experimentation and other induced learning activities such 
as training. In addition, the manager determines the rates of KT between the product 
and process design teams. We explicitly recognize that the effectiveness of KD and KT 
are both interrelated and dynamic. While investments in KD and KT are pursued to 
increase the cumulative knowledge embedded in the product and process designs, in 
the short-term these investments may uncover errors that trigger rework. Naturally, the 
errors reduce the stock of knowledge embedded in the product and process designs, 
which drives expected net revenue. Overall, the expected net revenue is comprised of 
three components. First, the manager faces uncertainty regarding the time the product 
will be successfully launched in the marketplace. A success launch occurs when product 
design efforts result in a new product whose functionality meets the needs of the 
marketplace. Second, the expected net revenue earned reflects the ability to efficiently 
manufacture the product. This dimension of expected net revenue is driver by efforts of 
the process design teams. Third, expected net revenue is a function of time to capture 
the effect of time-based competition.  
We outline conditions where the manager pursues a front-loading or a delay 
strategy for KT and KD. We show if the initial level of process design knowledge is small, 
the manager optimally delays her peak efforts of KT to the product design team until a 
later time when the process design team’s knowledge is larger. In addition, we show that 
rework associated with KD or KT impacts the rate and the timing of knowledge creation 
for both design teams. In particular, if a high rate of rework is triggered by KT from the 
process design team, the manager front-loads KD of the product design team and KT to 
the process design team but pursues the delay strategy for the KT to the product design 
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team. Lastly, we show drivers of expected net revenue that lead to a complementary 
relationship between the manager’s pursuit of KD and KT versus a substitution strategy. 
In Chapter 4, we consider the strategic level question of how a firm engages in a 
cooperative agreement with its competitor regarding the sharing or transfer of knowledge 
resources for NPD. We consider two cooperative mechanisms. Under competitive 
development (CD) knowledge transfer occurs between two firms who ultimately enter the 
market separately as competitors. In contrast, under joint development (JD), knowledge 
sharing occurs between two firms who ultimately enter the market together following the 
joint development of a new product. The models reflecting each of these cooperative 
mechanisms is described below.  
We define the CD mechanism as a limited form of cooperation between two firms 
that pursue NPD projects individually and develop products that ultimately compete in 
the same market. We consider the knowledge transfer from one firm to the other which 
consists of the rights to use knowledge contained in licenses and patents, 
documentation about NPD activities, and access to other knowledge based resources. 
While the recipient firm benefits by deploying the additional knowledge, the source firm 
earns revenue from the sale of that knowledge. However, the source firm also suffers a 
loss in value of its proprietary knowledge. The extent of KT (decision variable) is 
determined based on, among other things, the price charged by the source firm 
(decision variable). In addition to KT, each firm pursues its own KD (decision variables) 
to increase the level of knowledge embedded into its own NPD project. Each firm’s 
objective is to maximize its own expected profit. Expected net revenue is earned by each 
firm from the release of a new product whose value in the marketplace reflects the firm’s 
level of NPD knowledge. The stochastic element of the net revenue captures the ability 
of the firm to introduce a product with functionality that meets the market needs over 
time. Expected net revenue is earned (source) and a cost is incurred (recipient) for the 
transfer of knowledge between teams. Lastly, costs are incurred for KD.  
In contrast, the JD mechanism reflects a greater degree of cooperation between 
competing firms whereby both firms jointly enter into an NPD project and jointly release 
a new product to the marketplace. First, each firm determines the extent of knowledge to 
contribute to a joint NPD endeavor which we refer to as its rate of knowledge sharing 
(KS). Subsequently, each firm determines its investment in additional KD to be added to 
the pooled level of knowledge. The contribution each firm makes to the joint pool of 
knowledge drives the portion of total expected net revenue earned. While making the KS 
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decisions, each firm maximizes its individual expected profit, which consists of the 
portion of expected net revenue earned from the new product released to the 
marketplace, the reduction in expected net revenue from the loss in proprietary 
knowledge (i.e., the knowledge pooled in the JD), and the cost of KD. The firms make 
the joint KD decision that maximizes the joint profit, which consists of expected net 
revenue earned from the new products and the cost of joint KD. 
Analysis of the above strategic models enables us to explore situations where a 
firm is better off to pursue KT or KS through CD or JD, rather than pursuing an NPD 
project without cooperation. In addition, we determine the conditions that determine the 
firms KT/KS and KD decisions for each cooperation mechanism.  
Figure 1.1 illustrates the key points and the key decisions of models introduced in 
Chapters 2-4.  
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KT/KS related 
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Figure 1.1        KM strategies for NPD at different decision making levels 
Planning knowledge 
management of the 
product and process 
design teams  
Planning knowledge 
management of the 
product and process 
design teams 
Strategic KM for NPD 
under two cooperation 
mechanisms:  
Competition versus Joint 
Development 
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CHAPTER 2 
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR PRODUCT 
AND PROCESS DESIGN TEAMS 
2.1. Introduction 
Today’s highly competitive and dynamic marketplace has established knowledge 
as a main source of competitive advantage (Liebeskind 1996). According to Davenport 
and Prusak (1998), knowledge embodies experience, values, contextual information and 
expert insights that provide a framework for evaluating and incorporating new 
experiences and information. The scope of knowledge a firm must possess includes the 
customers’ needs, the external business environment, and the skills and experience of 
its workforce. Knowledge management (KM) refers to the collection of processes that 
govern the creation, dissemination, and utilization of knowledge. 
New product development (NPD) projects are among the most knowledge 
intensive endeavors in the modern corporation (Macher 2006). KM of the product and 
process development impacts the time to market, product and process functionality, 
manufacturing costs, and the match between customer requirements and final product 
features (Mihm et al. 2003, Ulrich and Eppinger 2003). Said differently, efficient and 
effective product and process design activities directly affect the commercial success of 
a product (Fine 1998, Fisher et al. 1999, Hatch and Macher 2005). Unfortunately, 
empirical evidence indicates that many firms lack an understanding of how to develop 
KM strategies that drive successful NPD outcomes (Döös et al. 2005, Terwiesch and 
Loch, 1999). 
We introduce a model to understand how to manage the levels of knowledge of 
the product and process design teams throughout the development project. The timing 
and extent of knowledge embedded by the product and process design teams during the 
NPD project determine the features, functionality and manufacturing efficiency of the 
new product and process and thereby drive the net revenue earned over the product's 
life cycle. Moreover, net revenue is driven by the product launch time which reflects the 
tradeoff between seeking early market entry benefits (Hendricks and Singhal 1997) 
versus delaying the product release to develop superior product and process features 
(Bhuiyan et al. 2004, Carrillo and Franza 2006, Cohen et al. 1996, and Joglekar et al. 
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2001). We simultaneously determine the optimal product launch time and the optimal 
KM strategies throughout the NPD project.  
The manager impacts the levels of knowledge of the product and process design 
teams during the NPD project by pursuing two forms of induced learning (Ittner et al. 
2001, Pisano, 1994). First, the manager invests in knowledge acquisition (KA) for each 
team (Adler and Clark 1991). KA may take the form of personnel additions such as hiring 
new engineers or reassigning existing employees (Fine 1998). Also, KA occurs when 
team members participate in continuing education programs offered by universities or 
training programs offered by equipment or software vendors. Lastly, KA occurs when 
team members attend professional conferences (Biskup and Simons 2004, Jacobs 
2006). The content of KA is broad including advancements in materials and technologies 
or improved design methods such as information technology support tools (Hatch and 
Mowery 1998, Lapre and Van Wassenhove 2001) 
Second, the manager may invest in knowledge transfer (KT), which is the 
process by which one team’s knowledge is affected by the experience of another (Argote 
and Ingram 2000). KT activities include the sharing of written documents and codified 
information about routines and practices, participation in meetings involving members of 
both teams, and the exchange of employees between teams (Boone 2008, Cummings 
and Teng 2003, Loch and Terwiesch 1998). KT from the product to the process design 
team conveys information such as consumer preferences and desirable product features 
(Blackburn et al. 1996, Hatch and Macher 2005). During the transfer of knowledge from 
the process to the product design team information on process constraints is 
communicated to ensure the manufacturability of the product (Adner and Levinthal 2001, 
Terwiesch et al. 2002). 
We explicitly recognize that the effectiveness of KA and KT are both interrelated 
and dynamic (Epple et al. 1996). The benefits realized from KA at a particular time 
depend on the team's level of knowledge at that time since a higher skilled workforce is 
better able to comprehend and deploy new knowledge. Similarly, the effectiveness of KT 
at a particular time depends on the levels of knowledge of both teams since a higher 
skilled source has more knowledge to offer and a higher skilled recipient is better able to 
absorb and exploit new knowledge (Darr et al. 1995). Early investments in KA and KT 
are appealing since the benefits are sustained over the remainder of the NPD project 
(Terwiesch and Loch 1999). However, the contribution to net revenue from preliminary 
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team knowledge early in the development project may be limited since market and 
technical uncertainties are not yet resolved. 
A team's level of knowledge also increases (autonomously) through learning-by-
doing (LBD) (Ittner et al. 2001, Wright 1936). A substantial literature exists in KM 
describing drivers of LBD. In the context of NPD, the product and process design teams 
realize benefits from LBD due to testing, experimentation, and problem solving activities 
during the NPD project (Loch et al. 2001, Thomke 1998). 
Beyond maximizing net revenue, the manager seeks to minimize the costs 
incurred for induced learning. Many costs are associated with KA including those from 
hiring and integrating new employees into the existing teams, salaries of consultants or 
specialists who offer training programs, tuition, travel, and conference registration fees. 
Furthermore, costs are incurred due to the disruption to ongoing development activities 
when members of the product or process design teams are engaged in KA. These 
disruption costs are substantial and may include overtime if the rate of development 
must be sustained during KA. Similarly, a substantial portion of the costs incurred for KT 
stem from the disruption to ongoing development activities (Carrillo and Gaimon 2004, 
Ha and Porteus 1995, Szulanski 1996, Zellmer-Bruhn 2003). In addition, we capture a 
key feature of the cost related dynamics of KT. The cost of KT for one team is impacted 
by the timing of KT pursued by the other team reflecting the potential for synergy or 
conflict if KT occurs in both directions simultaneously (Lado et al. 1997, Mihm et al. 
2003).  
We seek to contribute to the NPD literature on several dimensions. We introduce 
a model that provides a holistic view of KM of the product and process design teams 
throughout the NPD project. We consider the benefits realized by each team from LBD 
as well as the manager's pursuit of KA and KT. With few exceptions (Loch and 
Terwiesch 1998, Carrillo and Franza 2006) KA has received little attention in the NPD 
literature. Moreover, our model is general so that KT may occur in either or both 
directions during the development project, i.e., we do not a priori specify the nature of 
the dependency structure for KT between teams. Instead we observe the relationships 
obtained in the optimal solutions and identify conditions that drive those solutions. (Ha 
and Porteus 1995 consider communication in only one direction and Joglekar et al. 2001 
consider tradeoffs related  to communication but do not specify the optimal rates, 
directions and timing of KT.) 
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In contrast to much of the literature that focuses on early market entry, we 
capture the following key tradeoffs. To obtain time-to-market benefits, the manager may 
release an inferior product earlier or may accelerate the rate that knowledge is 
embedded in the development project so that the product is released earlier without 
degradation of quality. Alternatively, the manager may delay the launch to further 
develop product functionality and process capabilities. We show that under certain 
conditions the tradeoffs have less impact. We find that if either team realizes a higher 
rate of LBD or if the manager is better able to resolve market or technical uncertainty, 
then a superior product is launched earlier. Bhuiyan et al. (2004), Carrillo and Franza 
(2006), and Roemer et al. (2000) consider a tradeoff between early market entry and the 
additional design costs incurred with the an earlier launch. However, none of these 
authors provide the comprehensive view of KM presented in this chapter. 
Terwiesch et al. (2002) analyze the flow of preliminary information, and consider 
the impact of the level of knowledge of the source team. We build upon this approach 
and express the effectiveness of KT as a function of the efforts expended and the levels 
of knowledge of both teams (i.e., the source and the recipient). Our results show that the 
marginal values of KA and KT are interrelated and change throughout the development 
project. Also, we recognize that transferring preliminary information may be of limited 
value since considerable market and technical uncertainty exists early in the 
development project. Analytically we prove that a manager who is better able to reduce 
the impact of market or technical uncertainty during the development project optimally 
pursues more KA and KT. 
Based on analysis of the optimal solutions, we obtain important insights on a 
manager’s strategy to invest in KA and KT. Conditions are given whereby the manager 
optimally pursues a front-loading strategy. For example, we show that if the initial levels 
of knowledge of the product and process design teams are relatively high, the manager 
initially pursues KA and KT at high rates that decrease throughout the NPD project. 
Despite the declining rates associated with induced learning, the levels of product and 
process design team knowledge continue to increase as the manager leverages LBD. In 
contrast, conditions are given whereby the manager optimally pursues a delay strategy 
in which the peak efforts to increase the levels of knowledge occur later in the 
development project. For example, we show that if the initial level of process design 
knowledge is small, the manager optimally delays her peak efforts of KT from the 
product team until the process team’s knowledge has increased through KA and LBD. 
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This insight is in direct contrast with the existing literature that depicts the investments in 
knowledge creation as decreasing throughout the NPD project (Carrillo and Franza 
2006, Terwiesch and Xu 2004).  
We show that KA and KT are complementary strategies: higher KA efforts lead to 
higher KT, and vice versa. Moreover, we show how higher rates of KA or KT lead to an 
earlier product launch. With a higher rate of LBD of either the product or process design 
team, we show that the manager optimally pursues more KA for both teams, more KT in 
both directions (Hatch and Macher 2005) and realizes an earlier product launch. 
Therefore, we demonstrate the key role played by LBD for the competitive advantage in 
a NPD project.   
We capture an important dynamic relationship that is ignored in the literature: the 
cost implications of either synergy or conflict associated with the simultaneous transfer 
of knowledge between the product and process design teams. We show that due to 
conflict the manager may pursue a lower rate of KT in one direction and a higher rate of 
KT in the reverse direction. Moreover, we find that synergy versus conflict affects, not 
only the rates of KT, but also the manager's pursuit of KA. In addition, the product launch 
time is affected when there is synergy or conflict. As expected, synergy leads to an 
earlier product launch. However, surprisingly, the impact of conflict is unclear.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a 
review of the related literature. In Section 3, we introduce the objective and constraints 
of the model. We present analytic results in Section 4 and numerical results in Section 5. 
Section 6 contains the conclusions. 
2.2 Literature Review 
 This chapter is grounded in two research streams: KM and NPD. The KM 
literature helps us to characterize the functional relationships that drive changes in the 
levels of knowledge of the product and process design teams over time. Knowledge is 
created both from autonomous and induced learning (Biskup and Simons 2004, Lapre 
and Van Wassenhove 2001). Autonomous learning, e.g., LBD, occurs naturally as the 
workforce gains experience. The actual rate of LBD achieved may be partially under 
managerial control (Dorroh et al. 1994, Pisano 1994). The phenomenon of LBD at the 
individual or organizational level has been discussed extensively in the empirical 
literature (Biskup and Simons 2004, Ittner et al. 2001, Lapre and Van Wassenhove 
2001, Macher and Mowery 2003). LBD in teams has been shown to be analogous to the 
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phenomena observed with individuals and organizations (Darr et al. 1995, Schilling et al. 
2003). We model the LBD in a manner that is consistent with the empirical literature. 
Carrillo and Franza 2006, Loch et al. 2001, and Thomke 1998 consider the benefits of 
LBD obtained through experimentation and problem-solving activities that occur during 
the NPD project.  
 In contrast, induced learning requires explicit managerial intervention and has 
cost implications (Carrillo and Gaimon 2000, 2004, Hatch and Macher 2005). For 
example, GM managers pursue KA provided by equipment makers to familiarize the 
product and process design teams with new features of CAD software, robots, and 
programmable controllers (Jacobs 2006). Managers also acquire knowledge on total 
quality management, project management and leadership skills (Biskup and Simons 
2004, Ittner et al. 2001, Lapre and Van Wassenhove 2001) by hiring new employees, 
from consultants, or from faculty at educational institutions. KA costs are incurred from 
the associated disruption to ongoing activities of the workforce (Carrillo and Gaimon 
2000, Chand et al. 1996). For example, overtime may be necessary if the levels of 
product and process development must be sustained during training. Our 
characterization of the cost incurred for KA reflects the above-mentioned features.  
 KT is another form of induced learning that has received considerable attention in 
the literature. In their study of 49 blockbuster product and process development teams, 
Lynn and Reily (2002) identify KT between teams as one of the five highest priority 
practices leading to a successful NPD project. In a case study, Loch and Terwiesch 
(1996) describe how knowledge of the product and process teams contributes to the 
development of the Jalopy sports car during the project's life cycle. The authors highlight 
the problems that arise when the design teams execute parallel development without 
sufficient transfer of knowledge between teams. Ultimately, they show that the project 
suffers from a substantial amount of engineering change orders issued late in the 
development leading to a delayed product launch. 
Ha and Porteus (1995) examine KT from the product to the process design 
domain to determine the optimal number and timing of progress reviews during the 
development project to minimize the time-to-market. Loch and Terwiesch (1998) 
examine the amount of overlap of NPD activities as well as mechanisms to manage KT 
during the overlap. They determine the optimal meeting frequency and information 
batching policy. Roemer et al. (2000) explore the tradeoff between obtaining a shorter 
development time due to KT from the product to process design team versus the 
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additional rework and design costs caused by the transfer. Terwiesch et al. (2002) 
examine characteristics of the information that is transferred such as whether it is 
preliminary. Note, however, that in contrast to our approach, these authors consider 
either a one-directional information flow (from the product to the process design team), 
or do not specify the direction of KT between the teams. Also, these authors do not 
consider KA or LBD.  
 Most prior research considers KT strategies that reflect a particular dependency 
structure between design activities (Joglekar et al. 2001). The transfer of knowledge 
from the product to the process design team may be overlapped or may occur 
sequentially or simultaneously. The overlapping of activities in an NPD project has been 
studied in the concurrent engineering literature by Krishnan et al. (1997), Ha and 
Porteus (1995) and Loch and Terwiesch (1998). Smith and Eppinger (1997a), (1997b) 
and Eppinger (2001) have explored the sequencing of tasks within the product design. In 
contrast, we adopt a general approach that does not specify either the amount of overlap 
or the dependency between the product and process design activities. Rather, we 
observe the conditions that drive different optimal strategies for KT. 
 Blackburn et al. (1996) acknowledge that KT between the product and process 
development teams may occur in two directions simultaneously. According to Lado et al. 
(1997) and Luo et al. (2006), synergistic benefits are obtained with the simultaneous 
transfer of knowledge between the product and process design teams. In contrast, in the 
context of managing complex knowledge in NPD projects, Mihm et al. (2003) provide 
evidence of a conflict that occurs due to the difficulty of coordinating activities when the 
transfer of knowledge is simultaneous. Our approach is sufficiently general to capture 
the situations where there is either conflict or synergy due to KT that occurs in both 
directions simultaneously. 
 Lastly, our model captures complex and dynamic relationships that have not 
been taken into careful consideration in the literature. The effectiveness of KA is a 
function of a team's level of knowledge and is subject to diminishing returns. Similarly, 
the effectiveness of KT is a function of the efforts expended and the levels of knowledge 
of both teams (i.e., the source and recipient) and is subject to diminishing returns. We 
recognize that disruption costs are incurred from the pursuit of KA and KT (Loch and 
Terwiesch 1998, Mihm et al. 2003).  
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2.3 The Model Formulation 
In this section, a model is presented to aid the manager determine a dynamic KM 
strategy for the product and process design teams throughout the development project 
for a new product. We describe how the levels of knowledge of the product and process 
design teams change over time. We characterize how the knowledge that is embedded 
into the new product over the development project impacts the net revenue earned when 
the product is released to the marketplace. Lastly, we consider the costs associated with 
increasing knowledge. A summary of our notation appears in Table A.1 of Appendix A. 
2.3.1 Knowledge 
 Let D(t) (state variable) denote the level of product design team knowledge that 
is embedded in the NPD project at time t. In other words, D(t) is the level of knowledge 
at time t that is applied to the product design effort. Similarly, let M(t) (state variable) 
denote the level of knowledge that is embedded in the project by the process design 
team at time t. The levels of knowledge of each team reflect their skills such as their 
understanding of diverse scientific and engineering information. The levels of knowledge 
may be inferred from the overall educational background of team members, years of 
work experience, and performance appraisals (Leonard-Barton et al. 1994, Epple et al. 
1996, Carrillo and Gaimon 2004). The initial time levels of product and process design 
team knowledge are known and given by D0=D(0)≥0 and M0=M(0)≥0. As time passes 
during the development project, D(t) and M(t) increase and each team is able to apply 
more knowledge to the product and process design efforts.  
Empirically it has been shown that a worker's level of knowledge autonomously 
increases over time through LBD. The levels of team knowledge may increase as a 
result of normal problem solving activities. Also, knowledge increases autonomously as 
teams gain proficiency with new software design tools through repeated use. According 
to Jacobs (2006), in the automotive industry the learning benefits of an inexperienced 
product or process design team may be substantial whereas the learning potential of a 
highly experienced team is limited. In other words, the ability of a team to generate new 
knowledge from LBD exhibits diminishing returns (Darr et al. 1995, Lapre and Van 
Wassenhove 2001, Schilling et al. 2003). From the above, the rates of increase in the 
levels of product and process design team knowledge due to LBD at time t are 
expressed as α[D(t)]ρ1 and a[M(t)]r1, respectively, where α, a≥0 and 0<ρ1, r1<1. The 
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coefficients α and a
 
scale the effects of LBD relative to other factors that increase team 
knowledge. The parameters ρ1 and r1 indicate the rates of diminishing returns. 
 In contrast to passive LBD, the manager invests in KA, which is a form of 
induced learning. For example, KA may take the form of hiring or sending team 
members to continuing education programs and conferences. Let γ(t) and g(t)≥0 (control 
variables) denote the rates of efforts undertaken by the manager at time t for KA of the 
product and process design teams, respectively. The increase in team knowledge 
generated by KA at time t is related to the level of team knowledge at that time. A team 
with a higher level of knowledge requires less KA efforts to obtain the same increase in 
knowledge as a team with a lesser level of knowledge (Carrillo and Gaimon 2004, 
Jacobs 2006, Hatch and Macher 2005). Moreover, the increase in team knowledge due 
to KA exhibits diminishing returns (Terwiesch and Bohn 2001, Carrillo and Franza 2006, 
Jacobs 2006). From the above, the rates of increase in the levels of product and process 
design team knowledge due to KA at time t are given by d1γ(t)[D(t)]ρ4 and m1g(t)[M(t)]r4, 
respectively, where d1, m1, ρ4, and r4 are exogenous parameters (d1,m1≥0 and 0<ρ4, 
r4<1). The coefficients d1 and m1 scale the effects of KA efforts relative to other factors 
that increase team knowledge. The parameters ρ4 and r4 indicate diminishing returns. 
The manager also increases the levels of team knowledge over time by investing 
in KT efforts. GM managers pursue KT through regularly scheduled meetings of the 
product and process design teams and by monitoring each team's response to entries by 
the other team into the computerized Engineering Change Request System (Jacobs 
2006). Mathematically, capturing the impact KT on the level of team knowledge is 
complex. Empirical results show that the effectiveness of KT is related to the extent of 
efforts undertaken as well as the levels of knowledge of both teams participating in the 
transfer (Argote and Ingram 2000, Cummings and Teng 2003). We capture these as 
follows.  
Let β(t)≥0 (control variable) represent the rate of efforts by the manager for the 
transfer of knowledge from the process to the product design team at time t. At any time, 
a process design team with a higher level of knowledge is capable of transferring more 
knowledge to the product design team. According to Jacobs (2006), a product design 
team is more willing to receive knowledge from a process design team that it perceives 
has a higher level of knowledge. However, the extent that more knowledge of the source 
enhances KT exhibits diminishing returns, as given by ρ2. Lastly, a product design team 
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with a higher level of knowledge is better able to comprehend and deploy knowledge 
transferred from the process design team. Said differently, the knowledge level of the 
recipient of KT impacts the effectiveness of that transfer, again with diminishing returns 
as given by ρ3 (Dinur et al. 1998). The empirical results of Bhuiyan et al. (2004) suggest 
that consideration of diminishing returns is important. 
From the above, we express the rate of increase in the product design team 
knowledge at time t due to KT from the process design team as d2β(t)[M(t)]ρ2[D(t)]ρ3, with 
0≤ρ2, ρ3≤1 and d2≥0. This representation of the gain in product design team knowledge 
satisfies a Cobb-Douglas function where the inputs are the rate of KT efforts and the 
levels of knowledge of the process and product teams.  
Similarly, let b(t)≥0 denote the efforts undertaken by the manager for KT from the 
product to the process design team at time t (control variable). We express the increase 
in the process design team knowledge from KT at time t as m2b(t)[D(t)]r2[M(t)]r3, with 
0≤r2, r3≤1 and m2≥0. For example, as the product development advances, the knowledge 
transferred from the product design team may include information about product features 
that help define the appropriate process parameters (Loch and Terwiesch 1998). 
According to Jacobs (2006), the knowledge received by the process design team from 
the product design team substantially impacts the way the process design team 
conducts testing of the processes, selects materials, and specifies manufacturing 
procedures. 
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) mathematically capture the way the levels of 
knowledge of the product and process design teams change over time, t∈[0,T], where T 
indicates the end of the NPD project. Since the right sides of Equations (2.1) and (2.2) 
are positive, we know that D(t) and M(t) are positive and non-decreasing throughout the 
NPD project. (We denote the derivative of a function with respect to time by the subscript 
't'.) Figure 2.1 illustrates how team knowledge changes over time.  
 
Dt(t) = α[D(t)]ρ1 + d1β(t)[M(t)]ρ2[D(t)]ρ3 + d2γ(t)[D(t)]ρ4                       (2.1) 
Mt(t) = a[M(t)] r1 + m1b(t)[D(t)]r2[M(t)]r3 + m2g(t)[M(t)]r4 (2.2) 
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Figure 2.1 Dynamic knowledge management 
 
 
The net revenue earned from the NPD project when it is released to the 
marketplace (time T) reflects the knowledge applied by both the product and process 
design teams throughout the development project. Through KA and KT, the manager 
impacts the levels of product and process design knowledge that are embedded in the 
development project over time. Let X(t) and Y(t) (state variables) represent the 
cumulative levels of useful knowledge embedded in the product and process design 
through time t of the development project, with the initial values X(0) = X0 and Y(0) = Y0. 
(A similar representation appears in Carrillo and Gaimon 2000.) The word useful is 
important. Due to technical or market uncertainty, team knowledge applied early in the 
development project may be less useful at driving net revenue at time T as knowledge 
embedded later. Our notion of useful knowledge is similar to the preliminary information 
concept, which appears in NPD literature (Terwiesch et al. 2002).  
The cumulative levels of useful knowledge of the product and process design 
teams change over time. Let the exogenous functions δ1(t) and  δ2(t) reflect the extent of 
technical or market uncertainty resolution associated with product and process 
development efforts at time t, respectively, 0≤δ1(t), δ2(t)≤1. Since uncertainty is resolved 
naturally throughout the development project we know δ1t(t), δ2t(t)≥0. Thus, δ1(t)D(t) and 
δ2(t)M(t) denote the impact of uncertainty resolution at time t on the ability of product and 
process design efforts to contribute to net revenue. It is important to recognize that by 
pursuing knowledge creation at time t (increasing D(t) or M(t)), the manager may reduce 
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the impact of uncertainty on the levels of useful knowledge. For example, a team may 
receive training on new materials to reduce the extent of technical uncertainty. This 
gives us Equations (2.3) and (2.4).  
 
Xt(t)= δ1(t)D(t), (2.3) 
Yt(t)= δ2(t)M(t).       (2.4)  
2.3.2 The Objective 
Having completed the presentation of the model constraints, we turn our 
attention to the profit-maximizing objective. Consistent with the NPD literature, we 
assume that the revenue from the new product is earned at its release time when 
development efforts are complete (Kim 1998, Santiago and Vakili 2005). Net revenue, 
denoted by V[X(T),Y(T),T], is the difference between the revenue generated over the 
new product's lifetime in the marketplace less the associated manufacturing costs. 
Mathematically, net revenue is expressed as a function of the product release time, T, 
and the cumulative levels of useful knowledge that the product and process design 
teams embed in the development project through time T (Cohen et al. 1996).  
The product and process design teams may contribute to net revenue at different 
rates (Joglekar et al. 2001). As the cumulative levels of useful product and process 
design team knowledge increase during the development project, the net revenue 
earned increases but at decreasing rates giving us VX, VY≥0 and VXX, VYY≤0 (Carrillo and 
Franza 2006). In some situations, the manager may purposely delay the launch of the 
new product in order to accumulate more useful product or process design knowledge. 
However in doing so, the manager forgoes some portion of net revenue since time 
based competition has the effect of penalizing a later product release, i.e., VT≤0 and 
VTT≤0 (Carrillo and Franza 2006). Note that the second order effect occurs since the 
benefits realized from earlier market entry are ultimately limited. Therefore, our 
characterization of net revenue captures the trade-off between the loss in net revenue 
from delaying the product launch and the additional net revenue earned from the greater 
amount of useful knowledge accumulated during the longer development project (Cohen 
et al. 1996).    
C1[β(t)] and C2[b(t)] are the costs of KT efforts at time t. KT costs reflect the 
efforts of each team to document and codify knowledge and the relocation of employees 
between teams. Also, while engaging in KT, a portion of each team's efforts is diverted 
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from its usual activity of embedding knowledge into the product or process design (Loch 
and Terwiesch 1998, Mihm et al. 2003). Therefore, the costs of KT reflect the disruption 
to ongoing activities and include the costs of the overtime necessary to sustain team 
productivity during the transfer process. (See Carrillo and Gaimon 2000.) The cost of KT 
at time t increases at an increasing rate in relation to the efforts expended (C1β, C2b≥0 
and C1ββ, C2bb≥0) since increasing either β(t) or b(t) at any instant of time results in 
disproportionately large disruption costs. 
It is interesting to consider the cost implications of simultaneously pursuing KT in 
both directions. Loebecke et al. (1999) describe a synergistic effect on costs. They state 
that the cost savings that occur during the simultaneous KT between the product and 
process design teams reflect the reduction in time, capital and rework. In contrast, 
Terwiesch et al. (2002) state that knowledge flowing in both directions at the same time 
may reduce the quality of information and may force one of the teams to use preliminary 
information. Such problems are more likely to occur if the knowledge transferred is sticky 
(Von Hippel 1994), ambiguous (Sorenson et al. 2005), particularly rich such as involving 
complex technologies (Hansen 1999), or requires intricate communication tools such as 
interactive technology (Fine 1998). Communication barriers such as cultural differences 
may also be the source of conflict during simultaneous KT (Loebecke et al. 1999, Sosa 
et al. 2004).   
Let C3[β(t),b(t)] denote the impact on the cost of KT when the product and 
process design teams exchange knowledge simultaneously. Clearly, this term is non-
zero only if both β(t) and b(t) are positive. If the impact of simultaneous KT reflects 
conflict (synergy) then C3[β(t),b(t)] is positive (negative). Naturally, the cost (benefit) of 
simultaneous KT increases with respect to the amount of efforts expended. This gives us 
C3β, C3b>0 when conflict occurs and C3β, C3b<0 in the case of synergy. Furthermore,  as 
both  β(t) and b(t) increase, we know the cost (benefit) increases at an increasing 
(decreasing) rate so that C3βb>0. Lastly, we assume that C3ββ=C3bb=0 so that all second 
order effects with respect to one directional KT are captured in C1[β(t)] and C2[b(t)].  
The costs incurred for KA efforts of the product and process design teams at time 
t are denoted by C4[γ(t)] and C5[g(t)], respectively (Carrillo and Gaimon 2000). These 
costs include the salaries of trainers, consultants, attendance at conferences and 
workshops, and executive program tuition. Also, hiring costs (including those to integrate 
new employees into the existing teams) may be incurred. Finally, disruption costs such 
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as overtime are incurred to sustain team productivity levels during KA activities (Jacobs 
2006). The cost of KA at time t increases at an increasing rate in relation to the efforts 
expended reflecting the increasing challenge of managing larger amounts of disruption 
at an instant of time (C4γ, C5g≥0 and C4γγ, C5gg≥0) (Kim 1998, Biskup and Simons 2004). 
The objective to be maximized is given in Equation (2.5) and captures the above 
discussion of net revenue earned at the terminal time (product release) and the costs 
incurred over the NPD project. 
V[X(T),Y(T),T] -  C1βt	  + C2[b(t)] + C3[β(t),b(t)] + C4[γ(t)] + C5[g(t)]}dt          
(2.5) 
 
In the remainder of the chapter, the notation depicting time is suppressed 
whenever possible. Proofs of the analytic results (Section 4) appear in Appendix A. "*" 
indicates optimal solutions.  
  
2.4 The Optimal Solution 
We solve the above model using optimal control methods (Sethi and Thompson 
(2000)). The Hamiltonian to be maximized is given in Equation (A.1) of the Appendix A. 
The variables λ1(t) and λ2(t) are introduced and represent the marginal values of the 
levels of knowledge of the product and process design teams at time t, respectively. 
Also, λ3(t) and λ4(t) represent the marginal values of the cumulative levels of useful 
product and process design team knowledge at time t, respectively. The necessary 
conditions for optimality of the marginal value functions are given in Equations (A.2)-
(A.5).  
 Theorem 1, below, follows from analysis of the optimality conditions. From 
Theorem 1, we see that the marginal values of the levels of knowledge of the product 
and process design teams are non-negative and non-increasing functions of time. Also, 
we see that the marginal values of the cumulative levels of useful product and process 
design team knowledge are constant throughout the NPD project. Further interpretation 
of Theorem 1 is postponed until we present the optimal KA and KT policies. 
THEOREM 1. The marginal value functions satisfy the following conditions for t∈[0,T].  
λ1*(t), λ2*(t)≥0 and λ1t*(t), λ2t*(t)≤0; λ3*(t)=VX(T) and  λ4*(t)=VY(T), λ3t*(t), λ4t*(t)=0.  
Along with the non-negativity constraints, Equations (2.6)-(2.9) are the optimality 
conditions for the levels of KA and KT for both the product and process design teams. 
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To interpret these optimal policies, consider Equation (2.6). The first term represents the 
marginal cost of KT efforts from the product to the process design team at time t. The 
second term is the marginal reduction or increase in the transfer cost if both teams 
engage in KT simultaneously. The third term is the product of the value of another unit of 
product design team knowledge from time t through the remainder of the development 
project and the increase in knowledge realized from an additional unit of KT effort at t. 
Therefore, at time t, the optimal KT policy from the product to the process design team 
equates the additional marginal cost of transfer at t with the benefits realized from time t 
to T. A similar interpretation holds for (2.7). From Equation (2.8), we see that the optimal 
KA policy for the product design team equates the marginal cost at time t with the 
marginal value of the associated increase in product design knowledge from time t 
through the remainder of the development project. The interpretation of Equation (2.9) is 
analogous.   
 
∂H/∂β = – C1β – C3β + d1λ1Mρ2Dρ3 = 0 (2.6) 
∂H/∂b = – C2b  – C3b + m1λ2Dr2M r3 = 0 (2.7) 
∂H/∂γ = – C4γ + d2λ1Dρ4 = 0  (2.8) 
∂H/∂g = – C5g + m2λ2Mr4 =0                    (2.9) 
From Equations (A.2)-(A.5) and (2.6)-(2.9), we know the optimal strategies for KA 
and KT are non-negative over time until reaching zero when the product is released to 
the marketplace. In Theorem 2, we explore how the optimal rates of KA and KT change 
over time. With these insights, we find that the optimal solutions must satisfy one of the 
two cases given in Corollary 1. Figure 2.2 illustrates the two possible solutions described 
in Corollary 1. A complete discussion of Corollary 1 follows in Section 4.1.  
THEOREM 2. The change in the rate that the manager optimally pursues KT from the 
process to the product design team at time t, (βt*), satisfies Equation (2.10). Moreover, 
the change in the optimal rate of KA for the product design team at time t, (γt*), satisfies 
Equation (2.12). Analogous insights hold for bt* and gt*(see Equations (2.11) and (2.13)).   
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C1ββ(βt*) + C3βb(bt*) = d1λ1tMρ2Dρ3 + d1λ1ρ2Mρ2-1MtDρ3 + d1ρ3λ1Mρ2Dρ3-1Dt  
(2.10) 
C2bb(bt*) + C3βb(βt*) = m1λ2tDr2Mr3 + m1λ2r2Dr2-1DtMr3 + m1r3λ2Dr2Mr3-1Mt  
(2.11) 
C4γγ(γt*) = d2λ1tDρ4 + d2λ1ρ4Dρ4-1Dt  (2.12) 
C5gg(gt*) = m2λ2tMr4 + m2λ2r4Mr4-1Mt (2.13) 
COROLLARY 1. The rates the manager optimally pursues KA or KT during the NPD 
project satisfy one of the following (non-trivial) cases. (i) The optimal solution is positive 
and increasing, reaches a maximum, and then decreases until reaching zero at the 
product launch time (delay strategy). (ii) The optimal solution is positive and decreasing 
throughout the product development project until reaching zero at the product launch 
time (front-loading strategy).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2    Case (i) Delay strategy and Case (ii) Front-loading strategy 
 
2.4.1 Increasing Product Design Team Knowledge Through KA and KT   
It is important to understand the conditions that lead to the solutions satisfying 
Cases (i) and (ii) of Corollary 1. In this section, we consider the manager's strategies to 
increase knowledge of the product design team (γ, β) noting that insights for the process 
design team (g, b) are analogous. Also, we focus on interpreting the optimal strategies 
for the KT from the process to the product design team since the interpretation for KA is 
analogous. Initially, we consider the situation where neither conflict nor synergy occurs 
tmax 
β, b,  
γ or g 
 
0 
 
T 
 
     time  
 
     time  
 
β, b,  
γ or g 
 
0 
 
T 
 
 23
due to the simultaneous pursuit KT in both directions (C3[β,b]=0). Later, we relax this 
assumption.  
Case (i) of Corollary 1, illustrated in Figure 2.2, is referred to as the delay 
strategy. The delay strategy occurs when the effectiveness of KT from the process to the 
product design team is small early in the development project. This situation may arise if 
the initial levels of product and process design team knowledge are small, if there is 
considerable technical or market uncertainty early in the NPD project, or if the returns to 
KT are limited. Under any of these conditions, the manager pursues KT at a relatively 
small but increasing rate early in the development project. The rate increases since the 
effectiveness of KT is growing as the levels of product and process design team 
knowledge increase through LBD and knowledge creation and as technical and market 
uncertainty are resolved.  
Eventually, the manager optimally reduces her pursuit of KT for several reasons. 
First, product design knowledge has already reached a sufficient level (diminishing 
returns). Second, over time less of the NPD project remains to accrue the benefits from 
an increase in the level of product team knowledge. Third, over time the manager is 
better able to leverage the team's level of knowledge to derive further additions through 
LBD which is free. Basically in Case (i), the manager optimally delays her peak 
investment in KT until a later time when such investments are more effective. In their 
case on the Jalopy sports car, Loch and Terwiesch (1996) describe the problems that 
occur when the NPD manager does not follow a delay strategy despite low initial levels 
of knowledge of the product and process design teams.   
We refer to Case (ii) of Corollary 1 as the front-loading strategy, illustrated in 
Case (ii) of Figure 2.2. Front-loading occurs when the effectiveness of KT is high at the 
outset of the NPD project. This situation may arise if the levels of knowledge of both 
teams are relatively large at the initial time, there is limited technical or market 
uncertainty early in the development project, or the returns to KT are considerable. In the 
front-loading strategy, the manager pursues KT at a relatively high and decreasing rate 
throughout the NPD project. The manager has no incentive to delay investment in KT. 
The rate of KT decreases over time for several reasons. First, due to diminishing returns 
it is increasingly difficult to obtain further additions to the level of product design team 
knowledge through KT. Second, over time less of the NPD project remains to accrue the 
benefits from an increase in the level of team knowledge. Third, since the level of team 
knowledge is increasing, the manager's ability to leverage LBD increases.   
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The notion of a front-loading strategy has appeared in the literature (Terwiesch 
and Xu 2004, Thomke and Fujimoto 2000). Blackburn et al. (1996) describe the front-
loading of KT in the context of concurrent engineering in software development. 
However, these authors do not obtain a timing strategy for KT or the rate and direction 
that transfer should occur during the NPD project. Carrillo and Franza (2006) find that 
the manager optimally invests in KA at the highest rate at the beginning of the NPD 
project. These authors do not, however, consider knowledge creation through KT or 
LBD. Moreover, in contrast to the existing literature which advocates only the front-
loading strategy, we show that a delay strategy may optimally occur for KA of either 
team and KT between teams.  
With two possible strategies for each of two decision variables, the manager 
chooses from eight combinations of solutions for the rates of KA and KT. For example, 
suppose the initial levels of both the product and process design teams' knowledge are 
small. The manager pursues the delay strategy for both her investment in KA of the 
product design team and KT from the process to the product design team. Moreover, 
suppose the impact of diminishing returns is larger for KA as compared to KT. Under 
these conditions, the manager optimally starts to decrease her pursuit of KA earlier in 
the NPD project (the peak efforts occur for smaller t) while still investing at an increasing 
rate in KT from the process design team. These insights are stated mathematically in 
Corollary 2. 
COROLLARY 2. Suppose D0 and M0 are small and ρ3≥ρ4,. Then γt*(t)≥0 for t∈[0,tγ] and 
γt*(t)<0 for t∈(tγ,T] whereas βt*(t)≥0 for t∈[0,tβ] and βt*(t)<0  for t∈(tβ,T]. Lastly, we have 
tβ≥ tγ.. 
So far, we have considered the situations where the initial levels of product and 
process team knowledge are both either large or small. Next, suppose at the initial time, 
the level of product design team knowledge is large but the level of process design team 
knowledge is small. With the substantial level of product team knowledge, the manager 
front-loads her pursuit of KA. In contrast, the manager optimally delays the peak pursuit 
of KT from the process design team until a sufficient level of that team's knowledge is 
reached. As a result, the initial pursuit of KT to the product design team is modest and 
increasing as the level of process design team knowledge grows. Eventually, the pursuit 
of KT declines as described above. These insights are stated in Corollary 3. 
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COROLLARY 3. Suppose D0 is large and M0 is small. Then γ*(0) is relatively large and 
γt*(t)<0 for t∈[0,T] whereas βt*(t)≥0 for t∈[0,tβ] and βt*(t)<0  for t∈(tβ,T]. 
 
2.4.2 The Rates of KT between the Product and Process Design Teams   
In Section 4.1, we analyzed KM strategies of either the product design team (β 
and γ) or the process design team (b and g). In contrast next, we view the manager's 
strategies from a different perspective: we compare the optimal rates of KT between the 
product and process design teams, β and b.  
Suppose the initial level of the product design team knowledge is relatively large, 
whereas the initial level of the process team knowledge is relatively small. Also, suppose 
the level of knowledge of the source team is more effective at driving benefits from KT 
compared to the recipient team. Under these conditions, the manager optimally delays 
the peak transfer of knowledge from the process to the product design team. The delay 
strategy occurs since the effectiveness of KT is driven by the source team and the initial 
level of process team knowledge is small. In contrast, the manager pursues a front-
loading strategy for the transfer of knowledge from the product to the process team. The 
front-loading strategy is undertaken, in part, to accelerate the increase in the relatively 
low level of process design knowledge. As the level of knowledge about the 
manufacturability (process) of the product grows, the rate of KT from the process to the 
product team increases. At some point, due to diminishing returns, less time remaining 
in the product development project, and the increasing opportunity for LBD, the rate of 
KT from the process to the product design also team declines. These insights are 
summarized below in Corollary 4.  
COROLLARY 4. Suppose D0 is large and M0 is small; ρ2 and r2 are relatively large; and 
ρ3 and r3 are relatively small. Then b*(0) is relatively large and bt*(t)<0 for t∈[0,T] 
whereas βt*(t)≥0 for t∈[0,tβ] and βt*(t)<0  for t∈(tβ,T]. 
The situation depicted in Corollary 4 where the KT is front-loaded in one direction 
while delayed in the reverse direction is similar to the sequential development of the 
product and process design (i.e., Loch et al. 2001). Hence, while the literature prescribes 
the dependency structure of the design activities (Ha and Porteus 1995), in our 
approach, the dependency structure is an outcome of the optimal solution. 
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The above analytic results depicted in Corollaries 2, 3 and 4 did not consider the 
additional cost or benefit due to conflict or synergy that occurs when the transfer of 
knowledge between design teams occurs simultaneously. Earlier, we described how the 
benefit from synergy versus the cost from conflict are captured by the function C3(β,b). 
Whether or not there is conflict or synergy, the optimal rates of KT satisfy either a front-
loading or a delay strategy as given in Corollary 1. However, the conditions driving the 
solutions given in Corollaries 2, 3 and 4 are slightly different. In Corollary 5, analytic 
results are presented describing the impact of synergy versus conflict on the manager's 
optimal pursuit of KT.   
COROLLARY 5. Suppose C3[β,b]≠0. First, if C3[β,b]<0, then large β* (b*) is associated 
with larger b* (β*). Alternatively, if C3[β,b]>0, then large β* (b*) is associated with smaller 
b* (β*). Lastly, if C3[β,b]>0, it is also possible that both β* and  b* are smaller. 
In the first part of Corollary 5, the simultaneous transfer of knowledge embodies 
synergy (C3[β,b]<0) which drives larger rates KT in both directions as compared to the 
case where C3[β,b]=0. As a result, the levels of knowledge of both the product and 
process design teams increase faster. While C1(β) and C2(b) are larger for larger β and 
b, the total cost of KT may be smaller since C3(β,b)<0. In contrast, suppose the 
simultaneous transfer of knowledge is the source of conflict (C3[β,b]>0). Here, compared 
to the case where C3[β,b]=0, conflict may lead to smaller rates of KT in both directions. 
As a result, the levels of product and process design team knowledge increase more 
slowly during the NPD project. While C1(β) and C2(b) are smaller for smaller β and b, the 
total cost of KT may be larger since C3(β,b)>0. Alternatively, conflict may lead to the 
situation where KT is pursued at a higher rate in one direction but at a lesser rate in the 
other. As a result, the levels of knowledge of the product and process design teams may 
increase faster or slower and the full cost of KT may be larger or smaller.  
2.4.3 Analytic Sensitivity Results 
We now present results of analytic sensitivity analysis to provide additional 
insights on the manager's KM strategies. Corollary 6 shows how the effectiveness of KT 
in either direction impacts the optimal rates of transfer in both directions as well as the 
KA strategies for both teams. Corollary 6 depicts how the effectiveness of KA for either 
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team impacts the optimal rates of KA for both teams and the rates of KT in both 
directions. A discussion of some of the key managerial implications follows.  
COROLLARY 6. If any of the following measures of effectiveness are larger for either 
team, then the manager optimally pursues (i) more KT efforts in both directions (β and b) 
and (ii) more KA for both teams (γ and g).  
(i) Effectiveness of LBD (α, ρ1, a or r1);     
(ii) Effectiveness of KT (d1, ρ2 , ρ3 , m1, r2, or r3); 
(iii) Effectiveness of KA (d2, ρ4, m2 or r4). 
One might have expected that a high rate of LBD reduces the need for induced 
learning. However, from (i) we see the opposite result: there is a complementary 
relationship between the rate of LBD and the manager’s pursuit of knowledge creation. 
We obtain this result because any investment in KA or KT has greater impact when 
there is a high rate of LBD. Kim (1998) also examines LBD and KA, but does not 
consider the possibility of KT. In addition, we extend the literature since we describe how 
the effectiveness of LBD for either team increases the manager's pursuit of any form of 
knowledge creation for both teams. Clearly, these results show that, to the extent 
possible, the NPD manager should undertake efforts to increase the rates of LBD of her 
product and process design teams.  
From (ii), we see a key result: there is a complementary relationship between the 
manager’s pursuits of KT in both directions. In particular, if process team knowledge 
drives substantial benefits for the transfer of knowledge to the product design team, then 
the manager pursues higher rates of  KT in both directions. To see this result, note that 
with a greater rate of return, more KT is advocated from the process (source) to the 
product (recipient) design team. The subsequently higher level of product (source) 
knowledge makes the transfer of knowledge to the process design team (recipient) more 
beneficial. Therefore, if the transfer of knowledge from one team to the other is highly 
effective, then there is a direct benefit to the recipient team and an indirect benefit to the 
source team.   
A complementary relationship also exists between the optimal rates of KA and 
KT. Suppose KA is more effective for the product design team. Naturally, the manager 
optimally pursues more KA for that team. With the higher level of product team 
knowledge (recipient), the value of KT from the process design team is enhanced and 
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occurs at a higher rate. The higher level of product team knowledge (source) enhances 
the value of KT to the process team (recipient). Finally, the higher level of process team 
knowledge increases the returns from KA for that team. Hence, if KA for either team is 
highly effective, from (iii), the manager optimally pursues more KA for both teams and 
more KT in both directions. 
In Corollary 7, we describe how drivers of revenue impact the manager’s pursuit 
of KA for both teams and the pursuit of KT in both directions. The interpretation of 
Corollary 7 follows. 
COROLLARY 7. Suppose the marginal net revenue earned from the cumulative level of 
useful knowledge of either team is large (VX(T) or VY(T)).  Then the manager optimally 
pursues (i) more KT efforts in both directions (β and b) and (ii) more KA for both teams (γ 
and g).  
From Corollary 7, if the manager anticipates a higher market response for 
product-related features then she pursues more knowledge creation to increase the level 
of knowledge that the product design team embeds in the development project over 
time. (Also see Cohen et al. 1996.) In other words, the rate of KA for the product design 
team and the rate of KT from the process design team are both higher. Following our 
earlier logic, we conclude that beyond the effects on the product design team, the rate of 
KA for the process design team and the rate of KT to the process design team are 
larger, as well. This result is consistent with Joglekar et al. (2001) who state that to 
improve the overall performance a manager should consider investing in both the 
product and process teams rather than over-investing in one team.   
COROLLARY 8. Suppose a manager is better (less) able to resolve market or technical 
uncertainty associated with the product or process development (δ1 or δ2). Then the 
manager optimally pursues (i) more (less) KT efforts in both directions (β and b) and (ii) 
more (less) KA for both teams (γ and g). 
 Suppose early in the development project there is considerable uncertainty 
associated with the product or process development. From Corollary 8, the manager's 
response is to reduce her initial pursuit of KA for both teams and KT between teams. 
However, while smaller in magnitude, KA and KT are still desirable early in the NPD 
project for the following reasons. First, higher levels of knowledge reduce the impact of 
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uncertainty on the accumulation of useful product and process design team knowledge. 
In other words, the manager can endogenously reduce the impact of uncertainty through 
knowledge creation. Second, the benefits from increasing the levels of knowledge of the 
product and process design teams early in the development project are sustained until 
the product release time. Third, knowledge creation increases the benefits derived from 
LBD. Fourth, higher levels of knowledge enhance the future gains from KA and KT. 
Finally, the manager wants to avoid the disproportionately higher disruption costs 
incurred if larger rates of KA and KT are pursued at any particular time later in the 
development project. 
The above insight has some relation to the Kittyhawk project undertaken by 
Hewlett-Packard (Rogers and Christensen 1998). Despite considerable technical and 
market uncertainty at the outset of the NPD project, the general manager set very 
aggressive goals: the creation of a 1.3" disk drive within 12 months, a break-even in 36 
months, and a target revenue of $100 million two years after the product launch. While 
the design teams were able to resolve many technical challenges, identifying the 
appropriate target market proved daunting. Driven by the project deadline and despite 
the considerable market uncertainty that remained, the HP teams committed all of their 
efforts to creating the 1.3" disk drive for the personal digital assistant (PDA). 
Unfortunately, the anticipated high-volume demand for PDA's did not materialize. In 
hindsight, it seems that the NPD manager seriously underestimated the market 
uncertainty (δ1 and δ2 were overestimated). As a result, the NPD teams pursued intense 
design efforts too early in the development project. In the next section, we extend these 
results and explore the effect of market or technical uncertainty on the optimal product 
launch time.  
2.4.4 The Optimal Product Launch Time 
 In this section, we determine the optimal length of time during which the product 
and process design teams should continue to embed knowledge into the development 
project, i.e. the product launch time. We show that the optimal product launch time and 
the manager’s knowledge creation strategies are interrelated so that a simultaneous 
solution is needed. 
The optimal product launch time, T*, satisfies the transversality condition in 
Theorem 3. The first and second order conditions on V[X(T),Y(T),T] (see Section 3.2) 
drive a tradeoff. To realize an earlier market entry, the manager may release an inferior 
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product or may accelerate the rate that knowledge is embedded into the product and 
process design. Alternatively, despite the loss in time-to-market benefits, the manager 
may delay the product release to fine tune product features or process capabilities. 
(Similar tradeoffs are described in Bhuiyan et al. 2004, Carrillo and Franza 2006, Cohen 
et al. 1996, and Joglekar et al. 2001.) Reflecting the above, we have T* as illustrated in 
Figure A.2 in Appendix A. 
THEOREM 3. The optimal product launch time (T*) satisfies:  
δ1(T)D(T)VX(T)  +  δ2(T)M(T)VY(T) =  VT  .             (2.14) 
It is helpful to delve more deeply into Equation (2.14) to fully understand the 
product release time decision. We refer to the left and right hand sides of Equation 
(2.14) as LHS and RHS, respectively. (Simply by the way in which the variables are 
defined, we can reasonably assume that the direct effects of VX(T) or VY(T) on LHS 
dominate the indirect effects observed through D(T) or M(T).) Suppose the extent of 
time-based-competition in the marketplace is more pronounced. Here, the curve 
representing the adverse effect on net revenue due to delaying the product release 
(RHS) shifts up. As a result, profit is maximized with an earlier product release (T1*). 
Alternatively, suppose the knowledge embedded by the product design team has a more 
dramatic effect on increasing net revenue. From Figure A.2, the curve representing the 
marginal contribution to net revenue from embedding more useful knowledge (LHS) into 
the NPD project shifts up. As a result, delaying the product launch (T2*) is desirable to 
afford the manager additional time to improve product features and process functionality 
and thereby enhance profit.  
The relationship between the optimal product launch time and the manager's 
pursuit of knowledge creation for the product and process design teams is the focus of 
Corollary 9. While the corollary is stated in terms of efforts to increase the product team's 
knowledge, analogous results hold for the process team. Intuitively, if more knowledge 
creation occurs during the development project, then the marginal contributions to net 
revenue from any additional cumulative useful knowledge (VX(T)  and VY(T)) are smaller 
(diminishing returns) so that the curve in Figure A.2 shifts down and T* is smaller.  
COROLLARY 9. The optimal product release time (T*) occurs earlier (is delayed) if the 
rate of KT from the process to the product design team (β) or the rate of KA for the 
product design team (γ) is larger (smaller) during the development project.  
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Taken together, Corollaries 6, 7, 8 and 9 provide powerful insights. For example, 
if the rate of LBD is larger for either team, then from Corollary 6 the manager optimally 
undertakes more KA for both teams and more KT in both directions. As a result, the 
rates that the product and process design teams embed useful knowledge during the 
NPD project are higher. From Corollary 9, we see that this leads to an earlier product 
launch time. Therefore, with a higher rate of LBD for either team, the manager is able to 
achieve an earlier product launch. This analytic result confirms insights from the case 
study by Thomke and Fujimoto (2000) on NPD projects at Toyota. The authors describe 
how increasing the rate that NPD teams identify and solve design problems leads to a 
reduction in the development project timeline.  
Insights on the effect of the rate of uncertainty resolution on the optimal launch 
time are particularly interesting. Suppose technical or market uncertainty are resolved 
rapidly during the development project. From Corollary 8 we know that the manager 
invests in higher rates of knowledge creation for both teams. From Corollary 9 this gives 
us an earlier product launch. Essentially, a faster rate of uncertainty resolution drives 
faster rates of increase in the levels of cumulative useful knowledge of both the product 
and process design teams during a shorter development time period. A related result is 
obtained by Loch and Terwiesch (1998) and Terwiesch and Loch (1999) who find that a 
high rate of uncertainty resolution impacts the duration of overlapping of product and 
process design efforts during an NPD project. We extend this result by obtaining, not 
only the duration, but also the directions and rates at which KT optimally occur when 
uncertainty is resolved faster in the NPD project.  
Lastly, we consider the effect of synergy versus conflict when the transfer of 
knowledge occurs in both directions simultaneously. Suppose there is a cost reduction 
due to synergy. From Corollary 5, we know that synergy drives larger rates of KT in both 
directions as compared to the case where C3[β,b]=0. From Corollary 9, the faster rates 
at which the product and process design teams embed knowledge into the NPD project 
lead to an earlier product launch. Therefore, synergy allows the manager to achieve an 
earlier product launch.  
In contrast, there are two possible outcomes if the simultaneous KT is a source 
of conflict (higher cost). Again, from Corollary 5, relative to the case where C3[β,b]=0, 
conflict may lead to smaller rates of KT in both directions. Here, the cumulative levels of 
useful knowledge increase more slowly throughout the development project and the 
product launch time is optimally delayed. Therefore, conflict in the simultaneous transfer 
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of knowledge between the product and process design teams may drive a delayed 
product launch. Alternatively, conflict may cause a higher rate of KT in one direction and 
a lower rate in the other. In this situation, we do not know whether the cumulative useful 
levels of product or process team knowledge are larger or if the optimal product launch 
time occurs earlier or later.    
 
2.5 Numerical Analysis 
In this section, we introduce results based on numerical sensitivity analysis. We 
present two base examples (Examples 1 and 2), each reflecting a substantially different 
decision-making environment, as well as three variations of each base example. The 
purpose of the numerical examples is to illustrate some key analytical results and to 
extend those results by providing insights on profit. We compare the situation where the 
manager is given a mandate regarding the product launch time versus the situation 
where the manager has the authority to optimally determine the product launch. Also, 
our numerical results extend our analytic results on the effect of conflict or synergy when 
KT occurs in both directions simultaneously.  
The particular functions and input parameters we employ are inspired by the KM 
literature, interviews with managers from the automotive industry, and articles from 
academic and practitioner publications. Appendix A contains a detailed account of all 
functional forms and input parameter values. Most input parameters are the same for 
Examples 1 and 2. However, due to different input values for D0, M0, VX(T), VY(T), VT, and 
T, we obtain dramatically different solutions. Tables A.3 and A.5 summarize the results 
of Examples 1 and 2. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate key managerial insights.  
2.5.1 Example 1 and Its Variations 
The situation reflected in Example 1 is based on the following parameter settings. 
The product launch time is given (T=10). The product and process design teams have a 
solid foundation of knowledge at the outset of the NPD project due to recent training and 
past experience from related projects (D0= M0=8). The product design team knowledge 
is more effective at driving KT benefits to the process team compared to the ability of the 
process design team knowledge to drive KT benefits to the product team (r2=5ρ2). The 
level of product design team knowledge enhances the effectiveness of KA significantly 
more than the level of process team knowledge enhances the effectiveness of KA 
(ρ4=2r4). The remaining input parameter settings are identically defined for both teams. 
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Since the initial levels of knowledge of the product and process design teams are 
relatively large, the optimal rates of KA and KT decrease throughout the NPD project for 
both teams (front-loading strategy). As illustrated in Figures 2.3a and 2.3b, earlier in the 
NPD project, the level of knowledge of the product design team optimally increases 
faster than that of the process design team. Hence, as shown in Figure 2.3c, the level of 
knowledge embedded by the product design team during the development project is 
much larger than the knowledge contributed by the process design team. The manager 
focuses more efforts on increasing product design team knowledge due to its significant 
impact on the effectiveness of both KA and KT. It is interesting to note that rather than 
directly acquiring more process design knowledge, the manager optimally increases that 
knowledge by investing in more product design knowledge which is then transferred to 
the process design team. The total profit earned is $12,023. 
Example 1a is identically defined as Example 1 except that we optimally 
determine the product launch time, T1a*=8.7. As illustrated in Figures 2.3a and 2.3b, 
compared to Example 1, the manager realizes an earlier product launch while investing 
in higher rates of knowledge creation for both teams throughout the development 
project. As a result, despite the earlier launch time, the accumulated useful levels of 
product and process design team knowledge are higher at time 8.7 in Example 1a than 
at time 10.0 in Example 1. Therefore, by permitting the manager to derive T, we find that 
she optimally introduces a superior product to the marketplace at an earlier time. This 
leads the manager in Example 1a to realize a 12.0% higher ($13,460) profit relative to 
Example 1. 
Example 1b is identically defined as Example 1a except that the simultaneous 
transfer of knowledge between the product and process design teams incurs an 
additional cost due to conflict (c3=0.5). As a result, the manager in Example 1b pursues 
smaller rates of KT in both directions. The smaller rates of transfer drive smaller rates of 
KA. With the more limited pursuit of knowledge creation, the levels of product and 
process design team knowledge embedded in the NPD project are smaller. To ensure 
that sufficient levels of design knowledge are embedded during the development project, 
the manager in Example 1b delays the product launch time by 5.4% (T1b*=9.2) 
compared to Example 1a. Due to the later market entry and the lesser amounts of 
cumulative useful knowledge at the launch time, profit is 10.8% lower ($12,001) than in 
Example 1a.  
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In contrast in Example 1c (c3= 0.5) when there are benefits due to synergy for the 
simultaneous transfer of knowledge between teams, the optimal launch time is 10.6% 
earlier (T1c*=7.8) than in Example 1a. The manager optimally pursues greater rates of 
KT in both directions which leads to greater rates of KA for both teams. As a result, 
higher rates of product and process design team knowledge are embedded during the 
development project. Ultimately, profit is 9.4% higher ($14,718) as compared to Example 
1a. These results demonstrate the importance of developing KT strategies that embody 
synergy as opposed to conflict.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3a Optimal KT for T=10.0 (Example 1) and T*=8.7 (Example 1a) 
 
Figure 2.3b Optimal KA for T=10.0 (Example 1) and T*=8.7 (Example 1a) 
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Figure 2.3c Optimal levels of product and process design team knowledge for T=10.0 
(Example 1) and T*=8.7 (Example 1a) 
 
2.5.2 Example 2 and Its Variations 
The second base example is identically defined as Example 1 except for the 
following. We consider an NPD project in which the initial knowledge levels of both 
teams are small (D0=M0=0.01) and the product release time is given (T=3). The marginal 
revenue earned from embedding process design knowledge during the development 
project is twice as large as the corresponding value for product design knowledge 
(VY(T)=2VX(T)). Lastly, the manager incurs additional conflict costs when the transfer of 
knowledge between teams occurs simultaneously (c3=0.5).  
Despite the initially low levels of product and process design team knowledge, 
the manager undertakes front-loading strategies for KA for both teams. KA is high early 
in the NPD project because of the need to increase the levels of knowledge and since 
the rates of return on KA are considerably higher than those for KT. In contrast, with the 
initially small levels of product and process team knowledge and the additional cost due 
to conflict, KT provides limited benefits relative to the costs early in the NPD project. 
Therefore, the manager undertakes the delay strategies in both directions of KT. The 
peak pursuit of KT is delayed until later in the NPD project when the levels of product 
and process team knowledge are larger due to KA and LBD so that the effectiveness of 
KT is larger. 
Throughout the NPD project of Example 2, the manager pursues considerably 
more KT from the product to the process design team than transfer in the reverse 
direction (Figure 2.4a). This result occurs due to the higher contribution to net revenue 
from process design knowledge and the additional costs incurred when KT is pursued in 
D, M 
 
time 
D: T=10.0 
D: T*=8.7 
M: T=10.0 
M: T*=8.7 
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both directions simultaneously. Also, the substantial contribution to net revenue from 
process design knowledge leads to a higher rate of KA by the process design team 
compared to the product team. The profit earned in Example 2 is $5,909. 
The inputs to Examples 2 and 2a are identical except that in Example 2a we 
optimally determine the product launch time, T2a*=2.8. We find that the optimal rates of 
knowledge creation for both the product and process design teams are smaller 
throughout the NPD project in Example 2a compared to Example 2. As a result, the 
cumulative useful levels of knowledge embedded into the development project by both 
the product and process design teams are smaller at the earlier launch time (Figures 
2.4a-2.4c). Nevertheless, the strategy depicted in Example 2a leads to profit of $6,431, 
which represents an 8.8% increase compared to Example 2. Here, the impact of time-
based competition on net revenue is substantial and drives the manager to launch an 
inferior product at an earlier time.   
The input for Example 2b is identical to Example 2a except that the manager 
does not incur additional costs due to conflict (c3=0) from the simultaneous transfer of 
knowledge. The manager's knowledge creation strategy is illustrated in Figures 2.4d and 
2.4e. Due to the conflict cost in Example 2a, the optimal KT from the process to the 
product design team is lower whereas the KT in the reverse direction is higher compared 
to Example 2b. This is consistent with Corollary 5. Furthermore, the rates of KA for both 
teams are higher in Example 2a relative to Example 2b. Therefore, in Example 2a, KA is 
used to compensate for the lower rate of KT that occurs from the process to the product 
design team. Overall, the levels of knowledge of both teams increase slower in Example 
2a relative to 2b. Ultimately, due to the cost conflict in Example 2a, the manager 
optimally launches an inferior product 8.8% later (T2b*=2.6) and earns 7.5% less profit as 
compared to Example 2b where profit is $6,956.  
Lastly, instead of conflict, in Example 2c the simultaneous transfer of knowledge 
exhibits synergy (c3= 0.5). Here, the manager optimally launches a superior product 
earlier (T2c*=2.4) and earns 17.5% higher profit ($7,559) compared to Example 2a. 
Again, these results demonstrate the importance of developing KM strategies that 
embody synergy as opposed to conflict.  
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Figure 2.4a Optimal KT for T=3.0 (Example 2) and T*=2.8 (Example 2b) 
 
 
Figure 2.4b Optimal KA for T=3.0 (Example 2) and T*=2.8 (Example 2b) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4c Optimal levels of product and process design team knowledge for T=3.0 
(Example 2) and T*=2.8 (Example 2b) 
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Figure 2.4d Optimal KT for c3=0.5(Example 2a) and c3=0.0(Example 2b) 
 
 
Figure 2.4e Optimal KA for c3=0.5 (Example 2a) and c3=0.0 (Example 2b) 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
We develop a normative model to aid the manager of an NPD project determine 
her KM strategy for the product and process design teams. The timing and extent of 
knowledge embedded by each team during the development project determine the 
features, functionality, and manufacturing efficiency of the product and process. Thus, 
the manager's KM strategy drives the net revenue earned when the product is launched. 
The manager impacts the knowledge levels of the product and process design teams 
through knowledge creation. The manager determines the optimal rates of KA for each 
team and the rates of KT between teams. Also, the manager may determine the optimal 
product launch time, which reflects the tradeoff between early market benefits versus the 
development of superior product and process features. 
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2.6.1 The Delay or Front-Loading Strategies 
We show that there are two possible strategies that the NPD manager may follow 
when pursuing KA for each team or KT between teams. First, we introduce the delay 
strategy, which occurs when the effectiveness of KA or KT is small early in the 
development project. A low level of effectiveness may occur if the initial level of product 
and process design team knowledge is small, if there is considerable technical or market 
uncertainty early in the NPD project, or if the returns to KA or KT are small. Due to the 
limited effectiveness, the manager pursues KA or KT at a relatively small but increasing 
rate early in the development project. The rate increases for two reasons. First, over 
time, the levels of product and process design team knowledge increase through LBD 
and knowledge creation. Second, technical and market uncertainty are resolved over 
time. As a result, the effectiveness of KA or KT increases early in the development 
project. Eventually, the rate of KA or KT reaches a peak and declines thereafter. The 
decline occurs for several reasons. First, the level of product or process team knowledge 
reaches a point where additional gains are difficult to achieve (diminishing returns). 
Second, over time less of the NPD project remains to accrue the benefits KA or KT. 
Third, over time the manager is better able to increase knowledge by leveraging LBD 
which is free. Basically, in the delay strategy, the manager optimally delays her peak 
investment in KA or KT until a later time when the investment is more effective.    
Second, we introduce the front-loading strategy, which occurs when the 
effectiveness of KA or KT is high at the outset of the NPD project. This situation may 
arise if the levels of knowledge of the product or process design teams are relatively 
large at the initial time, if there is limited technical or market uncertainty early in the 
development project, or if the returns to KA or KT are considerable. In the front-loading 
strategy, the manager pursues KA or KT at a relatively high and decreasing rate 
throughout the NPD project. Therefore, the manager has no incentive to delay the peak 
investment in KA or KT. The rate of KA or KT decreases over time for several reasons. 
First, further additions to the level of product or process design team knowledge are 
more difficult to realize as a result of diminishing returns. Second, as time passes, less 
time remains in the NPD project to accrue the benefits from an increase in the level of 
product design team knowledge. Third, since the level of knowledge of the product or 
process team increases over time, the manager's ability to leverage LBD increases.   
The above analytic results are extended numerically (details not given here) to 
observe how the delay versus front loading strategy impact the optimal product launch 
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time and profit. Consistent insights are obtained in extensive sensitivity analysis. We first 
set the initial levels of knowledge of both teams at low levels and then increase them to 
observe the effect on the optimal solution. When the initial levels of knowledge are small, 
the manager optimally pursues the delay strategy. As the initial levels of knowledge 
increase, the peak rate of KT or KA occurs earlier. Eventually, when the initial levels of 
knowledge are sufficiently large, the manager optimally switches and pursues the front-
loading strategy for KT or KA. Moreover, we find that as the initial levels of product and 
process team knowledge increase, the manager launches a superior product earlier and 
earns higher profit. Analogous results are obtained for the other drivers of effectiveness 
of KA or KT. 
Since the manager has some control over the effectiveness of pursuing 
knowledge creation, the above insights are particularly important. In particular, we 
demonstrate that the manager must carefully assemble her product and process design 
teams so that the full potential of each team's knowledge is realized at the outset of the 
NPD project. To do so, the manager must understand the nature of the knowledge that 
will be required as well as the talents of potential team members. Naturally, if a key skill 
is not available internally, the manager should acquire the skill, perhaps, through hiring 
or engaging consultants. It is interesting to note that when a manager assembles teams 
for a more radical (incremental) development project, the initial levels of team knowledge 
are likely to be low (high) relative to the levels reached by the product launch time. 
Therefore, it is especially important as well as more challenging for the manager of a 
radical NPD project to form teams that embody the necessary skills.   
In addition, the rates of return on KA or KT also drive the levels of effectiveness. 
To the extent possible, the manager should create an environment that fosters higher 
rates of return. Incentives may be put into place to encourage the sharing of knowledge 
within a team so that any increase in knowledge by some team members (e.g., through 
LBD, executive education, etc.) is shared with other team members. Similarly, if a 
manager introduces an IT system to facilitate the sharing of knowledge within a team, 
then the returns to any investment in knowledge creation are higher.  
Lastly, the effectiveness of knowledge creation is impacted by the rates of 
technical and market uncertainty. To the extent possible, the manager should take action 
to reduce uncertainty early in the development project. Technical uncertainty may be 
reduced, in part, by selecting team members with the ability to anticipate future 
developments. Alternatively, forming alliances with university research labs may provide 
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insights on technology advancement. Similarly, selecting team members with extensive 
experience in marketing research may reduce uncertainty about the marketplace. Also, 
employing consulting firms that specialize in market research may be helpful. Lastly, KA 
or KT efforts that occur early in the development project may focus on reducing the 
impact of uncertainty.   
2.6.2 Complementary Relationships 
Another important insight from the model is that the manager should consider 
key complementary relationships among the KA and KT strategies and the impact of 
these strategies on the optimal product launch time. We show that if KT in either 
direction or KA for either team is higher, the manager pursues higher rates of knowledge 
creation for both teams. The higher rates of KA and KT enable the design teams to 
embed more knowledge into the development project over time. Thus, the manager 
optimally launches the product earlier. A larger rate of KA or KT optimally occurs if the 
effectiveness is larger or the cost is smaller. To increase the effectiveness, the manager 
should follow the suggestions given in Section 6.1. To reduce the cost, the manager 
should lessen any potential conflict when KT occurs in both directions simultaneously 
and enhance synergy, as described in Section 6.4.  
Analytically, we show that if the rate of LBD for either team is larger, then the 
manager optimally pursues more KA for both teams and more KT in both directions. 
Numerically we show that if the rate of LBD of either team is larger, then the manager 
earns higher profit by releasing a superior product at an earlier time. Therefore, a high 
rate of LBD reduces the tradeoff between time-to-market benefits and developing a 
superior product and process. Clearly, we show that LBD is a key source of competitive 
advantage. This is important since, to some extent, the manager can influence the rate 
of LBD. Pisano et al. (2001) describe several actions that can be taken to enhance the 
rate of LBD associated with the deployment of new cardiac procedures. In general, the 
manager may enhance the rate of LBD by creating an environment that values and 
rewards learning. The manager can encourage and facilitate KT between team members 
so that LBD realized by some team members benefits the entire team. Also, the 
investment in technical support systems may enhance the ability of a team to benefit 
from LBD. 
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2.6.3 Uncertainty Resolution 
We analyze the effect of uncertainty resolution that occurs during the 
development project. The rate of technical and market uncertainty is exogenous 
reflecting external market conditions and technology change. Analytic results are 
obtained demonstrating that if uncertainty is relatively small early in the development 
project or if uncertainty is resolved quickly over time then the manager pursues higher 
rates of KA and KT for both teams. As a result, higher levels of design team knowledge 
are embedded in the development project over time and an earlier product launch 
occurs resulting in a higher profit. Alternatively, suppose the extent of uncertainty is large 
early in the development project or decreases slowly. As a result, KA and KT are less 
effective and are pursued at lesser rates. However, we also find that by undertaking 
more KA and KT, and thereby increasing the levels of product and process design 
knowledge, the manager may endogenously reduce the impact of technical and market 
uncertainty. Therefore, the extent to which the manager reduces her pursuit of KA or KT 
is moderated by the ability of the product and process design teams to apply their 
knowledge to reduce uncertainty. In Section 6.1, we describe actions a manager may 
pursue to reduce the impact of uncertainty. 
2.6.4 Synergy or Conflict  
We analyze the impact of costs due to conflict or benefits from synergy when KT 
between the product and process design teams occurs simultaneously. Our results 
reveal that the benefits related to synergy lead to higher rates of KT in both directions. 
Due to the complementary relationships, this gives us higher rates of KA for both teams. 
With higher levels of product and process design knowledge embedded in the 
development project, the manager realizes an earlier launch of the product, although the 
product may not always be superior. Beyond these analytic results, numerical results 
show that synergy leads to higher profit.  
In contrast, there are two possible outcomes if additional costs occur due to 
conflict when the transfer of knowledge for both teams occurs simultaneously. First, the 
conflict may cause the manager to pursue less KT in both directions, which leads to less 
KA over time. Moreover, product and process design knowledge are embedded in the 
development project at a slower rate and the product launch time is delayed. Second, 
the manager may undertake a higher rate of KT in one direction and a lower rate in the 
other. In this case, the levels of knowledge embedded by the design teams may be 
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larger or smaller so we do not know whether the product launch is earlier or delayed. 
Beyond these analytic results, numerically we find that conflict always leads to lower 
profit.  
These results demonstrate that the manager should take actions to avoid conflict 
and to exploit synergy when KT occurs in both directions simultaneously. The literature 
provides examples of NPD projects where synergy and conflict occur (Loebecke et al. 
1999, Terwiesch et al. 2002). To the extent possible, the manager should reduce the 
sources of conflict including the transfer of knowledge that is sticky (Von Hippel 1994) or 
ambiguous (Sorensen et al. 2005). It is also important to reduce or manage the 
complexity in the content of the knowledge transferred (Hansen 1999). The NPD 
manager should establish incentives for collaboration and cooperation and should 
reward teams for the quality and clarity of the knowledge they share. Teams should be 
given support tools (information technology) to make documentation and communication 
more straightforward. Training teams to apply methods such as concurrent engineering 
is also useful. To reduce conflict and enhance synergy, basic principles of project 
management should be followed. At the outset, the goals of the KT activity should be 
established and the roles of individual team members should be clear. A project 
manager should be identified with the responsibility to coordinate and monitor the KT 
activities and to modify the original plan as needed. Lastly, through sensitivity training, 
the manager should reduce conflict and enhance synergy caused by communication 
barriers due to cultural differences (Loebecke et al. 1999, Sosa et al. 2004). 
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CHAPTER 3 
A STOCHASTIC MODEL FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE FOR 
PRODUCT AND PROCESS DESIGN TEAMS  
3.1. Introduction 
Today’s highly competitive and dynamic marketplace has established knowledge 
as a main source of competitive advantage (Liebeskind 1996). According to Davenport 
and Prusak (1998), knowledge embodies experience, values, contextual information and 
expert insights that provide a framework for evaluating and incorporating new 
experiences and information. The scope of knowledge a firm must possess includes the 
customers’ needs, the external business environment, and the skills and experience of 
its workforce. Knowledge management (KM) refers to the collection of processes that 
govern the creation, dissemination, and utilization of knowledge. 
New product development (NPD) projects are among the most knowledge 
intensive endeavors in the modern corporation (Macher 2006). KM of product and 
process development impacts the time to market, product and process functionality, 
manufacturing costs, and the match between customer requirements and final product 
features (Mihm et al. 2003, Ulrich and Eppinger 2003). Said differently, efficient and 
effective product and process design activities directly affect the commercial success of 
a product (Fine 1998, Fisher et al. 1999, Hatch and Macher 2005). Unfortunately, 
empirical evidence indicates that many firms lack an understanding of how to develop 
KM strategies that drive successful NPD outcomes (Döös et al. 2005). 
We introduce a model to develop insights on managing the levels of knowledge 
of the product and process design teams throughout the NPD project. The timing and 
extent of cumulative knowledge embedded in the development project by the product 
and process design teams determine the features, functionality, manufacturing 
efficiency, and launch time of the new product and process and thereby drive the 
expected net revenue earned over the product's life cycle. The expected net revenue is 
comprised of three components. First, the manager faces uncertainty regarding the time 
the product will be successfully launched in the marketplace. Second, the expected net 
revenue earned reflects the ability for early market entry deploying efficient 
manufacturing processes. While the first dimension of expected net revenue is driven by 
product development efforts, the latter is driven by efforts for process development and 
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the extent of time-based competition. As such, the expected net revenue derived from 
the NPD project captures the trade-off between seeking early market entry benefits 
(Hendricks and Singhal 1997) versus delaying the product release to develop superior 
product and process features (Bhuiyan et al. 2004, Carrillo and Franza 2006, Cohen et 
al. 1996, and Joglekar et al. 2001).  
The above establishes the critical role of the NPD manager who determines the 
levels of knowledge of the product and process design teams throughout the 
development project. Specifically, the  manager determines the optimal rate and timing 
of knowledge creation, which includes two types of induced learning (Ittner et al. 2001, 
Pisano, 1994). First, investment in knowledge development (KD) increases the level of 
knowledge of the product design team (Iansiti and Clark 1994). KD reflects problem 
solving activities undertaken by the product design team including testing, simulation, 
prototyping and experimentation (Thomke 1998). Also, KD occurs when team members 
participate in training programs offered by equipment or software vendors. KD may take 
the form of personnel additions such as hiring new engineers or reassigning existing 
employees. Finally, KD occurs when team members attend professional conferences 
(Biskup and Simons 2004, Jacobs 2006).   
Second, the manager invests in knowledge transfer (KT) to increase the 
knowledge levels of the product and process design teams. KT is the process by which 
one team’s knowledge is affected by the experience of another (Argote and Ingram 
2000). KT activities include the sharing of codified information about routines and 
practices, participation in meetings involving members of both teams, and the exchange 
of employees between teams (Cummings and Teng 2003, Loch and Terwiesch 1998). 
KT from the product to the process design team conveys information such as the 
consumer preferences and desirable product specifications (Blackburn et al. 1996, 
Hatch and Macher 2005). During the transfer of knowledge from the process to the 
product design team, information on process capabilities and constraints are 
communicated to ensure the manufacturability of the product (Terwiesch et al. 2002). 
We explicitly recognize that the effectiveness of KD and KT are both interrelated 
and dynamic (Epple et al. 1996). Early investments in KD and KT are appealing since 
the benefits are sustained over the remainder of the NPD project (Terwiesch and Loch 
1999). Moreover, the benefits realized from KD at a particular time depend on the level 
of knowledge of the product design team at that time since a higher skilled workforce is 
better able to comprehend and deploy new knowledge. Similarly, the effectiveness of KT 
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at a particular time depends on the levels of knowledge of both teams since a higher 
skilled source has more knowledge to offer and a higher skilled recipient is better able to 
absorb and exploit new knowledge (Darr et al. 1995).  
While investments in KD and KT are pursued to increase the levels of knowledge 
of the product and process design teams and ultimately drive net revenue, in the short-
term these investments may uncover errors that reduce the value of the cumulative 
knowledge previously embedded. For example, KD during CAD experiments undertaken 
by the product design team may reveal that an element of the product concept has been 
specified incorrectly (Terwiesch et al. 2002, Yassine 2008). Similarly, KT may cause the 
recipient team to uncover errors in its conception of product or process characteristics 
(Loch and Terwiesch 1998). The manager may respond to the reductions in embedded 
knowledge triggered by the errors by deploying more knowledge. This may occur in the 
form of design changes, i.e., activities whose implementation alters elements of the 
product or process design that were previously developed (Mitchell and Nault 2007).   
While maximizing the net expected benefits from the development project, the 
manager needs to account for the costs incurred for induced learning. Many costs are 
associated with KD including those from equipment and materials required for 
experimentation, or from integrating new employees (new knowledge) into existing 
teams. The costs of KT reflect the considerable efforts undertaken by members of both 
teams to codify knowledge (either manually or using information technology).  
Furthermore, disruption costs are also incurred when members of the product or process 
design teams are engaged in KT. The disruption costs are substantial and may include 
overtime if the rate of development must be sustained during knowledge creation 
(Carrillo and Gaimon 2004, Ha and Porteus 1995).   
We obtain important insights on a manager’s strategy to invest in KD and KT to 
maximize expected profit over the development project. Conditions are given whereby 
the manager optimally pursues a front-loading strategy. For example, we show that if the 
initial level of knowledge of the product design team is relatively high, the manager 
initially pursues KD and KT for the process design team at high rates that decrease 
throughout the NPD project. In contrast, we provide conditions whereby the manager 
optimally pursues a delay strategy in which the peak efforts to increase the level of 
knowledge occur later in the development project. For example, we show that if the initial 
level of process design knowledge is small, the manager optimally delays her peak 
efforts of KT to the product design team until the process design team’s knowledge has 
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increased. This insight extends the existing literature that depicts the investments in 
knowledge creation as decreasing throughout the NPD project (Carrillo and Franza 
2006).  
Our findings characterize the key impact of design changes on the manager’s 
knowledge management strategies throughout the NPD project. We show that design 
changes triggered by uncovering errors during KD or KT impacts the rate and the timing 
of knowledge creation for both design teams. For example, suppose there is a high rate 
of design changes triggered by KT from the process design team. We show that the 
manager front-loads KD of the product design team and KT to the process design team 
but pursues the delay strategy for KT to the product design team. Lastly, we show that 
the drivers of expected net revenue lead to a complementary relationship between the 
manager’s pursuits of KD and KT in some cases, and to a substitutability in other cases.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 contains a 
review of the related literature. In Section 3, we introduce the objective and constraints 
of the model. We present analytic results and sensitivity analysis in Section 3.4. Section 
3.5 contains the conclusions. 
3.2 Literature Review 
This chapter is grounded in two research streams, KM and NPD. In the context of 
NPD, two forms of induced learning have appeared in the literature. First, KD is 
comprised of problem solving undertaken by the product design team that involves 
testing, simulation, prototyping and experimentation (Thomke 1998, Iansiti and Clark 
1994). Thomke and Fujimoto (2000) emphasize the importance of pursuing activities that 
identify and solve problems early to reduce the lead time and costs of product 
development. Second, the NPD literature clearly establishes the importance of 
managing the rate and timing of KT between the product and process design teams. In 
their study of 281 blockbuster product and process development teams, Lynn et al 
(2000) identify KT between teams as one of the five highest priority practices leading to 
a successful NPD project. Clark and Fujimoto (1991) have analyzed the worldwide 
automotive industry, and introduced the concept of “integrated problem solving,” which 
refers to exchanging preliminary product design information to achieve overlap and 
intensive communication between product and process design efforts. In a case study, 
Loch and Terwiesch (1996) describe how knowledge exchange between the product and 
process teams impacts the development of the Jalopy sports car.  
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Much of the NPD literature characterizes KT in the context of concurrent 
engineering. Ha and Porteus (1995) examine KT from the product to the process design 
domain for a project where the product and project design processes are carried out in 
parallel. They determine the optimal number and timing of progress reviews during the 
development project that minimize the time-to-market. Krishnan et al. (1997) consider 
the general case of partially overlapping sequential design activities. They show that the 
timing of KT from the product to process design team depends on two characteristics of 
the NPD project:  (i) “upstream evolution” i.e., the rate at which the product design team 
converges to the final product attributes and features, and (ii) “downstream sensitivity” 
i.e., the extent of engineering changes generated by KT from the product design team. 
They optimize the overlap between the product and process design efforts in order to 
minimize time-to-completion. Loch and Terwiesch (1998) examine the amount of overlap 
of sequential NPD activities as well as mechanisms to manage communication policies, 
which refer to the KT from the product to the process design domain during overlap. The 
authors determine the optimal meeting frequency and information batching policy that 
maximizes the benefits from an earlier product launch realized by overlapping product 
and process development activities less the additional indirect costs of KT incurred. 
Roemer et al. (2000) develop an algorithm to determine the optimal overlap 
between multiple sequential activities and apply it in a real example. Joglekar et al. 
(2001) develop insights on optimal concurrency strategies between coupled product and 
process design activities under a deadline. They find that concurrency is not always the 
optimal design structure, depending on factors such as KT effectiveness and design 
errors. With the objective of minimizing the time-to market of an NPD project, Roemer 
and Ahmadi (2004) determine the optimal overlapping and crashing strategies of design 
activities for KT from the product to the process design team. In a comprehensive field 
study, Terwiesch et al. (2002) document properties of the information exchange and the 
modes of KT in automotive projects. In the context of larger and more complex 
engineering projects, Mihm et al. (2003) show how misaligned objectives of different 
sub-teams drive coordination problems and delay project completion. In a study of 
redesign and development projects in healthcare and telecommunications, Mitchell and 
Nault (2007) examine the impact of KT and uncertainty on rework for product and 
process design teams. They find that communication between teams reduces the impact 
of design changes, and thereby leads to earlier project completion. 
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Relative to the above-mentioned literature, our research is unique in its 
comprehensive treatment of dynamic knowledge management strategies for the product 
and process design teams throughout the NPD project. In contrast to much of the NPD 
literature, we permit the NPD manager to increase the level of knowledge of the product 
design team over time through KD as well as KT. Moreover, we explicitly permit the NPD 
manager to determine the dynamic rates of KT in both directions. As a result, we capture 
the value of efforts to improve the design for manufacturability, design efficient 
manufacturing processes, and ultimately launch a product with features that meet 
market demand.  
The existing literature considers the errors and subsequent design changes that 
occur during an NPD project as exogenous. In contrast, we capture the endogenous 
nature of detecting errors triggered by knowledge creation activities during the 
development project. Thus, we provide insights on the impact of the extent of errors 
uncovered on both the rate and timing of the knowledge creation for both of the product 
and process design teams. As such, we are able to extend the earlier work by Clark and 
Fujimoto (1991), Adler (1995) and Terwiesch et al. (2002) and explore the advantage of 
delaying KD or KT until later in the development project to minimize the impact on 
expected profit when design changes and rework are triggered by the detection of 
errors. 
We capture the uncertain nature of the value earned from NPD projects. The 
probability of releasing a successful product is impacted by the product design 
knowledge. Thus, we extend the past literature which have acknowledged the product 
design as an essential ingredient in the of NPD projects, and explicitly capture the 
importance of product design in the value earned from a development project. 
Meanwhile the net revenue earned from the marketplace is impacted by the process 
design knowledge, and the time-to-market. Thus, unlike most studies in the NPD area, 
that focuses on early market entry, our maximization of expected net revenue also 
captures the value of delaying a product launch to improve the efficiency of 
manufacturing processes as well as to develop product features and functionality that 
enhance the likelihood of releasing a product that meets market needs. 
Most prior research considers KT strategies with a particular dependency 
structure between design activities (Joglekar et al. 2001). In contrast, we adopt a general 
approach that does not specify either the amount of overlap or the dependency between 
the product and process design activities. In our research, KT between the product and 
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process design teams may be overlapped or may occur sequentially or simultaneously. 
Moreover, we characterize conditions that drive different dynamic strategies for KD and 
KT as well as different dependency structures. Finally, in contrast to the previous 
literature which assumes all knowledge is transferred during KT, we endogenously 
determine the optimal rates of KT in both directions throughout the project. 
3.3 The Model Formulation 
In this section, we present a model to aid the manager determine a KM strategy 
for the product and process design teams throughout a development project. We 
describe how the knowledge levels of both teams vary over time and the impact of 
rework that is triggered both by knowledge development of the design team, and 
knowledge transfer between teams. Moreover, we show how the knowledge embedded 
into the new product during development determines the probability of designing a 
functional product that returns positive net revenue in the marketplace. A summary of 
our notation appears in Table B.1 of the Appendix B. 
3.3.1 Knowledge 
 We consider the time horizon t∈[0,T], where 0 is the initial time of the 
development project and T is sufficiently large so that the end of the product lifecycle 
has been reached. Let D(t) denote the level of knowledge of the product design team 
that is relevant to the NPD project at time t.  Similarly, M(t) is the level of knowledge of 
the process design team that is relevant to the NPD project at time t. Each level of 
knowledge reflects the team’s competence about the scientific and engineering 
information that is relevant to the development project. The initial levels of knowledge 
are known, given by D0=D(0)≥0 and M0=M(0)≥0. The initial levels of knowledge may be 
inferred from the overall educational background of team members, years of work 
experience, performance appraisals, and past experience in similar scientific and 
engineering domains (Leonard-Barton et al. 1994, Epple et al. 1996, Carrillo and 
Gaimon 2004). While a team may possess a considerable amount of knowledge in 
general, the level of knowledge relevant to the development project under consideration 
may be small due to its novelty. As described below, the manager increases D(t) and 
M(t) so that each team is able to apply more knowledge to the NPD project.  
The knowledge level of the product design team increases as the manager 
allocates resources towards KD efforts. Let γ(t) denote the rate of efforts directed by the 
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manager at time t for KD of the product design team. KD efforts include problem-
structuring, goal-setting for the problem-solving process, and experimenting with working 
prototypes of different design alternatives (Thomke 2000, Clark and Wheelwright 1992). 
KD also occurs when team members undergo training such as participation in continuing 
education programs and conferences. In addition, KD may take the form of hiring and 
integrating new employees into the existing teams. 
The extent that KD efforts increase product team knowledge is related to the 
team’s existing level of knowledge as well as and the effect of diminishing returns. A 
product design team with a higher level of knowledge it is better able to comprehend and 
deploy new knowledge so that the impact of KD efforts is larger (Carrillo and Gaimon 
2004, Hatch and Macher 2005). However, the extent that the existing level of product 
design team knowledge drives gains from KD exhibits diminishing returns. 
Mathematically, the rate of increase in the level of product design team knowledge at 
time t due to KD is γ(t)[D(t)]ρ1, where ρ1 (0<ρ1<1) indicates the rate of diminishing 
returns. Our representation of the gain in product design team knowledge parallels the 
widely used Cobb-Douglas function in Economics. 
In addition to KD for the product design team, the manager increases the 
knowledge levels of both the product and process design teams by investing in KT. 
Knowledge transfer may take place in either or both directions through sharing codified 
information, participation in meetings, and exchanging employees. For example, in GM 
KT takes place through regularly scheduled meetings between teams and is monitored 
through a computerized Engineering Change Request System (Jacobs 2006). The 
recipient’s increase in knowledge due to KT is two dimensional. First, there is the direct 
value of the knowledge that is transferred and applied from the source team. Second, 
there is an indirect increase in the recipient’s level of knowledge because KT inspires the 
recipient to conduct additional experimentation and problem solving . 
Empirical results show that the effectiveness of KT is related to the extent of 
efforts undertaken as well as the levels of knowledge of both teams participating in the 
transfer (Argote and Ingram 2000, Cummings and Teng 2003). While a source team with 
a higher level of knowledge is capable of transferring more knowledge to the recipient 
team, the benefits to the recipient exhibits diminishing returns. Similarly, the recipient 
team with a higher level of knowledge is better able to comprehend, deploy and respond 
to knowledge transferred from the source team.  Said differently, the knowledge level of 
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the recipient team impacts the effectiveness of KT, again with diminishing returns (Dinur 
et al. 1998). 
We capture these relationships as follows. Let β(t)≥0 be the rate of efforts 
allocated by the manager to the transfer of knowledge from the process to the product 
design team at time t. Let ρ2 and ρ3 (0≤ρ2,ρ3≤1) indicate the rates of diminishing returns 
associated with the levels of product and process design knowledge, respectively. 
Therefore, β(t)[M(t)]ρ2[D(t)]ρ3 is the rate of increase in product design team knowledge at 
time t due to KT from the process design team.  Similarly, with b(t)≥0 representing the 
effort allocated by the manager to KT from the product to the process design team at 
time t, b(t)[D(t)]r1[M(t)]r2 denotes the increase in the level of process design team 
knowledge, with 0≤r1,r2≤1. Again, our formulation reflects the general Cobb-Douglas 
function. 
Equations (1) and (2) summarize how the levels of knowledge of the product and 
process design teams change over time (the subscript 't' denotes the derivative with 
respect to time.) Clearly, D(t) and M(t) are positive and non-decreasing throughout the 
NPD project. The product design team increases knowledge through KD and KT, 
whereas the process design team increases knowledge only through KT. In other words, 
KT from the product design team provides the impetus for knowledge creation activities 
to be undertaken by the process design team throughout the development project.  
 
Dt(t) = γ(t)[D(t)]ρ1 + β(t)[M(t)]ρ2[D(t)]ρ3                        (3.1) 
  
 Mt(t) = b(t)[D(t)]r1[M(t)]r2        (3.2) 
 
 Figure 3.1        Dynamic knowledge management 
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Bhuiyan et al. (2004) suggest the importance of diminishing returns on the 
increase in knowledge derived from knowledge transfer.  The extent that the level of 
knowledge of the source team increases the knowledge level of the recipient team may 
be different for the product and process design teams depending on characteristics of 
the NPD project. Thus we do not specify an a priori relationship between the parameters 
ρ2 and r1. However, we do reasonably assume ρ3<ρ1 indicating that, when increasing the 
level of knowledge of the product design team, the returns from KD are larger than the 
returns from KT (Darr et al. 1995). 
The expected net revenue earned from the NPD project when it is released to the 
marketplace is driven by the knowledge applied by both the product and process design 
teams at each instant of time throughout the development project. Let X(t) and Y(t) 
represent the cumulative levels of useful knowledge embedded in the product and 
process designs, respectively, through time t of the development project for t∈[0,T]. For 
simplicity (and without loss of generality) since time t=0 represents the start of the 
development project we let X(0)=0 and Y(0)=0. This characterization of the accumulation 
of useful product and process design knowledge is similar to the evolution concept 
introduced by Krishnan et al. (1997).  (Also see Carrillo and Gaimon 2000.)  
Two forces drive the cumulative levels of useful knowledge over time. X(t) and 
Y(t) increase as the product and process design teams (D(t) and M(t), respectively) 
embed knowledge into the development project. Thus, if the manager pursues 
knowledge creation activities at time t to increase the knowledge levels of the product or 
process design team, she is able to embed more knowledge into the NPD project 
thereafter.  
In contrast, X(t) and Y(t) may decrease at time t when knowledge creation 
activities (γ(t) and β(t)) or (b(t)) identify mistakes in prior development efforts that 
necessitate design changes. Suppose CAD experiments undertaken by the product 
design team reveal that an element of the product concept assumed prior to time t is 
specified incorrectly. As a result, a portion of the knowledge the product design team 
had embedded in the development project is useless (X(t) is reduced). Similarly, KT may 
cause the recipient team to uncover errors rendering a portion of the knowledge it had 
previously embedded in the development project useless (Mitchell and Nault 2007).  
From the above, we see a conflict in the way that knowledge creation activities 
impact the cumulative levels of useful product and process design team knowledge. The 
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pursuit of KD and KT directly increases D(t) and thereby indirectly increases the 
cumulative level of useful product design knowledge from time t through T. Similarly, KT 
indirectly increases the cumulative level of useful process design team knowledge 
starting at time t. At the same time investments in KD and KT (γ(t) and β(t)) may uncover 
errors that directly reduce the cumulative useful level of knowledge previously 
embedded in the product design (X(t)). Similarly, the pursuit of KT to the process design 
team (b(t)) may uncover errors that directly reduce the cumulative useful level of 
knowledge previously embedded in the process design, Y(t). Naturally, a small (large) 
rate of KD or KT provides less (more) opportunity to uncover errors.  Over time as the 
manager continues to apply product and process design knowledge (including rework 
and design changes), the reductions in the cumulative levels of useful product and 
process design knowledge recover (Loch and Terwiesch 1998).  
To formalize the above discussion mathematically, let θ1≥0 indicate the extent 
that KD triggers design errors and reduces the cumulative level of useful product design 
knowledge. Similarly, let θ2 and θ3 (θ2, θ3≥0) indicate the extent that design errors  
triggered by KT reduce the cumulative levels of useful product and process design 
knowledge, respectively (Yassine et al. 1999). Equations (3) and (4) summarize the 
above discussion regarding how the cumulative levels of useful product and process 
design team knowledge change over time. While it is possible for X(t) and Y(t) to 
decrease at time t, conditions are given (Appendix B) ensuring the non-negativity of 
these variables in any optimal solution. 
 
Xt(t)= D(t) - θ1γ(t) - θ2β(t) , (3.3) 
Yt(t)= M(t) - θ3b(t).       (3.4)  
3.3.2 The Objective 
Having completed the presentation of the model constraints, we turn our 
attention to the objective: to maximize expected profit. We denote the expected net 
revenue earned by a product released to the marketplace at time t as F[X(t)]R[Y(t),t]. 
Our conceptual representation of expected net revenue captures efforts of the product 
and process design teams as well as elements in the marketplace, as described below.  
The probability that the new product has been successfully developed by time t, 
denoted by F[X(t)], increases as the cumulative level of useful knowledge embedded into 
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the product design through that time increases (Lynn et al 2000, Christensen and 
Raynor 2003a). A product is deemed successful if it embodies the features and 
functionality demanded by the marketplace. Implicitly, the probability of developing a 
successful product represents a threshold acceptance the manager aims to achieve by 
accumulating product design knowledge.  Naturally, as the cumulative level of useful 
product design team knowledge increases (decreases), the probability of developing a 
successful product increases (decreases) but at a decreasing rate giving us ∂F/∂X≥0 
and ∂2F/∂X2≤0 (Krishnan et al. 1997, Bhuiyan et al.2004). 
The second component of the expected revenue function, R[Y(t),t], denotes the 
revenue earned less the associated manufacturing and distribution costs incurred for the 
product that is released to the marketplace at time t (Zirger and Maidique 1990, Smith 
and Reinertsen 1998, Ulrich and Eppinger 2003). At each instant of time, as the 
cumulative level of useful knowledge embedded by the process design team increases, 
the margin that is achieved by cost effective manufacturing processes increases. Thus, 
the net revenue earned at time t increases (at a decreasing rate) in relation to the 
cumulative level of useful knowledge embedded by the process design team, giving us 
∂R/∂Y≥0 and ∂2R/∂Y2≤0 (Armstrong and Lévesque 2002).  
The time the new product is launched to the marketplace also impacts the net 
revenue earned. In some situations, the manager may purposely delay the launch of the 
new product in order to increase the net revenue earned (increase Y(t)) or generate a 
higher probability of success in the marketplace (increase X(t)). However, in doing so, 
the manager forgoes a portion of net revenue since time based competition has the 
effect of penalizing a delayed product release. This gives us ∂R/∂t≤0 and ∂2R/∂t2≤0 
(Dhebar 1996, Christensen and Raynor 2003b). The second order effect occurs since 
the benefits realized from earlier market entry are bounded. Therefore, our 
characterization of expected net revenue captures the trade-off that occurs from 
delaying the product launch: the loss in expected net revenue due to time-based 
competition versus the additional expected net revenue earned from a superior product 
that is manufactured more efficiently (Cohen et al. 1996).  
Beyond the manufacturing and distribution costs captured in net revenue, costs 
are incurred for knowledge creation (Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Roemer et al 2000). The 
cost for KD pursued by the product design team at time t is denoted by C1[γ(t)]. This cost 
includes the wages of the design team and the costs for materials and equipment 
associated with modeling, experimentation, testing, prototyping and simulation (Jacobs 
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2006). Also, the cost of KD includes the salaries of trainers and consultants, expenses 
associated with attending conferences and workshops, and executive program tuition. 
The cost of KD at time t increases at an increasing rate in relation to the efforts 
expended at that particular time (Krishnan and Zhu 2006). While the first order effect is 
obvious, consider the second order effect. As more and more KD efforts are undertaken 
at a particular time, the costs for integration, coordination, and supervision increase at 
an increasing rate. Similarly, as the number of employees who divert their attention from 
development activities to pursue training increases, the costs (such as overtime) 
incurred to sustain team productivity levels increase at an increasing rate. This gives us 
∂C1/∂γ and ∂2C1/∂γ2≥0. 
The cost of KT from the process (product) design team at time t is given by 
C2[β(t)] (C3[b(t)]). This cost reflects the wages of the team members as they document 
and codify knowledge and pursue activities that are triggered by the transfer of 
knowledge. Costs are also incurred for the relocation of process and product design 
team members to facilitate the face to face transfer of knowledge. Analogous to the 
above discussion on KD, the cost of KT increases at an increasing rate as the extent of 
KT increases due to the overall disruption to ongoing activities as well as the difficulty of 
integrating and coordinating larger amounts of knowledge at a single instant of time 
(Loch and Terwiesch 1998, Mihm et al. 2003, Carrillo and Gaimon 2000). This gives 
∂C1/∂β, ∂C2/∂b, ∂2C1/∂β2, and ∂2C2/∂b2≥0. 
Lastly, at the terminal time, the cumulative levels of useful product and process 
design knowledge provide a foundation for future development projects and are 
therefore another source of profit. Let Φ1X(T) (Φ2Y(T)) denote the future value of the 
cumulative level of useful product (process) design knowledge with Φ1≥0 (Φ2≥0).  
The objective to be maximized is given in Equation (5) and captures the above 
discussion of the expected net revenue and the costs incurred over the NPD project.  
 FXt	RYt, t	  – C1[γ(t)] – C2[β (t)] – C3[b(t)]}dt + Φ1X(T) + Φ2Y(T)   
(3.5) 
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3.4 The Optimal Solution 
In the remainder of the chapter, the notation depicting time is suppressed 
whenever possible. Equations, tables and figures beginning with “B” refer to the 
Appendix. The symbol "*" indicates an optimal solution. Proofs of the analytic results 
appear in the Appendix B. 
For mathematical completeness, we must consider the non-negativity constraints 
for the cumulative levels of useful knowledge of the product and process design teams. 
The effect of the non-negativity constraints are straightforward: If the constraint on X(t) 
(Y(t)) is  binding, then the manager decreases the rates of KD or KT (KT) thereby forcing 
X(t) (Y(t)) to zero. The complete solution and the conditions on γ(t), β(t) and b(t) that 
ensure X(t) and Y(t) remain positive are given in the Appendix B. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that the manager would not optimally pursue KD or KT that would 
drive the cumulative level of useful product or process design team knowledge to zero. 
Moreover, the results in the chapter hold regardless of whether a non-negativity 
constraint is binding. Therefore, for simplicity hereafter, we assume the non-negativity 
constraints on X(t) and Y(t) hold in an optimal solution.  
The Lagrangian to be maximized is given in the Equation A.2. To obtain optimal 
solutions, we introduce the variables λ1(t) and λ2(t) to represent the marginal values of 
the levels of knowledge of the product and process design teams at time t, respectively. 
Also, λ3(t) and λ4(t) represent the marginal values of the cumulative levels of useful 
product and process design team knowledge at time t, respectively. The necessary 
conditions for optimality of the marginal value functions λ1(t), λ2(t), λ3(t) and λ4(t)  are 
given in the Equations (A.5)-(A.8).  
Theorem 1 states that the marginal values of the levels of knowledge of the 
product and process design teams are non-negative and non-increasing functions of 
time. Also from Theorem 1, the marginal values of the cumulative levels of useful 
product and process design team knowledge are non-negative throughout the NPD 
project. Further interpretation of Theorem 1 is postponed until we present the optimal 
policies for KD and KT. Theorem 1 follows directly from the optimality conditions.  
THEOREM 1. The marginal value functions satisfy the following conditions for t∈[0,T]. 
λ1*(t), λ2*(t)≥0 and λ1t(t), λ2t(t)≤0; λ3*(t)=Φ1+   and  λ4*(t)=Φ1+  , λ3t(t), λ4t(t) 
≥0.  
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Along with the non-negativity constraints γ, β and b≥0, Equations (6)-(8) are the 
optimality conditions for the rate of KD for the product design team and the rates of KT to 
both the product and process design teams. The first term Equation (6) represents the 
marginal cost of KD for the product design team at time t. The second term is the 
marginal value of the associated increase in the level of product design knowledge from 
time t through the remainder of the development project. Therefore, at time t, the optimal 
KD policy for the product design team equates the additional marginal cost at t with the 
benefits realized from time t through T. Similarly, from Equation (7) (Equation (8)), we 
see that the optimal policy for KT from the process (product) to the product (process) 
design team equates the marginal cost at time t with the net marginal value of the 
associated increase in the level of product (process) design knowledge from time t 
through the remainder of the development project. Note that the net marginal value of 
KT reflects the loss in value associated with uncovering errors (third terms in Equation 
(7) and (8)). 
∂H/∂γ = – C1γ + λ1Dρ1 – (λ3)θ1 = 0 (3.6) 
∂H/∂β = – C2β + λ1Mρ2Dρ3 – (λ3)θ2 = 0 (3.7) 
∂H/∂b = – C3b + λ2Dr1Mr2 – (λ4)θ3 = 0  (3.8) 
3.4.1 The Dynamic Rates of KD and KT 
 Theorem 2 describes how KD and KT change throughout the development 
project. From the results in Theorem 2, we find that the optimal solutions for KD and KT 
must satisfy one of the two cases given in Corollary 1. Each case corresponds to 
different project, team, and market characteristics. Figures A.2 and A.3 illustrate the two 
possible solutions described in Corollary 1. A complete discussion of Corollary 1 follows.  
 
THEOREM 2. The change in the optimal rate of KD for the product design team at time t, 
(γt), satisfies Equation (3.9). Moreover, the change in the rate that the manager optimally 
pursues KT from the process to the product design team at time t, (βt), and from the 
product to the process design team at time t (bt) satisfy Equations (3.10) and (3.11), 
respectively.  
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C1γγ (γt)  = λ1tDρ1 + λ1ρ1Dρ1–1Dt – FXRθ1    (3.9) 
C2ββ(βt) = λ1tMρ2Dρ3 + λ1ρ2Mρ2–1MtDρ3 + λ1ρ3Mρ2Dρ3–1Dt – FXRθ2 (3.10) 
C4bb(bt) =  λ2tDr1Mr2 + λ2r1Dr1–1DtMr2 + λ2r2Dr1Mr2–1Mt – FRYθ3 (3.11) 
COROLLARY 1. The rates the manager optimally pursues KD or KT during the NPD 
project satisfy one of the following (non-trivial) cases. (i) The optimal solution is positive 
and decreasing until reaching zero at or before the end of the development project 
(front-loading strategy). (ii) The optimal solution is positive and increasing, reaches a 
maximum, and then decreases until reaching zero at or before the end of the 
development project (delay strategy). 
In the front loading strategy, the manager pursues KD or KT at a rate that is 
initially high and decreases throughout the NPD project. Front-loading of KD or KT 
occurs when the effectiveness of KD or KT is high at the outset of the NPD project. The 
effectiveness of KD may be larger if: (i) the extent of errors uncovered by γ(t) is small; (ii) 
the initial level of product design team knowledge is large;  (iii) the marginal probability of 
developing a successful product is large; or (iv) the marginal expected net revenue from 
embedding process design knowledge is small. Similarly, the effectiveness of KT from 
the process (product) to the product (process) design team is larger if: (i) the rate of 
errors detected by β(t) (b(t)) is small; (ii) the initial level of process (product) team 
knowledge is large; or (iii) the marginal probability of developing a successful product is 
small (large) (iv) the marginal expected net revenue from embedding process design 
knowledge is large (small). Nevertheless, the pursuit of knowledge creation decreases 
over time in the front-loading strategy for two reasons. First, due to diminishing returns it 
is increasingly difficult to obtain further additions to the level of knowledge through KD or 
KT. Second, over time less of the NPD project remains to accrue benefits from 
embedding more product or process design team knowledge. 
The notion of a front-loading strategy has appeared in the literature. Blackburn et 
al. (1996) conceptually describe the front-loading of KT in the context of concurrent 
engineering in software development. In their study of design projects in the automotive 
industry, Thomke and Fujimoto (2000) advocate front-loading of problem solving to 
reduce the impact of late product design changes and thereby lower the development 
cost. In contrast, we show conditions whereby the rate of errors uncovered during 
 60
knowledge creation (KD or KT) drive either a front-loading strategy or a delay strategy. 
Moreover, we extend the literature by characterizing conditions on various facets of our 
model, such as the marginal probability of developing a successful product, that drive 
the manager to pursue a front-loading or delay strategy for KD or KT.   
In contrast, at the core of the delay strategy is the manager’s desire to postpone 
the peak rate of knowledge creation until a later time in the NPD project when such 
activity will be more effective at driving expected profit. Specifically, in the delay strategy, 
the rate that the manager pursues KD or KT is relatively small and increasing early in the 
development project, reaches a peak value, and then occurs at a decreasing rate 
thereafter. For example, if the initial level of product design team knowledge is small 
then KT to the process design team may follow the delay strategy. In general, the delay 
strategy may occur if the effectiveness of knowledge creation is relatively small early in 
the development project. Therefore, the conditions that drive the delay strategy are the 
opposite from those that lead to the front-loading strategy.  
At some point in the delay strategy, the rate of KD or KT peaks after which the 
manager optimally reduces her pursuit of KD or KT for two reasons. First, the level of 
product or process design knowledge has become sufficiently large so that any further 
pursuit of KD or KT adds little to D(t) or M(t) (diminishing returns). Second, over time 
less of the NPD project remains to capture the benefits from an increase in the level of 
product or process team knowledge. Loch and Terwiesch (1996) describe the 
challenges faced by the NPD manager who does not follow a delay strategy despite the 
low initial levels of knowledge of the product and process design teams. In addition, 
according to the literature, if product design knowledge is evolving quickly then KT to the 
process design team may be more intense later in the project (Adler 1995, Ha and 
Porteus 1995, Loch and Terwiesch 1998). While previous research has advanced our 
understanding of KT during NPD projects, it has not captured the impact on the 
manager’s KM strategy due to factors such as the endogenous design changes 
triggered by knowledge creation activities. 
In Corollary 2 we observe an important relationship between the rates of KT of 
the product and process design teams. A manager who optimally pursues a delay 
strategy for KT in one direction is driven to undertake a front-loading strategy for KT in 
the other direction. For example, suppose the ability of product design knowledge to 
increase the probability of developing a successful product is large. In contrast, suppose 
the extent that process design knowledge drives manufacturing efficiency thereby 
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improving net revenue is small. Under these conditions, the manager is driven to follow 
the delay strategy for KT from the process to the product design team and to front-load 
KT from the product to the process design team. Thus, she increases process design 
knowledge early in the development project through KT from the product design team 
but delays the pursuit of KT to the product design team until later when process design 
knowledge is more developed. 
COROLLARY 2. The conditions that drive KT to the product (process) design team β (b) 
to follow a delay strategy also drive KT to the process design team b (β)to follow a  front-
loading strategy. 
Knowledge management of the product and process design teams is comprised 
of three solutions: KD for the product design team and KT between teams. With two 
possible strategies (front-loading or delay) for each of the three decision variables, it 
appears that the manager chooses from eight combinations of solutions. However, from 
Corollary 2, we know that whenever conditions occur that drive the manager to pursue 
the delay strategy for KT in one direction, then under the same conditions the manager 
is driven to pursue the front-loading strategy for KT in the other direction. This allows us 
to eliminate two combinations of KD and KT strategies. Note that the reverse of 
Corollary 2 does not hold; if KT in one direction satisfies the front-loading strategy then 
the KT in the other direction may satisfy either the delay or front-loading strategy. The 
six remaining strategies are described in the Appendix B. In Sections 3.4.3-3.4.4, we 
explore two possible combinations of KD and KT strategies. 
3.4.2 Reflecting on the literature: KT only from the Product to the Process Design 
Team 
The traditional view in the NPD literature is that KT occurs only from the product 
to process design team (Ha and Porteus 1995, Krishnan et al. 1997, Loch and 
Terwiesch 1998, Terwiesch et al. 2002). To benchmark our model against the existing 
literature, we consider the situation where KT from the process to the product design 
team is exogenously restricted (β=0). Some of our results are consistent with the 
literature. However, we obtain three major insights that capture the complex and 
dynamic relationships driving the evolution of knowledge during development projects, 
which have not been considered in the NPD literature. 
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First, we find that if KT occurs only from the product to the process design team 
then KD for the product design team is always front-loaded. Moreover, the level of 
process design team knowledge increases faster early in the development project since 
more advanced knowledge is transferred from the product design team (source). 
Second, we are able to determine the conditions that drive high or low rates of KD. We 
find that if the effectiveness of KT to the process design team is large the manager is 
driven to pursue a higher rate of KD throughout the development project. Recall that the 
effectiveness of KT to the process design team is larger if, for example, the extent of 
errors detected by KT is smaller or the ability to develop manufacturing processes that 
enhance net revenue is large. These results are important since they extend the 
literature by linking the optimal KD and KT strategies and show that a complementary 
relationship exists between efforts to increase the knowledge levels of the product and 
process design teams. Third, we identify characteristics of the project, teams, and 
marketplace that drive KT to the process design team to be either front-loaded or 
delayed. We find that the manager is driven to front-load KT to the process design team 
if the marginal revenue of embedding process design knowledge is large or the initial 
level of process design team knowledge is small. In contrast, the manager is driven to 
delay the peak rate of KT when the marginal probability of developing a successful 
product is large or the effectiveness of KD is large early in the project.  
 
COROLLARY 3. If β=0 for t∈[0,T], the manager optimally pursues the front-loading 
strategy for KD of the product design team (γ). Moreover, KT from the product to the 
process design team follows the front loading-strategy if the conditions that drive bt(0)≤0 
hold (i.e. if RY or M0 is large or FX or D0 is small) . In contrast, KT follows the delay 
strategy if the conditions drive bt(0)>0.  
3.4.3 Product Oriented Development 
In this section, we focus on a particular combination of KM strategies. Suppose 
the following three conditions hold. (i) The initial level of product design team knowledge 
is relatively large whereas (ii) the initial level of process design team knowledge is 
relatively small. (iii) The level of knowledge of the process design team has a greater 
impact on the effectiveness of knowledge transfer to the product team than the level of 
product design team knowledge has on the effectiveness of KT to the process  team 
(ρ2>r1). 
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The optimal solution is illustrated in Figure A.4. Driven by the large initial level of 
product team knowledge, the manager optimally front-loads KD activities. Clearly, there 
is no incentive for the manager to delay KD since it is highly effective at the start of the 
development project. However, the manager delays the peak efforts of KT from the 
process to the product design team for two reasons. First, KT from the process design 
team is more effective later in the NPD project when the level of process design 
knowledge is larger. Second, note that the level of process design knowledge has a 
substantial impact on the effectiveness of KT to the product team. As a result, the 
manager delays the peak rate of KT to the product design team until later in the project 
when process design knowledge is more advanced. 
Interestingly, while the manager pursues the delay strategy for the transfer of 
knowledge to the product design team, she front-loads the transfer of knowledge to the 
process design team for two reasons. First, higher rates of KT to the process design 
team increase the initially low level of process team knowledge. Second, driven by the 
high initial level of knowledge of the product design team (source), KT to the process 
design team is effective at the outset of the NPD project.  
In conclusion, we term this case as product oriented development since it 
illustrates the how the manager leverages product design team knowledge throughout 
the development project to maximize expect profit. These insights are summarized in 
Figure 3.2 and Corollary 4, below. Note that Figure 3.2 is given for illustrative purposes 
only. 1 
 
                                                 
 
 
1
 For example, the solution in Case (i) may begin convex increasing, become concave increasing, 
and then is concave decreasing by T. Or, the solution in Case (ii) may start convex decreasing 
and change to concave decreasing by T.  
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Figure 3.2 KD and KT for the scenario depicted in Corollary 4a and 4b 
 
 
COROLLARY 4a. Suppose D0 is large and M0 is small. Then, the manager is driven to 
pursue (i) the front-loading strategy for KD (γ).  
 
COROLLARY 4b. Again, suppose D0 is large and M0 is small. In addition, suppose ρ2>r1. 
Then, the manager is driven to pursue (i) the delay strategy for KT to the product design 
team (β) and (ii) the front-loading strategy for KT to the process design team (b).  
 
We may interpret the above analytic results in the context of industry practice. 
Consider the NPD project pursued by Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) to develop the K6 
microprocessor. The K6 was created while leveraging a considerable amount of product 
design knowledge based on the K5 (Slater 1996). The product team designed a chip 
with 8.8 million transistors in 350 nm, which was twice the number of transistors in the 
K5 (Morrison and DeTar 1998). Due to the new product features, the manufacturing 
processes for the K6 chip were substantially different from those that already existed. 
Moreover, since the details of the microchip architecture of K6 were relatively complex, 
KT from the product to the process design team was difficult (Wilson 1996). Ultimately, 
AMD faced manufacturing challenges with K6 that led to the reduction in output volume 
and a delayed product launch (DeTar 1997, Takahashi 1997). As an aside, AMD’s slow 
ramp-up afforded Intel the opportunity to first introduce the Pentium MMX (Willcox 1999).  
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b 
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One possible explanation for AMD’s performance is that the NPD manager 
overestimated the knowledge level of the process design team at the outset of the 
development project. In fact, initially it appeared that the process design team would 
design the manufacturing system for the K6 chip employing the same die size as the one 
that had been used in the previous generation of microprocessors. The process design 
team planned on taking advantage of the additional metal layers and tighter physical 
design to pack more transistors into one area (Slater 1997). However, serious problems 
developed while designing the high yield process technology to build the small chips with 
such a high density of transistors (DeTar 1997). It would seem that by overestimating the 
initial level of knowledge of the process design team, the NPD manager did not 
recognize the importance of front-loading KT from the product design team. As a result, 
the ability of the process design team to embed useful knowledge into the NPD project 
was limited. Moreover, it seems that AMD placed little value on KT from the process to 
the product design team. As a result, it appears that product development proceeded 
without knowledge about manufacturability and early signals of insufficient process 
knowledge were not detected. Overall, AMD’s problems may be explained by its pursuit 
of a knowledge management strategy that did not properly leverage product design 
knowledge at the outset of the development project. 
3.4.4 Process Oriented Development 
Next, we assume the reverse conditions stated in Section 3.4.3 hold. Thus, the 
manager optimally pursues a front-loading strategy for KT to the product design team 
but delays the peak rates of KD of the product design team and KT to the process 
design team.  
Since the initial level of product team knowledge is small, the effectiveness of KD 
early in the development project is limited leading to the delay strategy. However, KT 
from the process to the product design team is effective at the outset of the development 
project due to the initially large level of process design team knowledge (source). Thus, 
the NPD manager leverages the process design team’s knowledge to drive the 
development of product design knowledge. This approach to NPD is generally referred 
to as design for manufacturability. Moreover, from the outset of the NPD project, the 
manager pursues KD and KT from the product design team at increasing rates. 
Eventually, when product team knowledge is sufficiently developed, the manager 
reaches the peak rates of KD and KT to the process design team. 
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In conclusion, we term this case as process oriented development since it 
illustrates the how the manager leverages process design team knowledge throughout 
the development project to maximize expect profit. These insights are summarized in 
Figure 3.3 and Corollary 5, below. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 KD and KT for the scenario depicted in Corollary 5a and 5b. 
 
 
COROLLARY 5a. Suppose D0 is small and M0 is large. Then, the manager is driven to 
pursue (i) the delay strategy for KD (γ).  
 
COROLLARY 5b. Again, suppose D0 is small and M0 is large. In addition, suppose ρ2<r1. 
Then, the manager is driven to pursue (i) the front-loading strategy for KT to the product 
design team (β) and (ii) the delay strategy for KT to the process design team (b). 
 
We may interpret the above analytic results in the context of industry practice. 
Consider the development of the first commercially mass produced and marketed hybrid 
automobile (Nonaka and Peltokorpi 2006), the Toyota Prius, which uses both a gasoline 
engine and an electric motor for propulsion. The product design of the Prius entails a 
complex electrical architecture for the power train, including the designs of electric 
motors, electric inverters and converters, high-voltage batteries, electronic control units, 
as well as semiconductors and sensors (Tilin 2005). Despite substantial innovations in 
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the product attributes of the Prius, Toyota manufactured and assembled it in the same 
factories as conventional (gasoline powered) vehicles (Weber 2006). Thus, we can 
reasonably assume that the initial level of knowledge of the process design team was 
large.  
The development of Toyota’s Prius demonstrates how process design expertise 
may shape product design objectives. Throughout the NPD project, the product and the 
process design teams collaborated closely through face-to-face KT from the process to 
the product design team (Magnusson and Berggren, 2001). Moreover, Toyota created 
the Unit Production Technology Department (UPTD) to facilitate KT from the process 
design team (including the drive system and chassis) regarding the manufacturability of 
the hybrid vehicle. At the same time, once the manufacturing process constraints were 
reliably addressed in the product design, the product design team intensified 
experimentation to converge to the final design (e.g. fuel infrastructure, battery powered 
design, engine system). This suggests that a delay strategy was used for KD (Nonaka 
and Peltokorpi 2006). Overall, it seems that Toyota’s success with the Prius may be 
explained by its ability to leverage a considerable level of process design knowledge 
from the outset of the development project. 
3.4.5 The Impact of Errors Detected during Knowledge Creation  
In this section we explore the impact of errors that are detected by KD or KT 
activities that reduce the cumulative level of useful product or process design 
knowledge. Suppose the initial knowledge levels of the product and process design 
teams are relatively similar. In addition, suppose the extent of errors detected by KD is 
large. As expected, we find that the manager pursues KD at a smaller rate throughout 
the NPD project. Moreover, we find that the manager is driven to pursue the delay 
strategy for KD. Essentially, if the extent of errors detected is large, then the manager 
delays the peak rate of KD until a later time when more advanced product design 
knowledge is available to reduce the impact of those errors. Said differently, with more 
knowledge later in the NPD project, the product design team is better able to respond to 
errors that are uncovered. Meanwhile, in order to recover the loss in the cumulative level 
of useful knowledge, the manager continues to apply product and process design 
knowledge, which takes the form of design changes and rework. Analogous results hold 
for the pursuit of KT in either direction. 
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We also find that if the effect of errors detected by KT to the process or process 
design team is large, then the manager front loads KD of the product design team. For 
example, suppose KT from the product to the process design team uncovers 
considerable errors. By intensifying KD early in the NPD project, the product design 
team is able to communicate more advanced knowledge to the process design team and 
thereby reduce the impact of the errors detected in KT. Similarly, suppose KT to the 
product design team triggers considerable design changes. In this situation, the 
manager front loads KD to better prepare product design team to absorb KT from the 
process design team and thereby reduce the impact of the errors that are uncovered.   
Lastly, if the extent of errors detected by KT in one direction is large, the 
manager front-loads KT in the other direction. To interpret this result, suppose the extent 
errors uncovered by KT to the process design team is large. The manager is driven to 
front-load KT to the product design team to increase the level of knowledge of the 
source. In this way, the manager leverages the enhanced product design team 
knowledge later in the NPD project and thereby reduces the impact of the errors 
detected during KT to the process design team. 
 
COROLLARY 6a. A high (low) rate of errors detected by a particular means of 
knowledge creation (θ1,θ2,θ3) drives the manager to pursue less (more) of that type of 
knowledge creation over the development project (γ, β, b).  
 
COROLLARY 6b. Suppose the extent errors uncovered by KD for the product design 
team (θ1) is large (small). Then, the manager is driven to (i) delay (front-load) KD (γ), (ii) 
front-load (delay) KT to the product design team (β) and (iii) delay (front-load) KT to the 
process design team (b). 
 
COROLLARY 6c. Suppose the extent of errors uncovered by KT to the product design 
team (θ2) is large (small). Then, the manager is driven to (i) front-load (delay) KD (γ), (ii) 
delay (front-load) KT to the product design team (β) and (iii) front-load (delay) KT to the 
process design team (b).  
 
COROLLARY 6d. Suppose the extent of errors uncovered by KT to the process design 
team (θ3) is large (small). Then, the manager is driven to (i) front-load (delay) KD (γ),(ii) 
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front-load (delay) KT to the product design team (β),and (iii) delay (front-load) KT to the 
process design team (b). 
3.4.6 The Impact of Drivers of Expected Net Revenue 
In this section we consider how the determinants of the expected net revenue 
impact the KM strategies. First, suppose the cumulative level of useful product design 
knowledge substantially increases the probability that the new product will have the 
features and functionality leading to success in the marketplace. As expected, we find 
that KD and KT to the product design team are larger throughout the NPD project. In a 
result that is not obvious, we find that the rate of KT to the process design team is also 
larger throughout the development project. Second, suppose the cumulative level of 
useful process design knowledge drives a substantial increase in net revenue when the 
product is released. As expected, we find that a higher rate of KT to the process design 
team is pursued throughout the development project. In a result that is not obvious, we 
find that KD and KT to the product design team are higher throughout the NPD project. 
Therefore, we demonstrate that a complementary relationship exists between the three 
means of knowledge creation. This result is consistent with Joglekar et al. (2001) who 
state that to improve performance a manager should consider investing in both the 
product and process teams rather than over-investing in one team.   
Drivers of net revenue not only impact the rates of knowledge creation activities 
but also the timing.  Again, suppose the cumulative level of useful product design 
knowledge substantially enhances the probability of a successful product launch. We 
find that KD for the product design team is front-loaded to accelerate the accumulation of 
useful product design knowledge. Moreover, KT to the process design team is front-
loaded so that process design knowledge increases rapidly early in the development 
project. However, the manager is driven to delay the peak rate of KT to the product 
design team until a later time when process knowledge is more refined. Therefore, when 
product design knowledge is a key driver of expected net revenue, to increase the level 
of product design knowledge the manager relies more on KD early and KT from the 
process design team later in the development project. In addition, by delaying the KT to 
the product design team, the manager transfers more advanced knowledge from the 
process design team about design for manufacturability.   
Similarly, suppose the cumulative level of useful process design knowledge 
substantially increases net revenue. We find that the manager optimally, front-loads KT 
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from the process design team to accelerate the increase in product design knowledge 
but delays KT to the process design team. The delay strategy is advocated so that KT 
from the product design team occurs after it has become more refined. The peak rate of 
KD for the product design team occurs later when product design knowledge is more 
advanced from earlier KT from the process design team. Therefore, KD is delayed 
reflecting the relatively high desirability of investing in process design knowledge as a 
means of maximizing expected net revenue. 
Time-based competition is another driver of expected net revenue. Specifically, 
the net revenue earned from the product release is driven by the level of useful process 
design knowledge as well as the amount of time based competition. We show that the 
manager’s pursuit of knowledge creation is smaller throughout the NPD project if the 
marginal impact of time-based competition on net revenue is larger. Therefore, time-
based competition reduces the potential gains realized from introducing the new product 
to the marketplace. However, while smaller in magnitude, the manager does pursue 
knowledge creation during the NPD project. We find that the manager is driven to front-
load KT to the process design team to accelerate the rate of increase in the cumulative 
level of useful process design knowledge. Moreover, KD is front-loaded so that the 
knowledge that is transferred from the product design team is more refined. Lastly, the 
manager delays KT to the product design team in order to transfer more advanced 
knowledge about the manufacturability of the product.  
 
COROLLARY 7a. Suppose any of the following conditions hold:  (i) the marginal 
probability that the new product is successfully developed by time t (FX(t)) is large (small); 
(ii) the marginal net revenue from embedding useful process design knowledge (RY(t)) is 
large (small); or (iii) the marginal reduction in net revenue from a delayed product launch 
(Rt) is small (large). Then, the manager is driven to pursue more (less) knowledge 
creation for both the product and process design teams (γ, β and b) throughout the NPD 
project.  
 
COROLLARY 7b. Suppose any of the following conditions hold: (i) the marginal 
probability that the new product is successfully developed by time t (FX(t)) is large (small); 
(ii) the marginal net revenue earned from embedding useful process design knowledge 
(RY(t)) is small (large);(iii) the marginal reduction in net revenue from a delayed product 
launch (Rt) is large (small). Then, the manager is driven to: (a) front-load (delay) KD (γ), 
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(b) delay (front-load) KT to the product design team (β), and (c) front-load (delay) KT to 
the process design team (b).  
3.5. Discussion and Conclusions 
We develop a normative model to aid the manager of an NPD project determine 
her KM strategy for the product and process design teams. The timing and extent of 
knowledge embedded by each team during the development project determine the 
features, functionality, and manufacturing efficiency of the product and process. The 
manager determines the optimal rate and timing of knowledge creation, which includes 
KD for the design team and KT between the product and process design teams. The 
optimal dynamic rates of knowledge creation are obtained to maximize the expected 
profit, which consists of the expected net revenue when the product is released less the 
costs for knowledge creation during development.  
3.5.1 The Delay or Front-Loading Strategies 
We show that each knowledge creation solution satisfies one of two possible 
strategies over the development project. First, in the front-loading strategy the manager 
pursues KD or KT at an initially high rate that decreases throughout the remainder of the 
NPD project. The rate of KD or KT decreases over time because further additions to the 
level of product or process design team knowledge are more difficult to realize 
(diminishing  returns), and because as time passes less time remains in the NPD project 
to accrue the benefits from KD or KT. 
In particular, KD is front-loaded when its effectiveness is high at the outset of the 
NPD project. The effectiveness of KD is high if the initial level of product design 
knowledge is large, or if the extent of errors detected while pursuing KD is small. Also, 
KD is front-loaded if the manager estimates that the cumulative level of useful product 
design knowledge substantially enhances the probability of a successful product launch. 
Moreover, what is not obvious is that KD is front-loaded when the cumulative level of 
useful process design knowledge is not a key driver of net revenue. In this situation, the 
manager focuses on developing product design knowledge as a means of maximizing 
expected net revenue.  
Similarly, KT to the product (process) design team is front-loaded if the initial 
level of process (product) team knowledge is large, or if the rate of errors detected by KT 
to the product (process) design team is small. In addition, if the ability of process design 
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knowledge to drive net revenue is large (small) early in the NPD project, the manager 
follows front-loading strategy for KT to the product (process) design team. Lastly, in a 
result that is not so apparent, the manager front-loads KT to the product design team if 
the cumulative product design knowledge is not a key driver of the probability of 
successful launch of the new product early in the NPD project. Under this condition, the 
manager accelerates the increase in the product design knowledge to increase the 
probability of developing a successful product. 
Second, in the delay strategy the manager optimally delays her peak investment 
in KD or KT until a later time when the investment is more effective. If the effectiveness 
of KD or KT is small at the initial time, then it is pursued at a relatively small but 
increasing rate early in the development project. The rate increases over time because 
as the levels of knowledge grow the effectiveness of investments in KD and KT increase. 
Eventually, the rate of KD or KT declines when the level of product or process design 
team knowledge reaches a point where additional gains are difficult to achieve 
(diminishing returns) and since less of the development project remains to reap the 
benefits from knowledge creation. The conditions that drive the delay strategy are the 
opposite from those that lead to the front-loading strategy.   
Since the manager has some control over the effectiveness of pursuing 
knowledge creation, the above insights are particularly important. In particular, we 
demonstrate that the manager must carefully assemble her product and process design 
teams so that the full potential of each team's knowledge is realized at the outset of the 
NPD project. To do so, the manager must understand the nature of the knowledge that 
will be required as well as the talents of potential team members. On the one hand, the 
knowledge embodied by team members should reflect some degree of differentiation, 
since such teams are more likely to develop novel solutions (Bonabeau et al. 2008, Sosa 
et al. 2007). On the other hand, a certain amount of overlap in the knowledge of team 
members positions them to better understand each other's expertise and draw links 
between their stocks of knowledge (Clark and Fujimoto 1991).  
The rates of return on KD or KT are key drivers of their effectiveness at building 
the levels of product and process design knowledge. To the extent possible, the 
manager should create an environment that fosters higher rates of return. Incentives 
may be put into place to encourage the sharing of knowledge within a team so that any 
increase in knowledge by some team members (e.g., through executive education, etc.) 
is shared with other team members. Similarly, if a manager introduces an IT system to 
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facilitate the sharing of knowledge either within or between teams, then the returns to 
any investment in knowledge creation are higher.  
We discuss two of the six combinations of KM solutions that can occur. Figure 
3.4 illustrates the KM strategies driven by the initial levels of knowledge of the product 
and process design teams. First, suppose the initial knowledge level of the product 
design team is large, the initial knowledge level of the process design team is small, and 
the effectiveness of KT to the product design team is larger than the effectiveness of KT 
in the other direction. Under these conditions the manager is driven to pursue a product 
oriented development strategy whereby the KD for the product design team and the KT 
to the process design team is front-loaded and the KT to the product design team is 
delayed. Second, suppose the above conditions are reversed. Here, the manager is 
driven to pursue a process oriented development strategy, in which the manager is 
driven to front-load KT to the product design team and delay KD for the product design 
team and the KT to the process design team. These product and process oriented 
strategies are illustrated in the first and fourth quadrants of Figure 3.4, respectively. 
Third, suppose that initial levels of knowledge of both product and process design teams 
are large. This condition drives the manager to purpose a front-loaded development 
strategy, where all the knowledge creation efforts follow a front-loading strategy (given at 
the second quadrant of Figure 3.4).  
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The KM strategies that constitute the first, second and fourth quadrants of Figure 
3.4 are driven by the initial knowledge levels of the product and process design teams. 
Suppose the initial levels of the product and process design teams are small. The 
manager’s strategy for under these conditions is driven by two other factors: (i) the 
extent of errors uncovered by KD for the product design team and KT between the 
teams and (ii) the drivers of expected net revenue. In sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, we 
describe the KM strategies driven by these drivers. In addition, we depict the actions a 
manager may pursue to reduce the impact of errors detected during knowledge creation, 
and increase the impact of the drivers of expected net revenue. 
3.5.2 The Impact of Errors Detected during Knowledge Creation 
We analyze the impact of errors that are detected by KD or KT activities on the 
KM strategy of the manager. We show that if the extent of design changes triggered by 
KD for the product design team, then the manager pursues KD at a smaller rate 
throughout the development project. Analogous results hold for the pursuit of KT in 
either direction.  
In addition, our results reveal three key insights with respect to the impact of 
errors uncovered on the timing of KD and KT.  First, if the extent of errors uncovered by 
KD for the product design team is large, then the manager is driven to pursue product 
oriented development strategy (strategy depicted at the first quadrant of Figure 3.4). 
Second, the manager is driven to pursue process oriented development strategy if the 
extent of errors uncovered by KT to the product design team is large. Finally, if KT to the 
process design team uncovered large extent of errors, then the manager is driven to 
pursue front-loaded product development strategy. According to this strategy, the 
manager front-loads the KD and KT to the product design team and delays KT to the 
process design team. Thus, the manager accelerates the increase in the knowledge 
level of the product design team and transfers knowledge related to the attributes and 
features of the product later in the project. Thus, more effective KT to the process design 
team mediates the impact of the errors uncovered by KT from the product design team.  
The extent of errors uncovered by KD and KT during the project is may be 
related to the complexity of the NPD project. According to Mitchell and Nault (2007), 
project scope, which stems from the number of subsystem interactions impacts the 
extent of errors uncovered for product and process design. Thus, it is crucial for 
managers to span the units, components and functional areas covered by the NPD 
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projects to identify the system interdependencies, and decompose the design problem if 
necessary to reduce design complexity. However, decomposing the NPD project, and 
pursuing product and process designs with less knowledge input from the other may not 
be preferable due to reduced system performance, increased manufacturing cost, or an 
increased development budget (Terwiesch et al. 2002).  
Finally, the types of processes and activities undertaken by the manager for KD 
or KT also drive the extent of errors uncovered by knowledge creation. To the extent 
possible, the manager should carefully assess the project and team characteristics and 
should determine the most effective form of KD and KT activities. For example, if the 
complexity in the content of knowledge transferred between the design teams is large, 
then detailed documentation of the design activities may be the form of KT with smaller 
extent errors uncovered compared to face-to-face meetings between teams. In addition, 
use of support tools, such as IT may be useful to make communication between teams 
more straightforward. 
3.5.3 The Impact of Drivers of Expected Net Revenue 
We analyze the impact of drivers of expected net revenue on the manager’s KD 
and KT strategies. We find that if the product design knowledge substantially increases 
the probability of releasing a successful product early in the development project, then 
the manager pursues larger rates of KD for the product design team and larger rates of 
KT to both the product and process design teams. Similarly, the rates of knowledge 
creation for both teams are pursued at a larger rate if the process design knowledge 
substantially increases the net revenue generated by the new product early in the 
project, or the impact of time-based-competition in the market is large. Therefore, with 
respect to these drivers of expected net revenue, we observe a complementary 
relationship between the KD and KT. 
Our results also reveal that the drivers of expected revenue impact the timing of 
the knowledge creation for the product and the process design teams. Specifically, we 
show that if the product design knowledge significantly increases the probability of 
developing a successful product, or the time-based competition in the marketplace is 
large, then the manager is driven to pursue product oriented development strategy. 
Meanwhile the manager is driven to pursue process oriented development strategy if the 
ability of the process design knowledge to enhance net revenue is large. 
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These results demonstrate that the manager should carefully assess the drivers 
of expected net revenue due to their impact on the manager’s KM strategy, and take 
actions to influence them to the extent possible. For example, projects with radical 
versus incremental product or process designs vary significantly with respect to their 
drivers of expected net revenue. The development project of a drug based on radically 
new compounds may have a low probability of a successful release to the marketplace 
while expected net revenue from manufacturing the product may be large. Thus, it is 
crucial for the manager to identify the product/process design of new product 
development project as processes involving radical changes or incremental 
improvements to existing designs.  
In addition, the manager may influence the probability of releasing a successful 
product or the impact of process design on the net revenue (e.g. through by forming 
alliances with university research labs may provide insights on scientific and 
technological advancements, etc.). The impact of delaying the product launch in the 
marketplace on the net revenue earned from the product may be reduced by selecting 
team members with extensive experience in marketing research. Also, employing 
consulting firms that specialize in market research may be helpful.  
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CHAPTER 4 
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FOR NEW PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT: COMPETITION VERSUS JOINT DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
In today’s highly competitive marketplace, a firm’s success is driven by its ability 
to successfully launch new products in the marketplace (Deeds and Hill 1996). Various 
domains of knowledge are required for successful new product development (NPD), 
including scientific and technology related expertise, as well as knowledge about the 
marketplace and manufacturing processes. Recent studies demonstrate that many firms 
are unable to rely solely on internal knowledge-based capabilities to develop new 
products (Arora and Gambardella 1990, Rigby and Zook 2002). To gain access to the 
full scope of knowledge necessary for NPD, these firms tap into external pools of 
knowledge (Cassiman and Veugelers 2006) by entering into various forms of 
cooperative agreements (Appleyard 1996, Samaddar and Kadiyala 2006).  
Ironically, the knowledge sought by a firm may only be available from competitors 
developing similar products (Arora and Fosfuri 2003). The traditional view suggests that 
the unique knowledge possessed by a firm provides the maximum benefit if it remains 
proprietary, i.e., if the firm does not share or transfer this knowledge to competitors 
(Teece 1986). However, under certain conditions, knowledge transfer (KT) or knowledge 
sharing (KS) between competing firms has its advantages. In particular, a firm may 
transfer or share knowledge with a competitor to generate revenue that may be used for 
other NPD projects. In addition, KT or KS may be beneficial if the ultimate value of that 
knowledge in the marketplace is uncertain (Appleyard 1996, Kulatikala and Lin 2006). 
Thus, firms considering cooperative agreements with competitors face complicated 
decisions. Moreover, since the firms entering into cooperative agreements ultimately 
compete in the same market, the decisions made by one firm generally influence the 
decisions of the other (Ulrich and Eppinger 2003, Klastorin and Tsai 2004). Structures of 
cooperative agreements range from those in which the expected gains from developing 
new products is maximized individually for each firm, to those in which the joint gain of 
both firms is maximized.  
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In this chapter, a framework for analyzing the knowledge flow between two 
competing firms engaged in cooperative agreements is provided. We introduce a two-
period game theoretic model that explores knowledge management (KM) strategies that 
drive NPD for two profit maximizing firms. KM strategies include the KT or KS between 
firms and the knowledge development (KD) each firm pursues either independently or 
jointly with its competitor. We examine two mechanisms of cooperation between the 
competitors: competitive development (CD) and joint development (JD) agreements. 
Through analysis of these models, we seek to provide insights to the following 
questions: (1) Under what conditions should competing firms enter into CD or JD 
agreements? (2) More specifically, what conditions drive each firm’s KT, KS and KD 
decisions? (3) What are the effects of market specific factors such as the drivers of 
expected net revenue?  (4) What are the effects of the unique capabilities of a firm to 
integrate the knowledge it receives through transfer or sharing? (5) What is the effect of 
the loss of competitive advantage by the source firm due to KT or KS with its 
competitor? (6) What is the impact of uncertainty associated with the marketplace and 
the ability to integrate knowledge on the firms KM decisions? 
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides an 
overview of the key terms and concepts guiding this research. Section 4.3 provides a 
review of the related literature. In Section 4.4, two models depicting the CD and JD 
mechanisms are introduced. Optimal solutions, analytic sensitivity analysis and 
numerical analysis for each mechanism are presented in Section 4.5. Conclusions and 
areas of future research are given in Section 4.6.  
4.2 Mechanisms of Cooperation 
In this research, we introduce a two-period game to examine two mechanisms of 
cooperation between competitors: competitive development (CD) and joint development 
(JD) agreements. CD and JD arrangements offer a particularly good venue within which 
to examine the KM strategies since collaboration through transferring or sharing 
knowledge is one of the most common forms of cooperation between competing firms 
(Anand and Khanna 2000b). 
We define the CD mechanism as a form of cooperation between two firms 
developing new products that ultimately compete in the same market. The flow of 
knowledge-based resources from one firm (the source) to the other (the recipient) may 
take many forms including giving the rights to use licenses and patents, documentation 
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about scientific or technical expertise, or the transfer of employees who possess unique 
knowledge. An example of one such CD approach is the licensing agreement between 
Hitachi, Ltd. and Sony Corp., in which Sony purchased the rights to use the CPU cores 
of the Hitachi’s SuperHTM RISC engine family (SuperH) in its development projects for 
electronic goods (Sony Corporation 1998). Both firms use the SuperH microprocessors 
for the development of digital AV electronics and information technology related 
electronic appliances, and, therefore, compete in the same markets. Another example of 
the CD mechanism is the agreement between Procter and Gamble (P&G) Co. and Glaxo 
Wellcome PLC, through which P&G Co. sold patents pertaining to ulcer therapy to Glaxo 
PLC. Both P&G and Glaxo embed the knowledge embodied in the patents into their 
ulcer-eradication treatments (Tritec and Helidac) that compete in the same end markets 
(The Wall Street Journal 1996).   
In contrast, cooperation through the JD mechanism involves the joint 
development and market entry of a new product by the two firms. When competing firms 
cooperate through the JD mechanism, each firm dedicates a portion of its knowledge to 
the NPD project that is jointly pursued to develop the single product. As an example of 
one such agreement, in 2005, Olympus Corporation and Matsushita Electric (more 
commonly known as Panasonic) agreed to jointly develop interchangeable lens type 
digital SLR cameras (Hug 2005). As a result, the firms were able to bring Olympus's 
industry-leading SLR camera technology with Panasonic's advanced digital AV 
technology to the market, and develop innovative new design concepts for next-
generation digital SLR cameras. As another example of firms pursuing NPD projects 
jointly, Phillips and Lucent formed a JD while developing PCS wireless phones and later 
shared the revenues from the sales of the new products (Business Wire, 10 September 
1997). 
4.2.1 Evolution of Knowledge 
The level of knowledge possessed by each firm that is related to the 
development project includes an understanding of diverse scientific and engineering 
information. The initial levels of knowledge may be inferred from the overall educational 
background of the employees working on the development project, years of work 
experience, performance appraisals, and past experience in similar research, 
development and engineering domains. While a firm may possess a considerable 
amount of knowledge in general, the level of knowledge relevant to the development 
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project under consideration may be small due to its novelty. As described below, the 
firms increase their level of knowledge throughout the development project so that they 
apply more knowledge to the NPD project. Specifically, the extent of knowledge 
embodied by the firms at the end of the NPD project is embedded into the new product, 
and determines the features, functionality and manufacturing efficiency of the new 
product. Throughout the rest of this Chapter, we use the level of knowledge of a firm at 
the end of the NPD project as a proxy for the knowledge embedded into the new product 
by the firm. 
We consider firms that pursue two forms of knowledge creation to increase the 
levels of knowledge they embed into the design of their new product and process (Ittner 
et al. 2001, Pisano 1994). First, in the initial period of the game, one or both of the firms 
may increase its level of NPD-related knowledge by entering into a cooperative 
agreement with its competitor. Firms engage in knowledge transfer (KT) that may take 
form of giving the rights to use licenses and patents, or documentation about component 
technologies or modules. We assume that, in the case of CD, KT occurs in one direction, 
and the source firm gives the recipient firm the rights to use the knowledge in exchange 
for revenue. The benefits the recipient realizes from the knowledge it buys are uncertain 
since its integration may prove difficult. Alternatively, the firms may engage in knowledge 
sharing (KS) whereby both firms share a portion of their knowledge in a joint NPD 
project and ultimately share the revenue earned when the new product is released. 
Again, the capability of the firms to integrate the shared knowledge dedicated to the joint 
NPD project is uncertain. Therefore, reflecting the challenges associated with knowledge 
integration, the level of knowledge after knowledge transfer (CD) or sharing (JD) is 
uncertain. 
The other means by which firms pursue knowledge creation is through 
knowledge development (KD) (Iansiti and Clark 1994), which occurs in the second 
period of the game. KD is a form of knowledge creation whereby the firm’s employees 
expend efforts resulting in advancements in materials, technologies, processes, or 
product designs (Hatch and Mowery 1998, Lapre and Van Wassenhove 2001). KD 
undertaken by product and process design developers may take the form of problem-
structuring and goal-setting for the problem-solving process teams; building working 
models of design alternatives through simulation or creating a physical prototype and 
analyzing, testing and evaluating these models (Clark and Wheelwright 1993). 
Knowledge creation activities are often supported by technologies such as computer-
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aided design and simulation software (Thomke 1998, Thomke and Fujimoto 2000). In 
addition to the above means of KD focusing on activities inside the firms, KD also occurs 
when members of design teams participate in continuing education programs offered by 
universities or training programs offered by equipment or software vendors. In addition, 
KD occurs when design team members attend professional conferences (Biskup and 
Simons 2004, Jacobs 2006). For the CD case, each firm individually makes a KD 
decision to maximize its individual profit. Alternatively, if the firms pursue a JD project, 
they jointly determine the rate of KD pursued in the second period of the game. The 
increase in the knowledge levels of firms due to KD occurs in a deterministic manner.    
To formalize the above discussion into research models, consider a two-period 
Stackelberg game setting, where the leader is the more powerful firm that makes the 
initial decision and the follower firm reacts to the leader’s decision (Samaddar and 
Kadiyala 2006). Moreover, we assume complete and perfect information. Under the CD 
agreement in the initial stage of period one, the leader determines the pricing strategy it 
will charge for the knowledge it is willing to transfer to its competitor. The follower reacts 
to the pricing strategy and determines the amount of knowledge it will purchase in the 
second stage of period one. In the second period for the CD mechanism, first the leader 
then the follower determines their individual amounts of KD. 
In the first stage of the first period under the JD agreement, the leader sets the 
portion of the joint profits it will earn from the new product. Naturally, this decision also 
sets the portion of the joint profit allocated to firm 2. In the second (third) stage of period 
one, the leader (follower) determines the amount of knowledge it will share with its 
competitor. In the second period of JD, the firms make the joint KD decision. Thus, for 
the JD mechanism the second period consists of one stage.  
4.2.2 Expected Profit 
Consistent with the NPD literature, we assume that revenue from the new 
product is earned when development efforts are complete and it is released to the 
marketplace (at the end of the second period) (Kim 1998, Santiago and Vakili 2005). The 
KT/KS and development decisions that are made by each firm reflect the following key 
trade-off: a firm may enhance its own ability to generate expected revenue from 
proprietary knowledge, or it may generate revenue from selling or sharing a portion of its 
knowledge. For the CD mechanism, firm 2, who is the recipient of KT, also considers the 
increased probability of developing a successful new product due to new knowledge 
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received through KT. Of course due to the uncertainty regarding knowledge integration, 
the increase in revenue is also uncertain. We assume that each firm’s predictions about 
the effectiveness of the KT or KS process, or the uncertainty associated with the 
marketplace is common knowledge.  
While making the KT or KS and KD decisions the firms maximize expected profit 
over the two-period horizon. Expected profit consists of: (i) the expected net revenue 
earned from the new product; (ii) the cost of KD pursued in period two; and (iii) the 
revenue or cost incurred for KT or KS in period one. Each of these drivers of profit are 
described below.  
First, we consider expected net revenue. At the end of the second period, the 
level of knowledge held separately by each firm (CD) or shared jointly by both firms (JD) 
determines the features, functionality and manufacturing efficiency of the new product 
introduced to the marketplace, and, thereby, drives the expected net revenue over the 
product’s lifecycle. For the CD mechanism, the expected net revenue earned from the 
new product is expressed as a function of the probability that the new product will have 
the features and functionality making it successful in the marketplace, the customer’s 
valuation of knowledge, the firm’s own level of knowledge, and the firm’s level of 
knowledge relative to its competitor. Therefore, the impact on firm 1’s expected revenue 
due to the transfer of knowledge to firm 2 is captured by those customers who flock to 
the firm offering the new product with the most features (i.e., with more knowledge). For 
firm 2, the probability of developing a successful product depends on whether or not it 
engages in KT from firm 1. Pursuing KT increases the level of knowledge embodied by 
firm 2, resulting in a larger probability of developing a successful product at the end of 
the NPD project. For the JD case, the expected net revenue earned from the new 
product is expressed as a function of the probability that the new product will have the 
features and functionality making it successful in the marketplace, the customer’s 
valuation of the knowledge that has been jointly embedded into the new product, and the 
joint level of knowledge embedded by both firms in the NPD project.  
Second, we consider the costs incurred by firms to pursue knowledge 
development during period two. These costs reflect the salaries of employees who 
perform knowledge creating activities such as experimentation, simulation, and 
prototyping. Also, costs are incurred for consultants and trainers and the integration of 
new hires. KD costs are incurred for materials, the operation of laboratories, and 
equipment including information technology. KD costs include the monetary resources 
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committed to permit employees to attend conferences and workshops, as well as 
executive programs. Lastly, KD costs, such as overtime, are required to sustain team 
productivity levels during KD. 
Third, consider the revenue and costs incurred directly for KS and KT. For the 
CD mechanism, the transfer of knowledge impacts the expected profit of the firms in the 
following manner: The leader that is the source gains revenue from sharing knowledge 
and the leader incurs a cost due to loss of proprietary knowledge. This loss can be 
viewed as an opportunity cost reflecting the loss in future revenue that would have been 
derived from the new product based on sole ownership of the knowledge. Meanwhile, 
the follower firm incurs a cost for the payment of the knowledge is receives from the 
source firm. The detrimental effect of sharing knowledge with a competitor also impacts 
the expected profit earned by each firm entering into the JD agreement. In particular, 
each firm incurs a cost due to its loss of proprietary knowledge. This loss is similar to the 
cost incurred by the source firm in the CD mechanism. 
4.3 Literature Review 
Past literature has addressed knowledge creation between competitors. 
Loebecke et al. (1999) examine the sharing of knowledge which may be a key source of 
competition in a two-player game theoretical setting. They consider the negative effects 
of sharing knowledge with a competitor. They suggest one of the most crucial elements 
to the firm’s decision as to whether to share knowledge or not is the firm’s ability to 
manage the process of KS. The analysis by Loebecke et al. suggests that, even in the 
best mechanism, firms are not sure whether to share knowledge or not. Nevertheless, 
firms overcome this uncertainty if they have developed an effective control strategy to 
manage the dynamics of the KS process. 
The problem of bargaining over the sharing of NPD knowledge between two 
competitors is examined by D’Aspremont et al. (2000). In their model, one of the firms 
licenses knowledge to a buyer firm through general licensing, and the profit earned from 
licensing is a function of the knowledge shared. However, the firms are in a race to 
develop a new product first, unlike our model of general licensing where both can first 
develop the new product, but the profit will be a function of the knowledge they transfer. 
Arora and Fosfuri (2003) analyze how the number of licenses sold is affected by 
competition from other technology holders, the strength of patent protection, and the 
nature of demand. They analytically show that firms license a technology when the 
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monetary gains from licensing exceed the loss in revenue due to increased competition 
in the marketplace. According to their results, if the licensor firm has a small market 
share, it is more likely to license since the loss of competitive advantage due to licensing 
is lower. In addition, they find that competition in the market for technology induces 
licensing of innovations, and firms may find it individually profitable to license even 
though their joint profits may be higher in the absence of any licensing. The authors also 
find that the number of licenses per patent holder decreases with the degree of product 
differentiation.  
In his study of 107 chemical product firms, Fosfuri (2006) analyzes whether the 
existence of multiple technology holders triggers more aggressive licensing behavior. 
His findings indicate that licensing behavior displays an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with the number of potential suppliers and is negatively related to the licensor’s market 
share and to the degree of product differentiation.  
Kulatikala and Lin (2006) explore how cooperation (in terms of licensing) among 
firms pursuing development project can discourage competition in the end-product 
market. The authors develop a model in which a firm invests in a development project of 
an innovation and can license its knowledge to a potential competitor. The authors focus 
on cooperation through general licensing, and determine the impacts of financial 
constraints on the structure of the cooperation. 
The competitive interaction between Intel and Microsoft, two producers of 
complementary products, is analyzed by Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie (2007). They 
consider the trade-off between the firms’ individual incentives to pursue development 
efforts for their own products, and the benefits of directing the joint investment into 
developing complementary products.  The findings show that conflicts emerge between 
the firms, in terms of pricing and launch time decisions for the new products. 
In his study focused on the KS decisions among competitors, Spiegel (2007) 
considers three firms that engage in a development projects who compete for market 
share in the end market. The findings show that the firm with the highest level of 
knowledge is better off licensing its knowledge to one or both of the other firms. The 
author considers the trade-off between the adverse effects of knowledge loss that 
provides competitive advantage, and the benefits from earning revenue due to the sale 
of knowledge. 
We extend the existing literature on several dimensions. We build on the past 
literature about KT or KS between firms and aim to develop complete KM strategies for 
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firms that consider cooperating with other firms. While most of the previous studies aim 
to solely develop cooperation strategies, we aim to examine the decision of firms with 
respect to KT/KS and KD decisions of those firms developing new products. Our model 
captures the complex and dynamic relationships between KT/KS and KD. For example, 
for the CD case, the effectiveness of KT/KS is a function of the integration capability, 
which is dependent on the initial knowledge levels of the firms, and the existing 
knowledge level of the recipient firm, as well as the level of knowledge it bought. 
Similarly, the effectiveness of KS for the JD case is a function of the integration 
capability, which is driven by the initial knowledge levels of the firms engaged in KS, and 
the levels of knowledge dedicated to the JD project by each firm. Finally, the 
effectiveness of KD for firms is a function of both the efforts expended and the existing 
knowledge level of the firms receiving KD. We capture the diminishing returns due to 
knowledge creation through KT/KS and KD.  
The past research that examines cooperation between firms analyzes the firms’ 
decisions regarding KT or KS. Meanwhile, through considering KD, as well as KT/KS, as 
means of knowledge creation, we aim to develop complete KM strategies for firms 
considering cooperation with other firms that compete in the same market. We identify 
the conditions that lead firms to cooperate through CD or JD mechanisms. In addition, 
we aim to examine the impacts of market or firm related factors on firms’ KM strategies. 
For example, we analyze the impact of expected customer valuation or the extent of loss 
or proprietary knowledge (due to cooperation) on firms’ KT/KS and KD decisions. We 
capture the impact of firm related factors such as the absorptive capacity of the recipient 
firm, or the initial knowledge levels of the firms on the KM strategies. 
4.4 The Model 
In this section, we delve into the details of the two models. A summary of 
notation appears in Table C.1 of Appendix C. 
4.4.1 Competitive Development 
We explore the CD agreement which is one form of cooperative mechanism. 
Through a CD agreement, firm 1 (source) sells a portion of its knowledge to firm 2 
(recipient) in exchange for revenue. Subsequently, both firms develop new products 
individually and compete in the same market.  
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4.4.1.1 Levels of Knowledge 
Let Kij denote the level of knowledge applied to the NPD project by firm i at time j, 
where i∈{1,2} and j∈{0,1,2}.  We denote the leader as firm 1 and the follower as firm 2. 
The initial time levels of NPD knowledge are known and given by K10 and K20 for firms 1 
and 2, respectively. The initial levels of knowledge may be inferred based on the overall 
educational background of team members working on the NPD projects, years of work 
experience, and performance appraisals (Leonard-Barton et al. 1994, Epple et al. 1996, 
Carrillo and Gaimon 2004).  In addition, each firm’s initial level of knowledge can be 
measured by the number of patents and publications awarded to that firm (Liebeskind et 
al. 1996; Shane, 2000). In period one, each firm’s level of knowledge changes due to the 
transfer of knowledge. In period two, the levels of knowledge increase through KD. Next, 
we describe how each firm’s level of knowledge evolves. 
In the first period of the NPD project, the question of KT arises. According to CD 
mechanism, firm 1 keeps the rights to continue using the knowledge it sells to firm 2 for 
its own NPD project. Let KTi denote the period one change in the level of knowledge of 
firm i due to KT, i=1,2. Since firm 1 retains the rights to use the knowledge it sells to firm 
2, its level of knowledge does not change during the first period (KT1=0). Thus, the 
knowledge level of firm 1 at the end of the first period is given in Equation (4.1). 
However, the knowledge level of firm 2 increases due to the purchase of new knowledge 
(KT2≥0). The knowledge level of firm 2 at the end of the first period is given in Equation 
(4.2). Let Q (decision variable) denote the amount of knowledge firm 2 buys from firm 1 
in period one. Naturally, firm 2 cannot buy more knowledge than that held by firm 1 at 
the beginning of period one (Q≤K10). Empirical results show that the effectiveness of KT 
is related to the resources allocated to the transfer activity, as well as the levels of 
knowledge of both firms participating in the transfer (Argote and Ingram 2000, 
Cummings and Teng 2003). We capture these relationships as follows. 
 
K11 = K10                        (4.1) 
 
K21 = K20 + KT2            (4.2) 
 
Firm 2 benefits more from KT as its level of absorptive capacity increases. 
Absorptive capacity indicates the firm’s ability to recognize the value of new external 
information, assimilate it, and apply it for competitive advantage (Cohen and Levinthal 
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1990). The absorptive capacity of the firm 2 is a function of two factors, the integration 
capability and the initial knowledge level of the firm that is the recipient of the knowledge. 
The level of absorptive capacity reflects the firm’s initial level of knowledge since a firm 
with higher level of knowledge is better able to comprehend and deploy knowledge it 
receives from another firm. The level of firm 2’s absorptive capacity is uncertain. At the 
initial time, the portion of knowledge firm 2 is able to integrate is unknown to both firms. 
Let βP[K10,K20] denote the expected portion of knowledge firm 2 is able to integrate 
(expected integration capability of firm 2) that satisfies the probability density function 
Φ(z) with mean  and standard deviation σ (Naturally, 0< βP[K10,K20]<1).  
Firm 2’s expected integration capability is a function of the initial knowledge 
levels of the both firms (K10,K20). As the initial knowledge of firm 1 or the initial 
knowledge of firm 2 increases, the expected integration capability of firm 2 increases. 
The magnitude of increase in the expected integration capability exhibits diminishing 
returns to scale with respect to K10 and K20. Mathematically, the mean of Φ(z) is a 
function of K10 and K20 satisfying the first and second order conditions ∂/∂K10, ∂/∂K20≥0 
and ∂2/∂K102, ∂2/∂K202≤0. As either K10 or K20 increases, additional knowledge is 
deployed that reduces the extent of uncertainty in the expected integration capability of 
firm 2 (as measured by the standard deviation σ). Mathematically, the standard deviation 
of Φ(z) decreases at an non-increasing rate with respect to K10 and K20, giving us 
∂σ/∂K10, ∂σ/∂K20≤0 and ∂2σ/K102, ∂2σ/∂K202≥0. The impact of the initial levels of 
knowledge on the probability distribution of the expected integration capability is known 
to both firms. 
The second component of absorptive capacity is the initial level of knowledge of 
firm 2. As firm 2’s own level of knowledge increases (K20), the level of knowledge gained 
by firm 2 increases at a decreasing rate. Also, a firm with a higher level of knowledge 
requires less KT efforts to obtain the same increase in knowledge as a firm with a lower 
level of knowledge. As the initial knowledge level of firm 2 increases, the level of 
knowledge gained by firm 2 increases at a decreasing rate. Similarly, as the extent of 
knowledge purchased from firm 1 increases (Q), the level of knowledge gained by firm 2 
increases at a decreasing rate. This gives us KT2=βP[K10,K20]K20θ1Qθ2 where 0≤θ1,θ2≤1. 
Mathematically, the increase in the knowledge level of firm 2 in period one due to KT 
satisfies a simplified Cobb-Douglas function, where the inputs are the portion of 
knowledge firm 2 predicts it will be able to integrate, the knowledge level of firm 2 at the 
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beginning of period one, and the amount of knowledge purchased from firm 1. Equations 
(4.3) and (4.4) summarize the above discussion regarding how KT affects the period one 
levels of knowledge of firms 1 and 2.  
 
K11 = K10                      (4.3) 
 
K21 = K20 + βP[K10,K20]K20θ1Qθ2                                                                        (4.4) 
 
Whereas in the first period knowledge creation is embodied in the KT decision, in 
the second period each firm invests in KD. Let KDi denote the period two change in the 
level of knowledge of firm i due to KD. Firm 1 (leader) makes the initial KD decision, 
followed by the firm 2’s (follower) decision. Thus, the knowledge levels of the firms at the 
end of the second period are: 
 
Ki2 = Ki1 + KDi                        (4.5) 
 
Let γi (decision variable) denote the period two efforts undertaken by firm i for KD. 
Again, the increase in each firm’s knowledge level from KD is a function of its absorptive 
capacity. First, each firm’s ability to increase knowledge during period two is a function 
of its level of knowledge at the end of period one. A firm with a higher level of knowledge 
requires less KD efforts to obtain the same increase in knowledge as a firm with a lower 
level of knowledge (Carrillo and Gaimon 2004, Jacobs 2006, Hatch and Macher 2005). 
Moreover, the increase in firm knowledge due to KD exhibits diminishing returns (Carrillo 
and Franza 2006, Jacobs 2006). Thus, the increase in the level of knowledge of firm i in 
period two is given by γiKi1µi, where µi represents the rate of diminishing returns (0≤µi≤1). 
Firm 1 and 2’s level of knowledge at the end of period two appears in Equations (4.6) 
and (4.7), respectively, and reflects the above discussion regarding the impact of KD.  
 
K12 = K11 + K11µ1γ1 = K10 + K10µ1KD1                                                  (4.6) 
 
K22 = K21 + K21µ2γ2  
       = K20 + βP[K10,K20]K20θ1Qθ2 + (K20 + βP[K10,K20]K20θ1Qθ2)µ2γ2      (4.7) 
 
 
 89
4.4.1.2 Expected Profit 
Having completed the presentation of the dynamics of each firm’s level of NPD 
knowledge, we turn our attention to the expected profit functions. As previously 
described, the knowledge level of each firm drives its ability to earn net revenue. Firm i’s 
expected net revenue is comprised of three components: the valuation of its level of 
knowledge by loyal customers, the extent that it gains or loses revenue due to switching 
customers who compare the levels of knowledge of both firms, and the probability that 
firm i is alone in the market at the end of period two, i.e., its competitor does not 
successfully develop a new product by the end of that period. 
First, we consider the portion of the expected net revenue earned by each firm 
that is solely driven by its own level of knowledge at the end of period two. This 
component of revenue can be viewed as the revenue earned from firm i’s loyal 
customers who do not consider the knowledge embedded into the new product by firm 
i's competitor. Three elements drive the expected net revenue from loyal customers. Let 
vi denote the loyal customers’ valuation of the knowledge embedded by firm i into the 
new product. Therefore, the net revenue from loyal customers is expressed, in part, by 
product of the customers’ valuation of knowledge and the level of firm i’s knowledge, Ki2. 
In addition, the revenue firm i earns from its loyal customers is stochastic, as described 
below. 
Let δi denote the probability that the new product developed by firm i will have the 
features and functionality making it successful in the marketplace. Under the CD 
mechanism, we assume that firm 1’s probability of developing a new product (δ1) does 
not change if it engages in KT with firm 2 since firm 1 retains the rights to use the 
knowledge it sells. Meanwhile, if firm 2 engages in KT, its knowledge level increases and 
the probability that it successfully develops a new product is larger. Mathematically, let δ2 
denote the probability firm 2 develops a successful product under KT, whereas let δ2N 
denote the probability if KT does not occur. Clearly, we have δ2≥δ2N. Therefore, δiviKi2 
denotes the expected revenue earned from loyal customers when the new product is 
released to the market at the end of period two.  
The second portion of expected net revenue reflects consumers’ who base their 
purchasing decision on the product which has embedded in it the higher level of 
knowledge. We refer to these as “switching customers.” Firm i earns (loses) revenue 
based on the difference between its period two level of knowledge and that of its 
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competitor’s. Mathematically, firm i's revenue is a function of, Ki2–Kk2, where i,k ∈{1,2} 
and i≠k (Lichtenstein and Burton 1989, Ali and Seshari 1993). It is important to note that 
when customers switch from firm i to firm k, firm k earns additional revenue from the 
switching customers while firm i’s revenue declines. In addition, the revenue firm i earns 
(loses) from switching customers is stochastic, as described below. 
Each firm faces uncertainty with respect to how its own level of knowledge 
relative to its competitor’s impacts the customers’ valuation in the marketplace. We 
assume that the distribution of the firms’ customers’ valuation of the knowledge is 
common knowledge for the firms, where the firm’s expected valuation of knowledge in 
the marketplace is denoted as wiP. Naturally, if firm i’s knowledge exceeds firm k’s, then 
firm i realizes the gain in expected revenue whereas firm k realizes the loss and vice 
versa.  The expected net revenue increase or loss due to switching customers is 
denoted by δiδkwiP(Ki2–Kk2), where i,k ∈{1,2} and i ≠k.  
Finally, consider the situation where firm i enter the market alone at the end of 
period two.  In this situation, firm i gains additional market share and revenue as the 
monopolist. Let zi denote the customers’ valuation of the knowledge embedded by firm i 
into the new product if firm i the only one to successfully develop a new product. 
Therefore, δi(1-δk)ziKi2 denotes the expected revenue earned by firm i due to the 
additional market share gained if firm k is not successful developing a new product.   
It is important to note that, while each component of the expected net revenue 
earned from the new product is a linear function of firm i's level of knowledge (the 
difference between the levels of knowledge of firms i and k) at the end of period two, the 
increase in the knowledge levels of the firms during the NPD project, whether from KT or 
KD, exhibit diminishing returns. Thus, we capture the increasing difficulty in generating 
revenue from embedding additional knowledge into the new product.  
 When firms cooperate through CD, each either earns revenue or incurs cost due 
to KT (Appleyard 1996, d’Aspremont 2000). Let G[KTi] denote the period one revenue 
earned or cost incurred due to KT between firms. In the first stage of period one, firm 1 
(leader) sets the price (P) for the knowledge it sells to firm 2. Firm 1 determines the price 
that maximizes its expected profit. In the second stage of the first period, given the price, 
firm 2 determines the amount of knowledge to buy (Q) that maximizes its own profit. The 
revenue earned by firm 1 from the KT equals the cost incurred by firm 2 and is given in 
Equation (4.8): 
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 G[KTi] = PQ                                     (4.8) 
 
Both firms incur a cost due to KD pursued in the second period, given by ciγi2. 
The cost of KD for firm i increases at an increasing rate in relation to the efforts 
expended for several reasons (Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Roemer et al. 2000, Krishnan 
and Zhu 2006). As more and more KD is undertaken, greater efforts are needed for 
coordination and supervision. A larger amount of KD may be associated with a larger 
amount of disruption to ongoing activities, especially if the knowledge is generated when 
employees attend training programs. In addition, as the extent of KD increases, firms 
resort to less and less efficient means (Kim 1998, Biskup and Simons 2004). Finally, as 
a consequence of KT in period one, firm 1 incurs a cost due to the loss of proprietary 
knowledge. By engaging in KT, firm 1 loses the sole ownership of a portion of its 
knowledge that is a source of competitive advantage. In other words, in period one, firm 
1 incurs an opportunity cost reflecting the future loss in net revenue had it been alone in 
introducing a new product based on the knowledge sold to firm 2. Thus, m1Q is the cost 
due to the loss of proprietary knowledge for firm 1, where m1 is the associated marginal 
cost. 
 The two-period expected profit firm 1 maximizes while determining P in the first 
stage of period one is depicted in Equation (4.9).   
 
E{pi1} = δ1v1K12 + δ1δ2w1P(K12 – K22) + δ1(1-δ2)z1K12 – c1γ12 + PQ – m1Q            (4.9) 
 
Given P, firm 2 determines the Q in the second stage of period one that maximizes its 
two-period expected profit, as shown in Equation (4.10).   
 
E{pi2} = δ2v2K22 + δ1δ2w2P(K22 – K12) + δ2(1-δ1)z2K22 – c2γ22 – PQ                     (4.10) 
 
Finally, to determine the optimal amounts of KD in period two, firms 1 and 2 also 
maximize expected profit functions in Equations (4.9) and (4.10), respectively.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates the evolution of knowledge over the periods, the decisions 
made by each firm in periods one and two, and the expected profit earned at the launch 
time of the new product for the CD mechanism. 
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Figure 4.1      Sequence of events for the CD mechanism 
 
4.4.2 Joint Development  
 Forming a JD is another possible mechanism of cooperation for firms developing 
new products for the same market. With the JD agreement, firms to cooperate in 
developing a new product and releasing it to the market. Subsequently, both firms share 
the expected revenue generated and the cost of knowledge development, which we 
refer to as expected net revenue (Fosfuri and Rønde 2004, Anand and Khanna 2000a).  
4.4.2.1 Levels of Knowledge 
We model the JD mechanism between two firms in a two-period model, similar to 
the CD model. In the first period, the question of KS arises. The first period is comprised 
of three stages. Firm 1, the leader, determines the portion of the total expected net 
revenue it will receive at the end of period 2 when the product is released to the market 
(stage one) as well as the amount of knowledge it will contribute to the JD project (stage 
two). Firm 2, the follower, determines the amount of knowledge it will contribute to the 
project given firm 1’s prior decisions (stage three). Naturally, Firm 2 will earn the portion 
of expected net revenue that remains after firm 1 takes its share. In the second period, 
both firms make a joint decision regarding the extent of KD to pursue before releasing 
the product to the market. The portion of the cost of the KD incurred by each firm is the 
same as the distribution of expected net revenue. The objective for each firm is to 
maximize its own expected profit, which is expressed as a function the expected net 
revenue it earns when the product is released minus a term reflecting the loss in its 
expected revenue that results from sharing knowledge. The loss in expected revenue 
occurs because the firm forgoes the benefits it would have realized had it retained that 
knowledge as proprietary.  
Knowledge development 
occurs 
Knowledge transfer 
occurs 
    At t = 1 
- Levels of knowledge: K11, K12 
- Firm 1 makes γ1 decision 
- Firm 2 makes γ2 decision 
 
    At t = 2 
-
 Level of knowledge: K12, K22 
-
 Firms observe pi1, pi2 
     At t = 0 
-
 Levels of knowledge: K10, K20  
-
 Firm 1 makes P decision
 
-
 Firm 2 makes Q decision
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The knowledge levels of each firm at the start of the first period are known to 
both firms and are denoted by K10 and K20. At the end of the first period, KJD1 denotes the 
joint level of knowledge dedicated to the JD project. KJD1 is expressed as a function of 
three elements: the amount of knowledge shared by firm 1, the amount of knowledge 
shared by firm 2, and the capability of the firms to integrate the shared knowledge. Let Qi 
denote the amount of knowledge contributed by firm i to the JD project, where i∈{1,2}. 
Given the  leader-follower setting, firm 1 determines Q1 first, and, after observing Q1, firm 
2 determines Q2. Naturally, the firms cannot share a larger level of knowledge than what 
is available at the beginning of period one (Q1≤K10, Q2≤K20).  
The knowledge shared by both firms, as determined in the second and third 
stages of the first period, must be integrated. However, the ability of the firms to 
integrate the shared knowledge is stochastic. Let βP[K10,K20] denote the common 
expectation of the portion of knowledge both firms will be able to integrate in period 2 
(0<βP[K10,K20]<1). The expected value satisfies the probability density function Φ(z) with 
a mean  and standard deviation σ. The mean and standard deviation of Φ(z) are 
functions of the initial knowledge levels of both firms. As the initial level of knowledge of 
firm 1 or 2 increases, the expected integration capability increases at a decreasing rate 
(∂/∂K10, ∂/∂K20≥0 and ∂2/∂K102, ∂2/∂K202≤0). In addition, as the initial level of 
knowledge of firm 1 or 2 increases, more knowledge can be leveraged to reduce the 
uncertainty in the expected integration capability, but at a decreasing rate (∂σ/∂K10, 
∂σ/∂K20≤0 and ∂2σ/K102, ∂2σ/∂K202≥0). The above stochastic relationships are similar to 
those in Carrillo and Gaimon (2004).  
The joint knowledge level dedicated to the JD project is given in Equation (4.11), 
where θ1 and θ2 (0≤θ1,θ2≤1) reflect the diminishing returns as each firm contributes more 
and more knowledge to the JD.  
 
KJD1 = βP[K10,K20]Q1θ1Q2θ2                     (4.11) 
 
In period two, the firms jointly undertake KD for the new product. Let γJD denote 
the extent of efforts to be jointly allocated to KD by the firms in period two. The increase 
in the knowledge realized from KD in period two increases at a decreasing rate as the 
joint level of knowledge dedicated to the JD project increases. Therefore, a more 
knowledgeable joint entity is better equipped to generate and absorb new knowledge, 
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but with diminishing returns, as denoted by µJD (0≤µJD≤1). Thus, the increase in the joint 
level of knowledge in period two is given by γJDKJD1µJD. Equation (4.12) depicts the level 
of joint knowledge at the launch time of the product (KJD2). 
 
KJD2 = KJD1 + γJDKJD1µJD                     (4.12) 
4.4.2.2 Expected Profit 
Having completed the presentation of the dynamics of the firms’ level of NPD 
knowledge, we turn our attention to the expected profit functions. Similar to the CD 
mechanism, the joint knowledge level of the firms drives their ability to earn expected net 
revenue. The expected net revenue is comprised of three components: the net revenue 
earned from the launch of the jointly developed new product, minus the costs of KD and 
the costs of KS for each firm.  
It is important to note that, at the first stage of period one of the JD agreement, 
firm 1 determines the portion of expected profit to be allocated to firms 1 and 2. Let,  λ 
and 1–λ denote the portions of expected net revenue earned at the end of period two, by 
firm 1 and firm 2, respectively (0≤λ≤1). Subsequently, we assume that each firm incurs 
the same portion of the KD costs. In addition, each firm incurs a cost due to the loss of 
proprietary knowledge that occurs from KS. 
The expected net revenue earned by firm i from the new product released by the 
JD project is a function of the joint knowledge level at the end of period two. We capture 
the uncertainty associated with the revenue earned from the new product in two 
dimensions. First, the firms face uncertainty in their ability to jointly develop a product 
that successfully meets the feature and functionality requirements of the customers. Let 
δJD denote the probability that the new product developed jointly by the firms will have 
the features and functionality making it successful in the marketplace. Second, firm i's 
profit is a function of customers’ valuation of the knowledge, which is uncertain. We 
assume that the distribution of the firms’ customers’ valuation of the knowledge is 
common knowledge for the firms, where the firm’s expected valuation of knowledge in 
the marketplace is denoted as vJDP. This gives us the expected net revenue from the 
new product released at the end of period two as δJDvJDPKJD2. Since firm 1 (firm 2) earns 
λ (1-λ) portion of the expected net revenue, the expected net revenue earned by firm 1 
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(firm 2) from the new product generated by the JD project is denoted by λδJDvJDPKJD2 
((1–λ)δJDvJDPKJD2). 
The expected profit is also a function of the costs associated with KD pursued 
jointly by the firms in the second period, denoted by cJDγJD2. Similar to the CD 
mechanism, we assume that the cost of KD is a quadratic function of the KD efforts 
pursued by the firms. In addition to reflecting how net revenue will be shared in the JD 
agreement, λ and 1λ denote the portion of KD costs shared by firms 1 and 2. Thus, the 
cost of KD incurred is λcJDγJD2 and (1–λ)cJDγJD2 for firms 1 and 2, respectively. 
Finally, as a consequence of KS in period one, each firm incurs a cost due to the 
loss of proprietary knowledge. When the firms enter into JD, they lose the competitive 
advantage they had due to sole ownership of their portion of the knowledge. In other 
words, in period one, firm i incurs an opportunity cost reflecting the future loss in net 
revenue from new product it would have released based on knowledge it shared. Let mi 
denote the marginal cost incurred by firm i for sharing knowledge. Thus, m1Q1 and m2Q2 
are the costs due to loss of proprietary knowledge for firms 1 and 2, respectively.  
Equations (4.13) and (4.14) mathematically capture the expected profit to be 
maximized by firms 1 and 2, respectively, when determining the period one KS 
decisions. Therefore, in period one, each firm maximizes its own expected profit. 
 
E{pi1} = λ{vJDPKJD2  –  cJDγJD2} – m1Q1  
          = λ{δJDvJDP(βP[K10,K20]Q1θ1Q2θ2 + (βP[K10,K20]Q1θ1 Q2θ2)µJDγJD) –cJDγJD2}  
             – m1Q1                     (4.13) 
 
E{pi2} = (1–λ)vJDPKJD2  –  cJDγJD2 – m2Q2  
  = (1–λ){δJDvJDP(βP[K10,K20]Q1θ1Q2θ2 +(βP[K10,K20]Q1θ1Q2θ2)µJDγJD)  
                – cJDγJD2} – m2Q2           (4.14) 
 
However, since firms make the KD decision (γJD) jointly in period two, they 
maximize the expected net revenue function in Equation (4.15).  
 
E{piJD} = vJDPKJD2  –  cJDγJD2                                 (4.15) 
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the evolution of knowledge, the decisions made by each 
firm in period one and made jointly by the firms in period two, and the profit earned at the 
launch time for the JD mechanism. 
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Figure 4.2       Sequence of events for the JD mechanism 
 
4.5 Analytical and Numerical Analysis 
We solve the models introduced in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 using backward 
induction. Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 provide the analysis for the models capturing the CD 
and JD mechanisms, respectively. For each cooperation mechanism, we give the 
optimal solutions and explore the of impact of various parameters on the firms’ KM 
strategies through analytical and numerical analysis. In addition we illustrate the impact 
of uncertainty associated with both market and firm characteristics on the each firm’s 
knowledge creation decisions. The proofs of propositions are included in the Appendix 
C. 
4.5.1 Competitive Development 
4.5.1.1 Optimal Solution and Analytic Sensitivity Analysis 
Propositions 1 to 4 depict the optimal KM strategies for the leader and follower 
firms under CD mechanisms. Equation (4.16) gives the optimal amount of KD pursued 
by firms 1 and 2 in period two that maximizes the profit functions (4.13) and (4.14), 
respectively. Note that the KD pursued in period two by firms 1 and 2 are symmetrical. In 
addition, we see that the KD pursued by each firm is a function of its knowledge level at 
the end of period one, as well as drivers of expected revenue and the costs of KD. 
 
Knowledge 
development 
occurs 
Knowledge sharing 
occurs 
    At t = 1 
-
 Levels of knowledge: KJD1 
- Firms jointly make γJD decision 
 
    At t = 2 
-
 Level of knowledge: KJD2 
-
 Firms observe piJD 
     At t = 0 
-
 Levels of knowledge: K10, K20  
-
 Firm 1 makes λ decision
 
-
 Firm 1 makes Q1 decision 
-
 Firm 2 makes Q2 decision 
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PROPOSITION 1. The optimal amount of KD pursued by firm 1 in the second period 
satisfies Equation (4.16). In addition, the optimal amount of KD pursued by firm 2 in the 
second period satisfies Equation (4.17): 
 
 γ   ! "#$ %"&#' ()  * +,                                          (4.16) 
 γ+  #!#" $#%"& '#()# *#+,#            (4.17) 
 
From Equations (4.16) and (4.17), the optimal amount of KD for firm i is larger 
(smaller) if: (i) firm i’s probability of developing a successful new product is large (small); 
(ii) firm i's customers’ valuation of the knowledge embedded by firm i into the new 
product (vi) is large (small); (iii) firm i’s expected valuation by the customers for 
exceeding/falling short of the competitor’s knowledge (wi) is large (small); (iv) firm i’s 
customer’s valuation of knowledge if firm i is the only firm developing the new product 
(zi) is large (small); (v) the knowledge level of firm i at the end of period one (Ki1) is large 
(small); and (vi) the marginal cost of KD for firm i (ci) is small (large).   
From (v) we obtain an interesting insight: there is a complementary relationship 
between firm 2’s pursuit of KT in the first period and KD in the second period. We obtain 
this result because any investment by firm 2 in KD has greater impact when the increase 
in the level of knowledge of the firm in the first period is large. Clearly, this result shows 
that to the extent possible, firm 2 should undertake efforts that increase the effectiveness 
of KT.  
In Proposition 2, below, we describe the optimal amount of knowledge bought by 
firm 2 in period one, which is  a function of the price set by firm 1. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. The optimal amount of knowledge firm 2 buys in period one after 
observing the price charged by firm 1 satisfies Equation (4.18): 
 
2.+ /  0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+(5+67+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9#;+<#&    
                             +=#3 #!#" $#%"& '#(>%) ?,)#?	)#?@ A@#B           (4.18) 
 
From Equation (4.18), we observe the impact of several firm and market 
characteristics on the interaction between the KT decisions of firms 1 (P) and 2 (Q).  A 
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high price set by firm 1 in the first period (P) drives firm 2 to purchase a small (large) 
amount of knowledge (Q) if: (i) the valuation of knowledge by firm 2’s loyal customers 
(v2) is large (small); (ii) firm 2 is the only firm to successfully enter the market and the 
customers’ valuation of firm 2 knowledge (z2) is large (small); (iii) firm 2’s prediction of 
the valuation by its switching customers (w2P) is large (small); (iv) the prediction of the 
portion of KT that firm 2 will be able to integrate βP[K10,K20] is large (small);  (v) the level 
of knowledge of either firm 1 or 2 at the beginning of the first period (K10 or K20) is large 
(small); (vi) the rate of returns to KT of firm 2’s initial knowledge level (θ1) is large (small); 
and (vii) the marginal cost of KD pursued by firm 2 (c2) is small (large).  
According to these results, if the valuation of knowledge by firm 2’s customers is 
large (conditions (i), (ii), (iii)), firm 2 is driven to purchase more knowledge from firm 1 if 
the price set by firm 2 per unit knowledge is small. Meanwhile, if the valuation of loyal or 
switching customer’s of firm 2 is below a threshold value, large (small) price set by firm 1 
drives firm to purchase large (small) amount of knowledge. For example, due to small 
customer valuation, the value of embedding knowledge into the new product is small for 
firm 2, and firm 1 sets a smaller price to encourage firm 1 to purchase larger amount of 
knowledge at a smaller cost. However, since the benefits firm 2 realizes from developing 
a superior product, firm 2 refrains from purchasing large amount of knowledge from firm 
1. As a result, although the price set by firm 1 is smaller; firm 2 purchases a smaller 
amount of knowledge from firm 1.  
In addition, firm 2 is driven to purchase a large amount of knowledge when firm 1 
sets a smaller price if firm 1’s probability of successfully developing the new product or 
the effectiveness of transferring knowledge from firm 1 is large (conditions (iv), (v), (vi)). 
Meanwhile, if the cost of KD is large (condition (vii)), firm 2 focuses on increasing its 
level of knowledge by purchasing a large amount of knowledge from firm 1, despite the 
high price set by firm 1.  
The conditions given in Equation (4.19) and (4.20) must be satisfied for firms 1 
and 2 to cooperate thorough CD mechanism. These conditions mathematically depict 
the rational decision making of firms 1 and 2: Each firm is willing to cooperate with the 
other firm if the expected profit under the condition that it cooperates exceeds the 
expected profit under the condition that it develops the new product individually. Thus, 
for the firms to engage in CD mechanism, both firms expected profit if they cooperate 
should be larger than their expected profits if they don’t cooperate.   
 
 99
PROPOSITION 3. Firm 1 will cooperate with firm 2 if the inequality in Equation (4.19) is 
satisfied. Firm 2 will cooperate with firm 1 if the inequality in Equation (4.20) is satisfied.  
 
 C 4 D: E FG 4 F7 / H#&#() ?#* I= / 02360+ 4 0+G;7+ 
                               / 00+23 J8K7, 7+	7+9 :9# / )#?">L) ?,)#?	)#?@ A@##*#+=# M 
                              4 00+G23 NH)#?#*#+=# O                                  (4.19) 
  
             C: E PG7+ / H)#?#*#I=# 4 00+G2+3 N7 / H) ?#* += O                                                 
                  4 P67+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9#; / #)#?">%) ?,)#?	)#?@ A@##*#I=#  
                    4 00+2+3 N7 / ) ?#* += O                    (4.20) 
 
where  F  01 / 0+23 / 1 4 0+ 
          P  0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+ 
          FG  061 / 0+G23 / 61 4 0+G;; 
          PG  0+G1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+. 
 
Equation (4.18) does not yield a closed form solution for firm 2’s KT decision (Q), 
which is expressed as a function of firm 1’s KT decision (P). However, if we assume that 
the returns to firm i’s KD in relation to its level of knowledge at the end of period one 
equals one-half (µi=1/2, i=1,2), then the optimal solutions for firm 1 and 2 are 
dramatically simplified. (This assumption is similar to the assumption in Pacheco-de-
Almeida and Zemsky, 2007). The results obtained with µi=1/2 are depicted in Proposition 
4 (Equations (4.21) - (4.24)).   
 
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose µ1=µ2=½. The optimal equilibrium price charged by firm 1 for 
knowledge sold to firm 2 in the first period satisfies Equation (4.21). In addition, the 
optimal equilibrium amount of knowledge firm 2 will buy in the first period after observing 
the price charged by firm1 satisfies Equation (4.22). Finally, the optimal equilibrium 
amount of KD pursued by firms 1 and 2 satisfy Equations (4.23) and (4.24), respectively. 
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     (4.24) 
where  F  01 / 0+23 / 1 4 0+ 
          P  0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+ 
 
Since we are able to obtain closed form solutions for the firms KM decision 
through the simplifying assumption, we are also able to isolate the impact of several 
parameters on the knowledge creation strategies of firms. In Propositions 5 - 8, we 
present results of analytic sensitivity analysis that provide important insights on the KM 
strategies pursued by firms 1 and 2. The results follow from Equations (4.21) to (4.24). 
Proposition 5 shows how firm and market-related parameters impact the KT decision of 
firm 1 (P). Proposition 6 depicts how firm and market related parameters impact firm 2’s 
KT decision (Q). Propositions 7 and 8 show the impact of these parameters on the firms’ 
period two KD decisions (γ1 and γ2), respectively.  
 
PROPOSITION 5. Firm 1 optimally pursues a larger (smaller) price for KT to firm 2 in the 
first period (P) if any of the following conditions hold: 
(i) The reduction in revenue from the loss in of proprietary knowledge firm 1 
incurs when it sells knowledge to firm 2 (m1) is large (small); 
(ii) The prediction by firm 1 of the valuation by switching customers in relation 
to the difference in the levels of knowledge of both firms (w1P) is large 
(small); 
(iii) The effectiveness of KT on increasing the level of knowledge of firm 2 (θ2) 
is small (large). 
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PROPOSITION 6. Firm 2 optimally buys a larger (smaller) amount of knowledge in the 
first period (Q) after observing the price set by firm 1 if any of the following conditions 
hold: 
(i) The reduction in revenue from the loss in of proprietary knowledge firm 1 
incurs when it transfers knowledge to firm 2 (m1) is small (large); 
(ii) The prediction by firm 1 of the valuation by switching customers in relation 
to the difference in the levels of knowledge of both firms (w1P) is small 
(large); 
(iii) The effectiveness of KT on increasing the level of knowledge of firm 2 (θ2) 
is large (small); 
(iv) Both firms’ prediction of the portion of KT that firm 2 will be able to integrate 
βP[K10,K20] is large (small); 
(v) The initial level of knowledge of firm 1 or 2 (K10 or K20) is large (small). 
 
PROPOSITION 7. Firm 1 optimally pursues a larger (smaller) amount of KD in the 
second period (γ1) if any of the following conditions hold: 
(i) The valuation of firm 1 knowledge by loyal customers (v1) is large (small);  
(ii) The prediction by firm 1 of the valuation by switching customers in relation 
to the difference in the levels of knowledge of both firms (w1P) is large 
(small); 
(iii) Firm 1 is the only firm to successfully enter the market and the customers’ 
valuation of firm 1 knowledge (z1) is large (small); 
(iv) Marginal cost of KD pursued by firm 1 in the second period (c1) is small 
(large); 
(v) The probability that the new product developed by firm 1 will have the 
features and functionality that make it successful in the marketplace (δ1) is 
large (small). 
 
PROPOSITION 8. Firm 2 optimally pursues a larger (smaller) amount of KD in the 
second period (γ2) if any of the following conditions hold: 
(i) The reduction in revenue from the loss in of proprietary knowledge firm 1 
incurs when it transfers knowledge to firm 2 (m1) is small (large); 
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(ii) The prediction by firm 1 of the valuation by switching customers in relation 
to the difference in the levels of knowledge of both firms (w1P) is small 
(large); 
(iii) The effectiveness of KT on increasing the level of knowledge of firm 2 (θ2) 
is large (small); 
(iv) Both firms’ prediction of the portion of KT that firm 2 will be able to integrate 
βP[K10,K20] is large (small); 
(v) The initial level of knowledge of firm 1 or 2 (K10 or K20) is large (small). 
 
From Propositions 5 through 8, we obtain important insights about firm 1 and firm 
2’s KM strategies. First, suppose the reduction in revenue from the loss in of proprietary 
knowledge firm 1 incurs when it transfers knowledge to firm 2 (m1) is large. Under this 
condition, firm 1 sets a larger price in period one for the knowledge sold to firm 2 (P). 
This result occurs since firm 1 aims to compensate for the cost of loss of sole ownership 
of knowledge, either by reducing the level of knowledge bought by firm 2 or by 
increasing the expected revenue directly earned from the transfer of knowledge. A large 
price set by firm 1 for selling the knowledge results in a small amount of knowledge (Q) 
purchased by firm 1. While a large reduction in firm 1’s revenue due to the loss in 
proprietary knowledge does not impact firm 1’s pursuit of KD (γ1), it does drive firm 2 to 
pursue a smaller amount of KD (γ2). Essentially, firm 2 starts period two with less 
knowledge and is therefore less able to exploit the benefits from KD. Thus, because of 
the large loss in revenue due to the loss in proprietary knowledge by firm 1, firm 2 
develops an inferior product. Meanwhile, firm 1 is able to develop a product of the same 
quality as under the condition where the cost of loss of proprietary knowledge is small.  
Another interesting insight is related to the impact of several parameters on the 
effectiveness of KT to firm 2. As expected, if the firms’ prediction of the portion of KT that 
firm 2 will be able to integrate βP[K10,K20] is large, firm 2 purchases a larger amount of 
knowledge from firm 1 in the first period. With the larger level of knowledge at the end of 
the first period, knowledge creation in period two is more effective so that firm 2 pursues 
a higher amount of KD.  
In a result that is not obvious, we find that the firms’ prediction of the portion of 
KT that firm 2 will be able to integrate does not impact firm 1’s decisions on the period 
one price or the period two amount of  KD. Although the price set by firm 1 is not 
impacted by the integration capability of firm 2, the amount of knowledge purchased by 
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firm 2 is larger and the expected revenue earned by firm 1 from the KT is larger. 
Therefore, if firm 2’s integration capability is large, it embeds more knowledge into its 
new product and the expected revenue earned by firm 2 in the marketplace is larger. 
Meanwhile, the level of knowledge embedded by firm 1 is does not change, and thus, 
the expected profit for firm 1 is not necessarily lower: Although the expected revenue 
earned (cost incurred) by firm 1 due to exceeding (falling short of) the level of knowledge 
of firm 2 is smaller (larger), and the reduction in revenue due to the loss of proprietary 
knowledge is larger, firm 1 also earns more expected revenue due to the larger amount 
of KT. It interesting to note that the above shifts in the KM strategies of firms and 2 are 
also obtained if the effectiveness of KT on increasing the level of knowledge of firm 2 
(θ2), 1 is large, or the initial level of knowledge of firm 1 or 2 (K10 or K20). 
Results that are not obvious emerge when we consider the scenarios where 
each of the following parameters is large: (i) loyal customers’ valuation of firm 1’s level of 
knowledge (v1); and (ii) firm 1 is the only firm to successfully enter the market and the 
customers’ valuation of firm 1 knowledge (z1). Under this condition, the period one 
decisions of firms 1 and 2, and the amount of KD pursued by firm 2 in the second period 
is not impacted by this condition. This result occurs since firm 1, who is the leader, 
makes the price decision based on the valuation of knowledge embedded by firm 2, 
rather than its own predictions. Since firm 2 is the follower, firm 2’s knowledge creation 
decisions are also driven by the same parameters. Meanwhile, firm 1 optimally pursues 
a larger amount of KD, in order to develop a superior earn larger revenue from its loyal 
customers, as well as from all the customers if firm 2 is not able to successfully develop 
the new product. Thus, firm 1 is able to integrate the customers’ valuation level of 
knowledge of firm 1 into the decisions constituting its KM strategy. 
Next, suppose that the firm 1’s prediction of the valuation by its switching 
customers (w1P) is large. Under this condition, firm 1 optimally sets a higher price in the 
first period and the amount of knowledge purchased by firm 1 is smaller. In the second 
period, firm 1 pursues a larger amount of KD, while firm 2 pursues KD at a smaller 
amount. Through setting a large price in period one, firm 1 reduces the knowledge 
purchased by firm 2, and firm 2 develops an inferior product. Meanwhile, since the 
amount of the KD pursued by firm 1 is larger, firm 1 develops a more superior product 
than it would have with small prediction of customers’ valuation. Thus, the expected 
revenue earned (cost incurred) by firm 1 due to exceeding (falling short of) the 
knowledge embedded into the new product by firm 2 is larger (smaller). 
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Finally, suppose that the rate of returns to KT of knowledge purchased by firm 2 
(θ2) is large. Under this condition, firm 1 sets a smaller price and the amount of 
knowledge purchased by firm 2 is larger, resulting in greater expected net revenue from 
KT for firm 1. Since the knowledge level of firm 2 at the end of period one is larger and 
the value of increasing the knowledge level of firm 2 is larger, the amount of KD pursued 
by firm 2 in the second period is larger. Meanwhile, the amount of KD pursued by firm 1 
is not impacted by the parameter relating to the effectiveness of KT to firm 2. Thus, the 
knowledge level of firm 1 remains unchanged, while firm 2 embeds a larger level of 
knowledge into the new product. In this scenario, firm 1’s period one decision results in a 
higher expected revenue earned directly from KT, rather than the revenue earned from 
the product in the marketplace. 
4.5.1.2 Numerical Analysis 
In this section, we introduce results based on numerical sensitivity analysis. We 
present one base example, Example 1, to reflect the decision-making environments of 
the CD mechanism. In addition, we present six variations of Example 1. The purpose of 
the numerical examples is to illustrate some key analytical results and to extend 
analytical results by providing insights on the impact of several parameters on the firms’ 
KM decisions and on the profit earned by the firms.  
The particular functions and input parameters we employ are inspired by the KM 
literature, interviews with managers from the automotive industry, and articles from 
academic and practitioner publications. Table C.2 contains a detailed account of all 
functional forms and input parameter values. Table C.3 summarizes the results of 
Example 1. For the variations of the base example, due to different input values for z2, 
c2, v2, w2
P
, δ1, and δ2, we obtain dramatically different solutions for the KT and KD 
decisions of firms 1 and 2. In addition, we show the impact of firm and market-related 
characteristics on each firm’s expected profit. Figures 4.3 to 4.6 illustrate key managerial 
insights. 
The situation reflected in Example 1 is based on the following parameter settings. 
Although both firms 1 and 2 have a solid foundation of knowledge at the outset of the 
NPD project, the initial knowledge level of firm 1 exceeds the initial knowledge level of 
firm 2 (K10=100, K10=80). The parameters of effectiveness of KT from firm 1 to firm 2 
(βP[K10,K20], θ1, θ2) are moderately large. In addition, the probability of successfully 
developing the new product (δ1) is 0.5 for firm 1, and is 0.5 for firm 2 if it engages in KT 
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(δ2) and 0.4 if it doesn’t (δ2N). The customers’ (expected) valuation of the knowledge 
embedded into the product under various market conditions (vi, wiP, zi) have the same 
input values for firms 1 and 2.    
 Example 1a is identically defined as Example 1 except that we vary the input 
value for the probability that firm 1 successfully develops the new product (δ1) between 0 
and 1. As illustrated in Figures 4.3a to 4.3e, for the scenario driven by input values given 
in Example 1, as the probability of successfully developing new product increases for 
firm 1, the price set by firm 1 in the first period (P) increases. The more firm 1 expects to 
earn larger expected net revenue from the new product, the less firm 1 is inclined to sell 
its competitive knowledge to firm 2. However, as the price set by firm 1 in the first period 
increases with firm 1’s probability of successfully developing a new product, the amount 
of knowledge purchased by firm 2 (Q) decreases. In addition, from Figure 4.3c, we 
observe that the KD pursued by firm 1 (γ1) increases as the probability of firm 1 
successfully developing the new product increases, while the KD pursued by firm 2 (γ2) 
remains the same. As a result, as firm 1’s probability of successfully developing new 
product increases, the expected profit for firm 1 increases (E{pi1}), while the expected 
profit for firm 2 (E{pi2}) decreases (whether the firms cooperate or not) (Figures 4.3d and 
4.3e). 
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 Figure 4.3a  P* with respect to δ1 Figure 4.3b Q* with respect to δ1 
                              
               Figure 4.3c      γ1* and γ2* with respect to δ1 
                           
        Figure 4.3d           E{pi1}* and E{pi1N}* with respect to δ1 
 
          Figure 4.3e      E{pi2}* and E{pi2N}* with respect to δ1 
 
Figure 4.3   KT and KD decisions and the expected profits of firms 1 and 2 with respect 
to δ1 
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 In Example 1b, we vary the input value for the probability that firm 1 successfully 
develops the new product if it cooperates with firm 1 (δ2) between 0.41 and 1. From this, 
we obtain substantially different results for the firms’ KM decisions and expected profit 
functions. Note that since the probability that firm 1 successfully develops the new 
product if it cooperates (δ2) is larger than the probability that firm 1 successfully develops 
the new product if doesn’t cooperate (δ2N). Therefore, for Example 1 and its variations, 
we define δ2>0.4 As illustrated in Figures 4.4d and 4.4e, for values of δ2 smaller than 
0.55,
 
 firm 2 does not engage in KT with firm 1. For values of δ2 larger than 0.79, firm 1 
does not engage in KT with firm 2. This result occurs for two reasons. First, for small 
values of δ2, the cost incurred for KT outweighs the benefits from increased probability 
and knowledge level due to KT. Second, for large values of δ2, the cost firm 1 incurs due 
to KT (loss of expected revenue from the new product and the loss of proprietary 
knowledge) outweighs the revenue earned from selling knowledge. If 0.54<δ2<0.79, as 
the probability that firm 2 successfully develops the new product if it cooperates 
increases, the price set by firm 1 per unit knowledge sold to firm 2 decreases, as the 
knowledge purchased by firm 2 increases. This result occurs since firm 1 aims to 
increase its earnings due to KT through increasing the amount of knowledge purchased 
by firm 2. The amount of KD pursued by firm 1 does not change as firm 2’s probability of 
successfully developing the new product (if it cooperates) increases. Meanwhile, the 
amount of KD pursued by firm 2 increases as δ2 increases, since the value of increasing 
knowledge in the second period is more prominent due to a greater level of knowledge 
for firm 2 at the end of the first period. As a result, the expected profit for firm 1 
decreases while the expected profit for firm 2 increases and as the probability of 
successfully developing the new product if firm 2 cooperates increases.      
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 Figure 4.4a  P* with respect to δ2 Figure 4.4b Q* with respect to δ2 
                              
               Figure 4.4c      γ1* and γ2* with respect to δ2 
                           
        Figure 4.4d           E{pi1}* and E{pi1N}* with respect to δ2 
                               
          Figure 4.4e      E{pi2}* and E{pi2N}* with respect to δ2 
 
Figure 4.4   KT and KD decisions and the expected profits of firms 1 and 2 with respect 
to δ2 
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 The impact of customer’s valuation of level of knowledge embedded by firm 2, 
regardless of knowledge embedded by firm 1 (v2), is examined in Example 1c. As 
illustrated in Figured 4.5a to 4.5c, as customer valuation increases, firm 1 sets a smaller 
price per unit knowledge sold. Firm 1 sets a smaller price to increase the amount of 
knowledge purchased by firm 2, and focuses on the expected revenue earned from the 
transfer of knowledge in the first period. Firm 2 then purchases larger amount of 
knowledge and pursues a greater amount of KD, while the amount of KD pursued by 
firm 1 does not change. As firm 2’s customer’s valuations increase, firm 2 is more 
inclined to embed a larger level of knowledge into the new product. In the second period, 
firm 2 increases its level of knowledge through KD to develop a superior product. 
Meanwhile, firm 1 does not focus on KD since the value of increasing knowledge in the 
second period is small. However, as illustrated in Figures 4.5d and 4.5e, the expected 
profit for both firm 1 and firm 2 increases if they engage in KT. Firm 1’s expected profit 
increases from the expected revenue earned from KT, while firm 2’s expected profit 
increases from the expected revenue from the new product in the marketplace. Finally, 
as the customer’s valuation of level of knowledge of firm 2 increases, the expected 
revenue for firm 2 increases if it does not cooperate, while the expected revenue for firm 
1 decreases if it does cooperate. In Example 1d we vary the input value for the 
customer’s valuation for knowledge embedded by firm 2 compared to knowledge 
embedded by firm 1 (w2P). Similarly, for Example 1e, we vary the customer’s valuation 
for knowledge embedded by firm 2 if firm 1 fails to successfully develop the new product 
(z2). The KM decisions of firms under CD mechanism and the expected profits of firms 1 
and 2 (whether they cooperate or do not cooperate) for Examples 1d and 1e, as 
illustrated in Figures C.1 and C.2, is similar to the solutions obtained for Example 1c.    
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 Figure 4.5a  P* with respect to v2 Figure 4.5b Q* with respect to v2 
                              
               Figure 4.5c      γ1* and γ2* with respect to v2 
                           
        Figure 4.5d           E{pi1}* and E{pi1N}* with respect to v2 
                  
          Figure 4.5e      E{pi2}* and E{pi2N}* with respect to v2 
          
Figure 4.5   KT and KD decisions and the expected profits of firms 1 and 2 with respect 
to v2 
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 Finally, the impact of cost of KD for firm 2 (c2) is examined in Example 1f, illustrated in 
Figures 4.6a-4.6e. From these figures, we obtain interesting insights. As the cost of KD 
for firm 2 increases, the price set by firm 1 decreases. As KD cost increases, firm 2’s 
ability to increase knowledge in the second period becomes more limited, and firm 2 
does not find it useful to buy a high amount of knowledge from firm 1. Meanwhile, firm 1, 
who knows that firm 2’s ability to develop knowledge is limited, finds firm 2 less of a 
threat in the new product market, and decreases the price it sets per unit knowledge. As 
expected, the amount of KD pursued by firm 2 in the second period decreases, while the 
amount of KD pursued by firm 1 does not change. As a result, the expected profit for firm 
1 increases, while the expected profit for firm 2 decreases as its cost of KD increases.     
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 Figure 4.6a  P* with respect to c2 Figure 4.6b Q* with respect to c2 
                              
               Figure 4.6c      γ1* and γ2* with respect to c2 
                           
        Figure 4.6d           E{pi1}* and E{pi1N}* with respect to c2 
                 
          Figure 4.6e      E{pi2}* and E{pi2N}* with respect to c2 
 
Figure 4.6 KT and KD decisions and the expected profits of firms 1 and 2 with respect to 
c2 
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4.5.1.3 Experimental Analysis of Impact of Uncertainty 
In this section, an exploration of the impact of the external (exogenous) 
environment and integration capabilities of the firms on the firm’s decisions and 
competitive positions is analyzed. An experimental design approach, similar to the one 
developed in Gaimon and Ho (1994), is used to examine the effect of various exogenous 
conditions on a firm’s optimal KT and KD decisions, and on their profits. Results are 
presented which characterize the effect on the optimal solutions due to the following 
conditions: (i) different expected valuation of firm 1 and firm 2’s customer’s for exceeding 
or falling short of the level of knowledge embedded by the competitor into the new 
product (ii) different expected integration capability of firm 2 of the knowledge purchased 
from firm 1 in the first period. Similar to the input values in section 4.5.1.2, the particular 
functions and input parameters we employ are inspired by the KM literature, interviews 
with managers from the automotive industry, and articles from academic and practitioner 
publications.  
 In order isolate the effect of uncertainty on the firm’s decisions, we controlled the 
other exogenous conditions so that any differences attributed to the different 
experimental factor settings. As the starting point of the experimental design, we 
consider Example 1, which is the base example introduced in section 4.5.1.2. In the 
stochastic numerical analysis, customer’s valuation of knowledge embedded into the 
new product by a firm compared to it’s competitor (wiP), and the integration capability of 
firm 2 (βP[K10,K20]) is a random variable satisfying a triangular distribution and defined at 
two levels: high and low uncertainty. It is assumed that a low level of uncertainty 
associated with each of these variables is characterized by a small standard deviation, 
whereas a relatively large standard deviation is used to represent a high level of 
uncertainty. The means of the exogenous demand distributions are assumed identical so 
that the results obtained are solely attributed to different levels of uncertainty.  
Corresponding to each cell in the experimental design, values are randomly 
drawn from the assumed distributions and the model is solved for firms 1 and 2 for CD 
mechanism. One hundred replications are generated to guarantee stability of the results. 
The firm’s decisions regarding knowledge creation, and their expected profits for the 
cases they cooperate and they do not cooperate are computed. These values are then 
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analyzed to obtain insights concerning the effects associated with the different levels of 
uncertainty in customer valuation and integration capability.  
In order to examine the impact of the stochastic valuation of customers of firm 1 
(w1P), two experiments are presented. For the first experiment, symmetric triangular 
distribution used is used for exogenous customer valuation. For the second experiment, 
a skewed triangular distribution is assumed (the mean is to the right of the mode) so that 
there is a greater chance of experiencing exogenous customer valuation in excess of the 
mode. The means of each distribution, however, are equal. The three parameters used 
to define the triangular distributions for the random variable w1P are given by: lower 
value, upper value and mode. These values and other relevant data are given in Table 
C.4. Skewed distributions used to represent customer’s valuation have realistic 
interpretations. While a firm may be uncertain as to the exact customer valuation it will 
experience, it knows the lower bound (at least zero). However, the difference between 
the upper bound of the demand distribution and the mean may be much greater than the 
difference between the lower bound and the mean. This situation may be particularly 
realistic for new product introduction. Table C.5 compares the means obtained over all 
factor combinations. 
The primary insights offered by the stochastic experiments involve the impact of 
uncertainty on the firm’s first and second period decisions. From Table C.5, a high 
degree of uncertainty for firm 1’s customers valuation of the knowledge level of firm 1 
compared to the knowledge level of firm 2 is associated with a higher price set by firm 1 
in period one and lower KD pursued by firm 1 in the second period. The amount of 
knowledge purchased by firm 2 and the amount of KD firm 2 pursues in the second 
period is not impacted by higher uncertainty. In terms of expected profit, if the 
uncertainty regarding customer valuation is larger, the expected profit for firm 1 if it 
cooperates with firm 2 through CD mechanism is smaller while the expected profit for 
firm 2 if it cooperates with firm 1 is larger. Moreover, if the distribution of customer 
valuation of firm 1 is skewed, the impact of uncertainty on firm 1’s decisions is more 
pronounced. Meanwhile, skewed distribution drives firm 1 to pursue knowledge creation 
at a smaller amount, and results in a smaller expected profit for 2 if it engages in 
cooperation through CD mechanism. 
The impact of firm 2’s prediction of switching customer’s valuation of level of 
knowledge is similar to that of w1P. However, as uncertainty increases, the expected 
profit of firm 1 if it cooperates decreases while, the expected profit of firm 2 if it 
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cooperates increases. Skewed distribution amplifies the results regarding expected 
profit. These results indicate that firms’ own predictions for customers’ valuation of 
competition results in larger expected profit for that firm under CD mechanism.   
The impact of uncertainty regarding integration capability of firm 2 on the firm’s 
KM decision and expected profits are examined through a similar approach. The input 
values for the three parameters used and other relevant data regarding the triangular 
distribution for βP[K10,K20] are given in Table C.6. When we analyze the results regarding 
impact of uncertainty associated with the integration capability of firm 2, given in Table 
C.7, we see that the KT and KD decision of firm 1 is not impacted by uncertainty 
associated with knowledge integration. The uncertainty drives firm 2 to purchase large 
amount of knowledge from firm 1 in period one and pursue larger amount of KD in period 
two. In addition, the expected profit of both firms is larger if the uncertainty associated 
with integration capability of firm 2 is larger. Meanwhile, skewed distribution reduces the 
impact of uncertainty.   
4.5.2 Joint Development 
4.5.2.1 Optimal Solution and Analysis 
The JD model described in Section 4.4.2 is solved using backward induction. 
Proposition 9, below, illustrates the optimal KD pursued jointly by firms 1 and 2 in period 
two. From Proposition 9, we see that the KD pursued by the firms is a function of their 
joint knowledge level at the end of period one, as well as the expected customer 
valuation of the knowledge jointly embedded into the new product and the costs of KD.  
 
PROPOSITION 9. The optimal amount of KD jointly pursued by the firms in the second 
period satisfies Equation (4.25): 
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 ef!ef%)ef *ef+=ef                                            (4.25) 
 
From Equation (4.25), the optimal amount of joint KD for the firms is large (small) 
if: (i) the firm’s probability of jointly developing a successful new product (δJD) is large 
(small); (ii) customers’ expected valuation of the knowledge embedded jointly by the 
firms into the new product (vJD) is large (small); (iii) the level of knowledge jointly 
dedicated to the JD project at the end of period one (KJD1) is large (small); (iv) the 
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effectiveness of KD in increasing the joint knowledge level in period two (µJD) is large 
(small); and  (v) the marginal cost of joint KD (cJD) is small (large).  
According to these results, the optimal amount of joint KD increases as the firms’ 
capability to integrate shared knowledge (βP[K10,K20]) increases, or the amount of returns 
on the knowledge shared by each firm on the joint knowledge level at the end of period 
one (θ1, θ2) increases. Thus, we observe a complementary relationship between the two 
means of knowledge creation, and observe that more-effective knowledge-sharing drives 
firms to pursue joint KD at a greater amount. 
In Proposition 10, below, we describe the optimal amount of knowledge 
dedicated by firm 2 into the JD project in period one which is a function of the amount of 
knowledge dedicated by firm. 
 
PROPOSITION 10. The optimal amount of knowledge firm 2 dedicates to the JD project 
in the first period after observing the amount of knowledge dedicated by firm 1 satisfies 
Equation (4.26): 
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                      (4.26) 
 
We obtain interesting insights from Equation (4.26).  A large (small) amount of 
knowledge dedicated by firm 1 into the JD project (Q1) drives firm 2 to dedicate a large 
(small) amount of knowledge into the JD project (Q2) if: (i) probability that the product 
jointly developed by the firms will have the features and functionally making it successful 
in the marketplace (δJD) is large (small); (ii) customer’s valuation of joint knowledge (vJD) 
is large (small); (iii) firms’ common expectation of portion of knowledge that will be 
integrated into the JD project (βP[K10,K20]) is large (small); (iv) portion of expected profit 
allocated to firm 1 (λ) is small (large); (v) marginal cost of loss of proprietary knowledge 
for firm 2 (m2) is small (large); and (vi) the rate of returns to KS of knowledge dedicated 
by firm 2 (θ2) is large (small).  
Suppose conditions (i) or (ii) holds. Since large level of joint knowledge results in 
higher expected net revenue, the larger amount of knowledge shared by firm 1 drives 
firm 2 to dedicate a larger portion of its knowledge into the JD project. Similarly, the 
higher effectiveness of KS, given in condition (iii), results in a larger amount of 
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knowledge dedicated by firm 2 in period one if firm 1 shares a larger amount of 
knowledge. In addition, if the portion of expected profit allocated to firm 2 is large 
(condition (iv)), or sharing knowledge is less costly for firm 2 (condition (v)), firm 2 has 
less incentive to keep knowledge proprietary and shares a larger amount of knowledge 
per unit knowledge shared by firm 1. Meanwhile, if the increase in the level of joint 
knowledge  at the end of period one, due to knowledge shared by firm 2, is small (as 
depicted in condition (vi)), firm 2 refrains from sharing a larger amount of knowledge with 
firm 1 and keeps a greater share of its knowledge proprietary. 
The conditions given in Equation (4.27) and (4.28) must be satisfied for firms 1 
and 2 to cooperate through the JD mechanism. These conditions mathematically depict 
the rational decision making of firms 1 and 2: Each firm is willing to cooperate with the 
other firm if the expected profit under the condition that it cooperates exceeds the 
expected profit under the condition that it develops the new product individually. Thus, 
for the firms to engage in JD mechanism, both firms expected profit if they cooperate 
should be larger than their expected profits if they don’t cooperate.   
 
PROPOSITION 11. Firm 1 will cooperate with firm 2 through JD mechanism if the 
inequality in Equation (4.27) is satisfied. Firm 2 will cooperate with firm 1 through JD 
mechanism if the inequality in Equation (4.28) is satisfied.  
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Equation (4.26) does not yield a closed-form solution for firm 2’s KT decision (Q2) 
which is expressed as a function of firm 1’s KT decision (Q1). However, if we assume 
that the returns to firms’ KD in relation to their joint level of knowledge at the end of 
period one equals one half (µi=1/2, i∈{1,2}), then the optimal solutions for firm 1 and 
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firm2 are dramatically simplified. The results obtained with µi=1/2 are depicted in 
Proposition 12 (Equations (4.21)-(4.24)). 
 
PROPOSITION 12. Suppose µ1=µ2=½. The optimal portion of expected net revenue 
allocated by firm 1 to firm 1 is given in Equation (4.29). The optimal equilibrium amount 
of knowledge firm 2 will dedicate to the JD project in the first period after observing the 
amount of knowledge dedicated by firm 1 satisfies Equation (4.30). In addition, the 
optimal equilibrium amount of knowledge firm 1 will dedicate to the joint KD efforts in the 
first period satisfies Equations (4.31). Finally, amount of knowledge firm 1 will dedicate 
to the joint KD efforts in the first period satisfies Equation (4.32), respectively. 
 h  +9#&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(4.32) 
 
From Equations (4.29) to (4.32), we obtain important insights about firm 1 and 
firm 2’s KM decisions in the first and second periods. In Propositions 13 and 14, we 
present results of analytic sensitivity analysis that provide important insights into the KM 
strategies pursued by the firms. Proposition 13 relates the drivers of effectiveness of KS 
with firm 1’s decision on profit allocation (λ). Proposition 14 depicts the impact of several 
firm and market characteristics on the firm’s individual knowledge-sharing decisions (Q1 
and Q2), and joint KD decision (γJD).   
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PROPOSITION 13. Firm 1 optimally allocates a large (small) portion of the expected net 
revenue to itself (λ) if the rate of returns to KS of the amount of knowledge shared by 
firm 2 (θ2) is large (small). 
 
PROPOSITION 14. Suppose any of the following conditions hold:  
(i) The probability that the new product developed jointly by the firms will have 
the features and functionality that make it successful in the marketplace 
(δJD) is large (small); 
(ii) The expected valuation of customers of the knowledge embedded jointly by 
the firms into the new product (vJDP) is large (small); 
(iii) Both firms’ prediction of the extent that knowledge resources shared by one 
firm can be integrated with the knowledge resources shared by the other 
firm (βP[K10,K20]) is large (small); 
(iv) The initial level of firm 1 or 2 (K10 or K20) is large (small); 
(v) The reduction in revenue from the loss of proprietary knowledge firm 1 or 
firm 2 incurs when it shares its knowledge with the other firm (m1 or m2) is 
small (large). 
Then:  
(a) The amount of knowledge shared by firm 1 in the first period to be 
dedicated to the JD project (Q1) is larger (smaller); 
(b) The amount of knowledge shared by firm 2 in the first period to be 
dedicated to the JD project (Q2) is larger (smaller); 
(c) The amount of KD pursued jointly by the firms in the second period (γJD) is 
larger (smaller).  
 
Proposition 13 reveals a key result: The portion of expected net revenue 
optimally allocated by firm 1 (λ)  is driven only by the effectiveness of the knowledge 
amount shared by firm 2 on the knowledge jointly dedicated to the NPD project at the 
end of period one (θ2). If the KS is effective, due to large rate of returns to KS of the 
amount of knowledge shared by firm 2, then firm 1 allocates a large portion of profit to 
itself. This result occurs due to firm 1’s incentive to take advantage of an effective KS 
process early on, through allocating a larger portion of the expected net revenue to itself.  
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From Proposition 14, we obtain important insights about the firms’ decisions 
regarding their KM strategies. First, suppose that the probability that the new product 
developed jointly by the firms will have the features and functionality to be successful in 
the marketplace (δJD) is large. This condition drives firm 1 (leader) to allocate a large 
amount of knowledge to the JD project (Q1), which leads firm 2 to also share a large 
amount of knowledge (Q2). With the large level of knowledge dedicated to the JD project 
at the end of the first period, the value of joint KD in the second period (γJD) is enhanced 
and occurs at a greater amount. Thus, the firms jointly embed a large level of knowledge 
into the new product. The firms pursue the same strategy if the expected customers’ 
valuation of the knowledge embedded into the new product (vJDP) is large. This result 
occurs because developing a superior product drives larger expected net revenue in the 
marketplace and larger expected net revenue. 
Next, suppose that the initial knowledge levels of either firm are large at the 
beginning of the first period. Then, the firms are driven to dedicate large amounts of 
knowledge to the joint NPD project and they jointly pursue a greater amount of KD. This 
result occurs since large initial level of knowledge of either firm drives large integration 
capability for firms (βP[K10,K20]). Effective KS drives large knowledge levels that are 
jointly dedicated to the NPD project at the end of the first period. In addition, a large 
amount of KD pursued jointly in the second period drives firms to embed more 
knowledge into the new product, which leads to greater expected profits for both firms. 
Another interesting insight is obtained when we analyze the impact of the cost 
incurred by firms due to loss of proprietary knowledge (m1 or m2). First, suppose firm 1 
incurs a large marginal cost due to loss of sole ownership of knowledge. Under this 
condition, firm 1, who is the initial decision-maker in the first period, dedicates a small 
amount of knowledge to the JD project, in order to reduce the cost of loss of proprietary 
knowledge. In addition, firm 2 also shares a small amount of knowledge with firm 1 in 
period one. Since a smaller level of knowledge is dedicated to the JD project at the end 
of the first period, the value of KD is smaller, and firms jointly pursue KD at a smaller 
amount. Thus, the firms embed lower levels of knowledge to the new jointly developed 
product. As a result, the expected net revenue earned from the new product is smaller. 
The impact of the cost incurred by firm 2 due to loss of proprietary knowledge is similar. 
This result shows that the large cost incurred by one firm due to sharing knowledge with 
a competitor discourages both firms from dedicating knowledge to the JD project or 
pursuing a high amount of KD.         
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4.5.2.2 Numerical Analysis 
In this section, we introduce results based on numerical sensitivity analysis. We 
present one base example, Example 2, to reflect the decision-making environment of JD 
mechanism. In addition, we present three variations of Example 2. The purpose of the 
numerical examples is to illustrate some key analytical results and to extend the 
analytical results by providing insights on the impact of several parameters on the firms’ 
KM decisions and on the profit earned by the firms.  
The particular functions and input parameters we employ are inspired by the KM 
literature, interviews with managers from the automotive industry, and articles from 
academic and practitioner publications. Table C.8 contains a detailed account of all 
functional forms and input parameter values. For the numerical example illustrating the 
JD mechanism, due to different input values for θ2, cJD and θ1, we obtain different 
solutions for firm 1’s decision regarding the allocation of expected net revenue, the firms’ 
period one knowledge-sharing decisions and period two joint KD decision, as well as the 
solutions regarding joint and individual expected profit solutions. Table C.9 summarizes 
the results of Example 2. Figures 4.7 to 4.9 illustrate key managerial insights. 
The situation reflected in Example 2 is based on the following parameter settings. 
Similar to the firms introduced in Example 1, both firms 1 and 2 have a solid foundation 
of knowledge at the outset of the NPD project, and firm 1’s  initial knowledge level 
exceeds the initial knowledge level of firm 2 (K10=100, K10=80). The integration capability 
of the firms for KS (βP[K10,K20]) is moderately large. However, we assume that the rate of 
returns to KS of knowledge shared by firm 2 (θ2) is significantly larger than the rate of 
returns to KS of knowledge dedicated by firm 1 (θ1).  In addition, since the firms jointly 
develop the product and do not compete with each other in the end product market, the 
customers’ valuation of knowledge embedded jointly by the firms (vJD) is significant.  
Example 2a is identical to Example 2, except that we vary the rate of returns to 
KS of knowledge shared by firm 2 (θ2) between 0.52 and 0.66 (since from Equation 
(4.29), we know that 0.52<θ2<0.66). Firm 1 engages in KS for values of θ2 between 0.56 
and 0.65, and firm 2 engages in KS for values of θ2 between 0.52 and 0.64, as illustrated 
in Figures 4.7d and 4.7e, respectively. Thus, for values of θ2 smaller than 0.56 and 
larger than 0.64, firms develop the new product individually, without engaging in 
cooperation with the other firm. From Figure 4.7a, we see that the portion of expected 
net revenue allocated to firm 1 in the first period (λ) increases as the rate of returns to 
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KS of knowledge shared by firm 2 increases. Thus, firm 1 claims a larger portion of the 
profit in advance, in order to increase the gains from the possibility of being able to 
embed a high level of knowledge into the new product. Meanwhile, for smaller values of 
θ2, the knowledge amount dedicated by each firm to the JD project increases as θ2 
increases; for larger values of θ2, the knowledge amount dedicated by each firm to the 
JD project decreases as θ2 increases. Specifically, firm 1 dedicates the largest amount 
of knowledge when θ2=0.62, and firm 2 dedicates the largest amount of knowledge when 
θ2=0.61. Similarly, the amount of KD pursued jointly by the firms in the second period 
increases as θ2 increases for 0.52<θ2<0.61 and decreases as θ2 increases for 
0.61<θ2<0.66. This result occurs because of two reasons. First, for smaller values of θ2, 
the firms substitute for the small effectiveness of knowledge creation by sharing larger 
amount of knowledge and pursuing a higher amount of KD. For larger values of θ2, due 
to the increased effectiveness of KS (and thus KD), the firms focus less on knowledge 
creation. Second, as θ2 increases beyond 0.61, the portion of expected net revenue 
allocated to firm 1 increases; thus, firm 1 earns the same expected profit by dedicating a 
lower amount of knowledge to the JD project. As a result, firm 2 earns a smaller portion 
of the expected net revenue, and is less willing to share knowledge with firm 1. A smaller 
level of knowledge at the end of period one drives the firms to pursue a smaller amount 
of KD in the second period. It is important to note that, for smaller values of rate of 
returns to KS of knowledge shared by firm 2, the amount of knowledge dedicated by firm 
1 into the JD project exceeds the amount of knowledge dedicated by firm 2; for larger 
values of θ2, the amount of knowledge dedicated by firm 2 exceeds the one dedicated by 
firm 1. As illustrated in Figures 4.7d and 4.7e, these KM strategies are reflected in the 
expected profits earned by firms 1 and 2, which also follow a “first increase then 
decrease” pattern.  
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Figure 4.7   KS and KD decisions and the expected profits of firms 1 and 2 with respect 
to θ2 
 
       
            
Figure 4.7a   λ* with respect to θ2 Figure 4.7b     Q1* and Q2* with respect to  θ2 
                                
Figure 4.7c        γJD* with respect to  θ2 
                               
Figure 4.7d           E{pi1}* and E{pi1N}* with respect to θ2 
                                 
Figure 4.7e      E{pi2}* and  E{pi2N}* with respect to θ2 
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The inputs for Example 2a are the same as Example 2, except that we vary the 
value of the rate of returns to KS of knowledge shared by firm 1 (θ1) between 0 and 0.38 
(since, for Example 2, we set θ2=0.62, we have θ1<0.38). The portion of the expected net 
revenue allocated to firm 1 (λ) is 0.63 and does not change as θ1 changes, since λ is a 
function of θ2 only (Figure 4.8a). However, as θ1, the amount of knowledge dedicated to 
the JD project by each firm (Q1, Q2) increases (Figure 4.8b). Since KS is more effective, 
the firms share a higher amount of knowledge, which increases the value of knowledge 
creation in the second period. Thus, for larger values θ1 the amount of KD pursued 
jointly by the firms (γJD) is larger (Figure 4.8c). As a result, the knowledge embedded 
jointly into the new product is larger, resulting in higher expected profits for each firm 
(Figures 4.8d and 4.8e). 
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Figure 4.8   KS and KD decisions and the expected profits of firms 1 and 2 with respect 
to θ1 
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Figure 4.8e      E{pi2}* and E{pi2N}* with respect to θ1 
0
0.5
1
0 0.2
40
60
80
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0
10000
20000
30000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0
4000
8000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Q1 
Q2 
E{pi1} 
E{pi1N} 
 
E{pi1}, E{pi1N} 
 
λ
 
Q1, Q2 
γJD 
E{pi2} 
E{pi2N  
 
E{pi2}, E{pi2N} 
 
γJD 
 126 
For the third variation of Example 2, Example 2c, the same inputs are used, 
except that the value of cost of joint KD (cJD) is varied between 20 and 220. From 
Figures 4.9d and 4.9e, we can see that for 20≤cJD≤220, firms 1 and 2 find it optimal to 
cooperate through JD mechanism rather than pursuing the NPD projects without 
cooperation. However, it is important to note that the additional profits earned by 
cooperating through the JD mechanism decreases as cJD increases. Further, if the cost 
of joint KD exceeds a threshold value, it is optimal for firms to pursue NPD projects 
individually. Although the portion of expected profit allocated to firm 1 (λ) does not divert 
from 0.63 as cJD increases, the amount of knowledge shared by the firms (Q1 and Q2) 
and the rate of joint KD pursued in period two decreases (Figures 4.9a to 4.9c). Since 
the value of KD in the second period is small, the firms refrain from dedicating high 
amount of knowledge in the first period. Thus, as the joint KD becomes more costly, the 
expected profit for each firm decreases (Figures 4.9d and 4.9e). 
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Figure 4.9   KS and KD decisions and the expected profits of firms 1 and 2 with respect 
to cJD 
 
       
                  
Figure 4.9a   λ* with respect to 
cJD 
      Figure 4.9b     Q1* and Q2* with respect to cJD 
                                    
Figure 4.9c        γJD* with respect to cJD 
                                 
Figure 4.9d           E{pi1}* and E{pi1N}* with respect to cJD 
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4.5.2.3 Experimental Analysis of Impact of Uncertainty 
In this section, an exploration of the impact of the external (exogenous) 
environment and integration capabilities of the firms on the firm’s decisions and 
competitive positions is provided. Similar to the experimental analysis for the CD 
mechanism given in section 4.5.1.3, the effect of various exogenous conditions on a 
firm’s optimal KS and joint KD decisions, and on their profits are examined. Results are 
presented which characterize the effect on the optimal solutions due to the following 
conditions: (i) different expected customer valuation of the knowledge jointly embedded 
by the firms into the new product, and (ii) different expected integration capability of firm 
2 of the knowledge purchased from firm 1 in the first period. 
As the starting point of the experimental design, we consider Example 2, which is 
the base example introduced in section 4.5.2.2. In the stochastic numerical analysis, 
customer’s valuation of knowledge jointly embedded into the new product (vJDP), and the 
integration capability of the firms (βP[K10,K20]) is a random variable satisfying a triangular 
distribution and defined at two levels: high and low uncertainty. It is assumed that a low 
level of uncertainty associated with these variables is characterized by a small standard 
deviation, whereas a relatively large standard deviation is used to represent a high level 
of uncertainty. The means of the exogenous demand distributions are assumed identical 
so that the results obtained are solely attributed to different levels of uncertainty. 
In order to examine the impact of the stochastic valuation of customers of firm 1 
(vJDP), two experiments are presented. First, the triangular distribution used for 
exogenous customer valuation is symmetric. Second, a skewed triangular distribution is 
assumed (the mean is to the right of the mode) so that there is a greater chance of 
experiencing exogenous customer valuation in excess of the mode. The means of each 
distribution, however, are equal. The three parameters used to define the triangular 
distributions for the random variable vJDP are given in Table C.10.  
From Table C.11, the initial decision of the leader, the portion of expected profit 
allocated to firm 1 is not impacted by the uncertainty of customer valuation. According to 
the results, larger uncertainty regarding the customers’ valuation of knowledge jointly 
embedded by the firms is associated with larger amount of knowledge dedicated by the 
firms into the JD project in period one, and larger amount of joint KD pursued in period 
two. However, the expected profit under the JD agreement is lower for both firms if 
uncertainty regarding customer valuation is large. This result indicates that uncertainty 
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drives the firms to jointly embed larger level of knowledge into the new product by 
pursuing knowledge creation at a large amount, while the gains in the marketplace from 
developing a superior product is outweighed by costs of knowledge creation. It is 
important to note that skewed distribution for high uncertainty experiment amplifies the 
results regarding the firms KS and KD decisions, while curtailing the reduction effect of 
uncertainty on the expected profit. 
The impact of uncertainty regarding integration capability of the firms on the KM 
decision and expected profits are examined through a similar approach. The input 
values for the three parameters used and other relevant data regarding the triangular 
distribution for βP[K10,K20] are given in Table C.12. When we analyze the results 
regarding impact of uncertainty associated with the integration capability of firm 2, given 
in Table C.13, we see that the impact is similar to that of expected customer valuation: 
larger uncertainty of the integration capability of the firms is associated with larger 
amount of knowledge dedicated by the firms into the JD project, and larger amount of 
joint KD. Conversely, the expected profit for the firms if they cooperate through JD 
mechanism is smaller. Moreover, skewed distribution amplifies the effects regarding KS 
and KD, while mediates the reduction in the expected profits of the firms due to 
uncertainty. 
4.5.2.4 Simultaneous Decision Making 
In the model introduced in Section 4.5.2, whose analytical solutions and 
numerical and experimental analysis are provided in Sections 4.5.2.1, 4.5.2.2, and 
4.5.2.3, we assume that firms make knowledge-sharing decisions sequentially. Firm 1, 
who is the leader, makes the profit allocation decision, followed by the initial decision 
regarding the amount of knowledge to dedicate to the JD project. Then, firm 2 responds 
by making its knowledge-sharing decision. In the second period, firms jointly set the 
amount of KD to be pursued. In this section, we approach the JD mechanism from a 
different angle, and we assume that after firm 1 makes the profit allocation decision, the 
firms make knowledge-sharing decisions simultaneously. Similar to the model introduced 
in the previous section, we assume firms jointly make the second period decision.  
When we set the impact of the firms’ joint knowledge level at the end of the first 
period (KJD1) on the effectiveness of KD to power ½ (µi=1/2), we get the solutions for the 
decisions for firms 1 and 2, depicted in Proposition 15. 
 
 130 
PROPOSITION 15. Suppose µ1=µ2=½ and firms 1 and 2 make KS decisions 
simultaneously. The optimal portion of expected net revenue allocated by firm 1 to firm 1 
is given in Equation (4.33). The optimal equilibrium amount of knowledge firm 2 will 
dedicate to the JD after observing the amount of knowledge dedicated by firm 1 in the 
first period satisfies Equation (4.34). In addition, the optimal equilibrium amount of 
knowledge firm 1 will dedicate to the joint KD effort in the first period satisfies Equations 
(4.35). Finally, amount of knowledge firm 1 will dedicate to the joint KD effort in the first 
period satisfies Equation (4.36), respectively. 
 h  +9#&&9# ,         0.52<θ2<0.66                              (4.33) 
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Firm 1’s profit allocation decision, given in Equation (4.33), is the same solution 
in Equation (4.29). From Equations (4.34) to (4.36), most of the results regarding the 
impact of firm and market characteristics on the firms’ KM decisions are the same as the 
results given in Section 4.5.2.1 and 4.5.2.2. The only parameter whose impact of firms’ 
KS and KD decision differs from the sequential model is the rate of returns to KS of 
knowledge shared by firm 2 (θ2).  
The results regarding the impact of θ2 on the firms’ KM decisions are obtained 
through a numerical analysis. Specifically, we consider the base Example 2 introduced 
in Section 4.5.2.2 and generate different input values for θ2. Figure 4.10 illustrates the 
impact of various values of θ2 on firm 1’s profit allocation decision, the firms’ decisions 
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regarding KS and KD, and the expected profit for firms 1 and 2. From Figure 4.10a, the 
portion of expected net revenue allocated to firm 1 increases as the rate of returns to KS 
of knowledge shared by firm 2. The amount of knowledge shared by firm 1 increases as 
the rate of returns to KS of knowledge shared by firm 2 increases for values of θ2 smaller 
than 0.59 and decreases as the rate of returns increases for values of θ2 larger than 
0.59. Similarly, the amount of knowledge shared by firm 1 increases as the rate of 
returns to KS of knowledge shared by firm 2 increases for values of θ2 smaller than 0.61 
and decreases as the rate of returns to KS of knowledge shared by firm 2 increases for 
values of θ2 larger than 0.61. Thus, the relationship between the amount of knowledge 
shared by the firms and the effectiveness of KS follows a similar pattern to the one in 
Example 2a, where the decision making was sequential. However, the amount of 
knowledge shared for each value of θ2 smaller if the decision making is simultaneous, 
compared to the sequential game. As the rate of returns to KS of knowledge shared by 
firm 2 increases, the amount of KD jointly pursued by the firms, and the expected profit 
earned by each firm also initially increases then decreases from the Figures 4.10c, 4.10d 
and 4.10e, respectively. It is important to note that the although the amount of joint KD is 
relatively similar I value to the sequential game, the expected profit for each firm is 
smaller in value for each θ2, since the amount of knowledge shared by firm 2 is smaller. 
Thus, the range of θ2 for which firms engage in cooperation through JD is smaller 
(Figures 4.10d and 4.10e). 
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Figure 4.10   KS and KD decisions and the expected profits of firms 1 and 2 with respect 
to θ2 in simultaneous decision making setting 
       
            
Figure 4.10a  λ* with respect to θ2     Figure 4.10b    Q1* and Q2* with respect to  θ2 
                                
Figure 4.10c        γJD* with respect to  θ2 
                               
Figure 4.10d           E{pi1}* and E{pi1N}* with respect to θ2 
                                 
Figure 4.10e      E{pi2}* and E{pi2N}* with respect to θ2 
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4.6 Conclusions and Future Research  
In this chapter, we provide a framework for analyzing the knowledge flow 
between two competing firms engaged in cooperative agreements. We introduce two 
two-period game theoretical models that explore KM strategies that drive NPD for two 
profit-maximizing firms. Knowledge management strategies include the KT or KS 
between firms and the KD pursued either by each firm independent of its competitor, or 
jointly. Furthermore, we examine two mechanisms of cooperation between the 
competitors: CD and JD agreements. We develop analytical models that examine the 
KM strategies for two firms that cooperate through the CD or JD mechanism. We extend 
the results of analytical analysis by developing numerical examples. Our results provide 
insights to the factors that drive each firm’s KM decisions including the effects of firm 
and market-specific characteristics. 
4.6.1 Competitive Development 
Key analytical insights are obtained demonstrating the interactions between each 
firm’s period one KT decisions. In a surprising result, we find that if firm 1 charges a 
lower price for its knowledge, firm 2 may purchase either a larger or smaller amount of 
knowledge. If the valuation of knowledge by firm 2’s customers is large, a lower price set 
by firm 1 drives firm 2 to purchase a larger amount of knowledge. Meanwhile if the 
valuation of knowledge by firm 2’s customers is small, a lower price set by firm 1 drives 
firm 2 to purchase a smaller amount of knowledge. According to this result, if the level of 
knowledge of firm 2 is not valued highly by the customers in the marketplace, firm 2 may 
refrain from focusing on KT although the price set by firm 1 may be lower.   
We also find that firm 2 purchases less knowledge if firm 1 charges a low price 
and firm 1’s probability of successfully developing the new product is small or the 
effectiveness of transferring knowledge from firm 1 is small. Similar to the impact of 
direct competition mentioned above, if firm 2 is not likely to develop a successful 
product, or does not have high gains due to KT, small price charged by firm 1 may drive 
firm 2 away from engaging in KT, since expected value of transferring knowledge is 
small.   Furthermore, if the cost of KD in period two is larger, firm 2 focuses on 
transferring a larger (small) amount of knowledge from firm 1 in period one, despite a 
high (small)price set by firm. According to this result, large cost of KD for firm 2 either 
drives firm 2 to focus on KT as opposed to KD as a means of knowledge creation, or to 
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pursue knowledge creation at a smaller rate and develop an inferior product to reduce 
costs.  
Additional analytic results are obtained under the modest simplifying assumption 
that the rate of diminishing returns to KD associated with each firm’s level of knowledge 
equals one-half. We find that if the expected capability of firm 2 to integrate  knowledge 
transferred from firm 1 is large, then firm 2 purchases a larger amount of knowledge in 
period 1 and pursues more KD in period 2. This result highlights the complementary 
relationship between the two means of knowledge creation for firm 2. However we also 
find that the knowledge integration capability of firm 2 does not impact the price set by 
firm 1 in the first period or the amount of KD pursued by firm 1 in the second period. 
Thus, the expected net revenue of firm 1 on the competitive dimension is smaller while 
the expected net revenue earned due to selling knowledge to firm 1 is larger, despite the 
same price set by firm 1. The expected profit earned by firm 1 is larger although the KT 
cost is larger. The impact of the rate of returns to KT of firm 2’s initial knowledge level is 
similar to the results for expected integration capability.  
 We obtain insights on the impact of direct competition between firms 1 and 2 by 
exploring the customers’ valuation of the difference between the knowledge each firm 
embeds into their product (switching customers). If the switching customers’ valuation of 
firm 2 knowledge is high, then the price set by firm 1 in period one is smaller and firm 2 
pursues more KT in period one and more KD in period 2. Meanwhile, the amount of firm 
1’s KD is not impacted. Thus, if the level of direct competition is high, firm 1’s strategy is 
to increase its expected revenue by driving firm 2 to purchase a larger amount of 
knowledge; whereas firm 2 focuses on increasing expected net revenue by embedding 
more knowledge into the product offered in the marketplace. This result occurs since 
gains due to developing a superior product is outweighed by the gains through KT, firm 1 
focuses on earning revenue from knowledge sold to firm 2. Similarly, we show that if the 
cost of the loss of proprietary knowledge suffered by firm 1 is small, the firms are driven 
to follow the same strategy. Since the gains due to selling knowledge to firm 2 outweighs 
the cost of loss of sole ownership of knowledge for firm 1, firm one focuses on earning 
revenue from KT. Meanwhile, since cost of KT is smaller for firm 2, firm 2 focuses on 
embedding knowledge into the new product, and on earning large expected revenue in 
the marketplace. 
 Beyond the analytic results reported above, numerical results are obtained on the 
effect of the probability that firm 1 successfully develops the new product. One might 
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expect that with a high probability, firm 1 has the confidence to transfer more knowledge 
to firm 2, and thereby charges a lower price. This is not the case. If the probability is 
high, firm 1 pursues a large amount of KD in period 2 and sets a higher price for 
knowledge transfer in the first period. The higher price reduces the amount purchased 
by firm 2, while the amount of KD pursued by firm 2 does not change. Therefore, as the 
probability of firm 1 succeeding in its NPD project increases, firm 1 pursues a more 
aggressive KD strategy in period 2 and firm 2 is driven to an inferior competitive position 
overall. As a result, the expected profit for firm 1 is smaller while the expected profit form 
firm 2 is smaller. Meanwhile, if the probability that firm 2 successfully develops the new 
product is large, firm 2 sets a smaller price in period one, driving firm 2 to purchase more 
knowledge. In addition, firm 2 pursues more KD in the second period, and thus, is driven 
to focus on developing a superior product. Firm 1, whose KD is not impacted by the 
probability that firm 2 successfully develops the new product focuses on earning larger 
revenue from KT. However, through numerical analysis we show that the expected profit 
of firm 1 is smaller while the expected profit of firm 2 is larger.  
 Numerical results are obtained that illustrate the impact of the cost of KD pursued 
by firm 2. We find that if the cost is high, firm 2 offers an inferior product to the 
marketplace at the end of period 2; firm 1’s product features do not change. Specifically, 
since firm 2 pursues less KD in the second period, there are less overall benefits from 
KT in period one. The lesser pursuit of KD in period 2 makes firm 2 less of a competitive 
threat to firm 1. To raise its revenue and with less fear of direct competition, firm 1 seeks 
to entice firm 2 to undertake KT in period 1 and charges a lower price. The lower price, 
however, only serves to lessen the reduction in KT pursued by firm 2. Thus, whereas 
firm 2’s cost reducing strategy leads it to deliver an inferior product to the marketplace, 
the level of knowledge embedded into firm 1’s product does not change. Although the 
revenue generated from the lower amount of KT reduces firm 1’s profit, firm 1’s expected 
net revenue due to switching customers increases. As a result, the expected profit of 
firm 1 is larger while the expected profit of firm 2 is smaller.  
 It is important to note two results regarding the impact of the cost of KD for firm 2. 
First, if the cost of KD for firm 2 is significantly large, firm 2 does not enter into 
cooperation with firm 2 through CD mechanism. Through focusing its resources in 
developing the product without cooperation, firm 2 is able to avoid the cost of KT, and 
earn larger expected profit. Meanwhile, since large cost of KD for firm 2 drives firm 2 to 
not engage in KT, firm 2’s expected profit is smaller if the firms do not cooperate. Thus, 
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large cost of KD for firm 2 drives firm 2 t not cooperate with firm 1, while firm 1 would 
have been better off engaging into CD with firm 1. Second, the KM strategies of the firms 
are more sensitive to the cost of KD for firm 2 compared to the cost of KD for firm 1.  
Based on extensive numerical experimentation, we explore the impact of 
uncertainty associated with the valuation of knowledge by firm 1’s switching customers. 
Assuming the distribution for uncertainty is symmetric around the mean, with a high 
degree of uncertainty; firm 1 charges a high price for KT in period one and undertakes 
less KD in period two. In contrast, the high uncertainty has no effect on firm 2’s KT or KD 
decisions. As a result, firm 1 develops an inferior product, while the quality of the product 
introduced by firm 2 is not impacted. Although the revenue earned by firm 1 due to KT is 
larger, since the expected net revenue earned from the product in the marketplace, the 
expected profit of firm 1 is smaller. As a result, the expected profit for firm 2 is larger 
despite large cost of KT. According to this result, uncertainty regarding switching 
customers’ valuation of firm 1 drives firm 1 to focus on earning revenue from KT, 
however, loss in expected net revenue outweighs the gains of selling knowledge to firm 
2. Meanwhile, due to the inferior product developed by firm 1, the expected net revenue 
earned by firm 2 due to direct competition is larger. Moreover, if the distribution of 
customer valuation of firm 1 is skewed so that there is a greater chance of experiencing 
large valuation by switching customers of firm 1, the detrimental impact of uncertainty on 
firm 1’s decisions is more pronounced. This result highlight that significantly large 
uncertainty regarding switching customers’ valuation of firm 1 knowledge drives firm 2 to 
be more willing to cooperate while firm 1 refrains from competition. 
The impact of the uncertainty associated with the switching customers’ valuation 
of firm 2 knowledge is similar to the results for uncertainty associated with the switching 
customers’ valuation of firm 2 knowledge in terms of firms KM strategies. However, while 
larger uncertainty associated regarding firm 2 knowledge results in smaller expected 
profit for firm 1, firm 2’s expected profit is larger. If uncertainty is represented by a 
skewed distribution so that there is a greater chance of experiencing large valuation by 
switching customers of firm 2, these results are amplified. Therefore, as uncertainty 
regarding the effect of direct competition increases, the expected profit of firm 1 
decreases, while the expected profit of firm 1 may increase or decrease.  
Similarly, we obtain insights on the effect of uncertainty regarding the integration 
capability of firm 2 using numerical methods. We find that the price and KD decisions of 
firm 1 are not impacted by the level of uncertainty associated with firm 2’s ability to 
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integrate KT. However, if uncertainty is symmetric around the mean, then more 
uncertainty drives firm 2 to purchase a larger amount of knowledge from firm 1 in period 
one and pursue a larger amount of KD in period two, which leads to better quality 
products for the marketplace. The expected profit of both firms is larger if the uncertainty 
associated with integration capability of firm 2 is larger. For firm 1, the expected revenue 
is smaller in competition dimension; however, the revenue due to KT is larger, thus firm 
1 gains larger expected revenue, despite setting the same price and pursuing same 
amount of KD. For firm 2, the expected revenue earned from the marketplace outweighs 
the cost incurred for KT. Meanwhile, skewed distribution reduces the impact of 
uncertainty on firm 2’s KT and KD decisions, and on expected profits of both firms. 
These result highlight an important insight: Uncertainty in customer valuation drives a 
different effect on firm 1 and 2 solutions than uncertainty in integration. Thus, to the 
extent possible, the firms should carefully assess the source of uncertainty. 
The above insights show that there are many parameters that impact the KM 
strategies of firms that are in the same market and have the opportunity to cooperate 
through a CD agreement. Our results extend the literature in multiple dimensions. First, 
while past literature, such as D’Aspremont et al (2000), Arora and Fosfuri (2003) have 
identified that competition in the marketplace plays an important role in firms KM 
strategies, our results reveal that different market characteristics may drive significantly 
different KM strategies for the firms. While past literature have focused on firms that race 
to develop a new product first to reap benefits in the marketplace, we show that the 
features and functionality of the product and the valuation of the quality of the product in 
the marketplace drive firms to pursue unique KT and KD strategies. In particular, the 
impact of the valuation of loyal customers and the valuation of customers if one firm is 
the sole developer of the new product on the firms KM strategies and expected profits 
differ significantly from the impact of direct competition. 
Second, while past literature (Kutikala and Lin 2006, Fosfuri 2006) have focused 
on KT decisions of firms, particularly in terms of decisions regarding licensing, we have 
complex relationships we capture on the evolution of knowledge in NPD projects. 
Specifically, we recognize the two means of knowledge creation, KT and KD pursued by 
the firms to increase their knowledge levels. We develop analytical and numerical 
insights on the impact of market and firm characteristics on each firm’s KT and KD 
strategies. 
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Third, our analysis captures the impact of the absorptive capacity of the firm that 
is the recipient of knowledge on the firms’ decisions regarding knowledge creation, and 
expected profits. Unlike past literature that have considered the beneficial impact of 
tapping into an outside source for knowledge, we capture the impact of the expected 
absorptive capacity and the expected integration capability of the recipient firm on both 
firms KM strategies and decisions. Our results show that the components of expected 
absorptive capacity, such as the initial relevant knowledge of the firms, expected 
integration capability, and the amount of knowledge transferred have significant impact 
of firms knowledge creation decisions. In addition, the uncertainty regarding the 
integration capability should be carefully assessed by the firms, since the expected 
profits of the firms can be significantly affected by this factor. 
4.6.2 Joint Development 
Our analytical results reveal important insights regarding the interaction effects 
between the firms’ period one KS decisions. According to these results, if firm 1 
dedicates a large amount of knowledge to the JD project, firm 2 may dedicate a larger or 
smaller amount of knowledge. If the probability of jointly developing a successful product 
or the customer’s valuation of joint knowledge or higher effectiveness of KS is small, 
then larger (smaller) amount of knowledge shared by firm 1 drives firm 2 to dedicate a 
smaller (larger) portion of its knowledge into the JD project. For example, while firm 1 
may aim to reap benefits from the new product by sharing large level of knowledge, firm 
2 refrains from dedicating large level of knowledge to the new since the expected net 
revenue earned from the product in the marketplace is small.  
In addition, if sharing knowledge is less costly for firm 2, or the portion of 
expected profit allocated to firm 2 is large, or the increase in the level of joint knowledge 
at the end of period one, due to knowledge shared by firm 2 is small, firm 2 has less 
incentive to keep knowledge proprietary and shares a larger amount of knowledge per 
unit knowledge shared by firm 1. Thus, if the drivers of expected profit for one firm are 
small, the firms pursue a “compensation strategy,” where smaller level of knowledge 
dedicated by one firm is compensated by the larger level of knowledge dedicated by the 
other firm.  
Additional analytic results are obtained under the modest simplifying assumption 
that the rate of diminishing returns to KD associated with joint level of knowledge equals 
one-half. We find that the initial decision in period one, the portion of expected profit 
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allocated to firm 1 (and, therefore, firm 2), is dependent only on the rate of returns to KS 
of the knowledge dedicated by firm 2. As the effectiveness of knowledge shared by firm 
2 increases, the portion of expected profit allocated to firm 1 also increases. By following 
this strategy, firm 1 aims to increase its gains from the knowledge shared by firm 2.  
Meanwhile, according to the numerical analysis, large rate of return to KS of the 
knowledge dedicated by firm 2 may drive firm 2 to dedicate either a larger or smaller 
amount of knowledge. For smaller values of the rate of returns of knowledge dedicated 
by firm 2, the amount of knowledge shared by the firms, and the joint amount of KD, as 
well as expected profit for the firms, increases as the effectiveness of knowledge shared 
by firm 2 increases. However, for larger values of the returns of knowledge dedicated by 
firm 2, the amount of KS and KD pursued by the firms decreases as the effectiveness of 
knowledge shared by firm 2 increases. This result occurs since firm 1, who is leader, 
claims a larger portion of the expected profit for larger values of the returns of KS by firm 
2. This drives firm 2 to refrain from dedicating high amount of knowledge to the JD 
project. Since the value of increasing the knowledge embedded in the JD project in the 
second period is small, the KD is also pursued at a smaller amount. Similarly, for smaller 
values of rate of returns of knowledge shared by firm 2, the expected profit of firms 1 and 
2 increase as rate of returns increase, while for larger values of rate of returns, the 
expected profits of the firms decrease as rate of returns increase. In addition, firm 1 (2) 
prefers to develop the new product individually if the rate of returns of knowledge shared 
by firm 2 is small (large). Thus, for the firms there is a range of values for rate of returns 
of knowledge shared by firm 2 where firms cooperate through JD. This result occurs 
since for the firms there is a tradeoff between the increase/decrease in the portion of 
expected net revenue they earn versus decrease/increase in the level of knowledge 
dedicated by the other firm into the JD project. 
As expected, if the parameters that drive the effectiveness of KS to firm 2 are 
large, the firms are driven to dedicate larger amount of knowledge to the JD project. In 
addition, the firms share more knowledge with their competitor if the cost of loss of sole 
ownership is small. Due to the complementary relationship between the knowledge 
creation pursued in periods one and two, firms are also driven to purse a greater amount 
of KD, if the effectiveness of KS is large or if the cost of sharing knowledge is small. 
Thus, larger effectiveness of KS and smaller cost of loss of proprietary knowledge drives 
larger expected profit for firms if they cooperate, and drives firms engage in cooperation 
through JD. 
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Furthermore, if the initial knowledge level of either firm, the firms’ joint probability 
of successfully developing the new product, or the customer’s valuation of knowledge 
embedded in the new product is large, the firms are driven to dedicate a high amount of 
knowledge to the JD project in period one, and pursue a higher amount of KD in period 
two. This result occurs since the firms’ expected gains from embedding large levels of 
knowledge into the new product outweigh the cost of knowledge creation. The expected 
net revenue and the individual expected profits earned by the firms are also larger under 
these conditions. The numerical analysis reveals that a small cost of joint KD also drives 
the firms to pursue the above KM strategy. Thus, as the drivers of expected net revenue 
are large of joint KD efforts are less costly for firms, the firms are driven to engage in KS 
and develop the new product jointly. 
Based on extensive numerical experimentation, we explore the impact of 
uncertainty associated with the firms’ customer’s valuation of joint knowledge. Assuming 
the distribution for uncertainty is symmetric around the mean, with a high degree of 
uncertainty; the firms dedicate larger amounts of knowledge in the first period, and 
pursue larger amount of KD in the second period. However, the expected profit under 
the JD agreement is lower for both firms if uncertainty regarding customer valuation is 
large. This result indicates that uncertainty drives the firms to develop a superior product 
by pursuing knowledge creation at a large amount, while the gains in the marketplace 
from developing a superior product is outweighed by costs of knowledge creation. 
Moreover, if the distribution of customer valuation of firm 1 is skewed so that there is a 
greater chance of experiencing large customer valuation, the increasing impact of 
uncertainty on the firms’ decisions is more pronounced, while the reduction effect of 
uncertainty on the expected profit is diminished.  
The impact of the uncertainty associated with the integration capability of the 
firms is similar to the results for uncertainty associated with the customers’ valuation of 
joint knowledge in terms of firms KM strategies. However, the expected profit for the 
firms if they cooperate through JD mechanism is smaller. Moreover, skewed distribution 
amplifies the effects regarding KS and KD, while it lessens the reduction in the expected 
profits of the firms due to uncertainty. 
The insights regarding the KM strategies and expected profits of firms enhances 
the current understanding of cooperation through JD mechanism. First, many market 
and firm characteristics impact the KS and KD decisions of the firms. While he 
effectiveness of KS overall is critical for the firms, it is important for the firms to assess 
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the individual drivers of effectiveness of KS. Past literature, Including Samaddar and 
Kadiyala (2006), have identified the initial relevant NPD knowledge of the firms as an 
important component of effectiveness of KS. However, we identify that the rate of returns 
to KS of knowledge shared by each firm, and the expected integration capability of the 
firms, each impact the KS and KD strategies of the firms differently. In addition, the 
market characteristics, such as the customers’ valuation of knowledge significantly 
impact the firms KM strategies, and the expected gains of each firm at the end of the JD 
project. 
Second, engaging in JD projects create value for the firms if the firms can 
develop viable KS and KD strategies. Many studies, such as Anand and Khanna 
(2000a), Cassiman and Veugeler (2006) have examined the KS among firms through 
empirical analysis, and considerable research exists on the normative analysis of 
cooperation through JD mechanism (Appleyard (1996), Atallah (2005)). However, 
through viewing cooperation via JD mechanism as games between firms that operate in 
the same market, we provide a viable theoretical lens to understand the decision making 
process regarding KM strategies of the firms. Moreover, this study contributes to the 
literature in terms of adding insights regarding uncertainty associated with the customers 
valuation of knowledge (market) and the firms’ capability to integrate the knowledge 
dedicated to the JD project. 
Third, we build on the past literature in examining the dynamic relationship 
between two forms of knowledge creation, namely KS and KD, for JD mechanism. Our 
findings reveal that there exists a complementary relationship between the joint 
knowledge dedicated by the firms to the JD project, and the KD efforts. Meanwhile, we 
show that the amount of knowledge dedicated by each firm may constitute complements 
or substitutes for each other, and this relationship is driven by various firm and market 
characteristics.    
Finally, the insights depicted in this chapter provide a framework on the drivers of 
firms’ decisions regarding whether or not to enter JD agreements. For example, our 
results regarding the range of values for rate of returns to KS of knowledge shared by 
the follower firm illustrate that firms may not choose to cooperate if the effectiveness of 
KS is significantly large or significantly small. Hence, the ability of firms to identify, 
absorb, and improve on knowledge shared by another firm does not necessarily imply 
that these firms are well positioned to profit from NPD projects that are built on the KS 
process. It is crucial for firms to identify the drivers of effectiveness of KS process.    
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4.6.3 Future Research 
We believe this study is an important step in understanding firms’ cooperation 
strategies in a competitive market. Based on our analysis, we outline a number of fruitful 
avenues for future research. 
 First, the model introduced for the CD mechanism can be enriched by including 
the price competition in the marketplace. In this chapter, we assume that customers’ 
(expected) valuations of knowledge embedded by the firms drive the firms’ expected 
revenue from the new products in the marketplace. However, in a more realistic setting, 
the firms’ decisions would include the price set for the products developed. Specifically, 
since each firm may embed different levels of knowledge into the new product they 
develop, the products may vary in quality. The firms may maximize their expected profit 
by setting an optimal price for the product in the marketplace, considering the quality of 
the product (in comparison to the product developed by the competitor). Such an 
extension of the model using a Bertrand-game setting in the marketplace would provide 
important insights on the impact of price competition on the firms’ decision regarding KT 
and KD. 
 Second, the model introduced in Section 4.4.1 captures the impact of KM 
strategies on the firms’ probability of developing a successful product in a simplified 
manner. Specifically, we assume the probability of developing a successful product is 
independent of the knowledge level embedded by each firm into the new product. This 
assumption can be relaxed by defining the probability of developing a successful product 
as a function of the level of knowledge of the firms at the end of first or second periods. 
This extension allows us to capture the complex interactions regarding the uncertainty of 
NPD process. 
Third, for the JD mechanism, we assume that the portion of expected profit 
allocated to each firm is determined by firm 1 at the beginning of the first period. 
However, depending on the structure of the firms and the agreement between firms, the 
allocation of expected profit between the firms may take various forms. For example, an 
extension of the model introduced in Section 4.4.2, which allocates the expected profit to 
each firm in proportion to the amount of knowledge dedicated to the JD project (i.e. 
λ=Q1/(Q1+Q2)), where λ is the portion of the profit allocated to firm 1, would provide 
interesting insights on the impact of profit allocation on firms’ KM strategies. 
Finally, consideration of other cooperation mechanisms between firms that 
compete in the market will provide insightful analysis of the KM in NPD problem at the 
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firm level. One such mechanism is a two-directional transfer of knowledge between firms 
that compete in the same market. Cross-licensing of knowledge, in terms of patents, 
components or modules between firms, which is a common mechanism of cooperation 
between firms in certain industries (i.e. semiconductor and electronics industries), is an 
example of a two-directional KT. We believe that extending the analysis provided in this 
chapter by delving into other mechanisms of cooperation will yield a fruitful avenue of 
research. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Management of knowledge involved in the new product development (NPD) 
projects is critical to the success of firms competing in environments that require rapid 
innovation. Although there is agreement of its importance, there is a lack of general 
understanding and recommendations regarding KM strategies for successful NPD. The 
fundamental contribution of this thesis is a rich and multifaceted understanding of how 
KM strategies drive successful NPD outcomes. The research addresses the integration 
of KM and NPD at different decision making levels of the firm. First I consider the KM 
strategies of a manager responsible for a single NPD project. This research integrates 
key factors from the largely separate literatures of KM and NPD. Second, I consider KM 
at strategic level where a firm establishes strategies to transfer or share knowledge 
resources with a competitor. This research on NPD also reflects themes in the literature 
on strategic management. From this research, we are better able to understand the 
unique nature of KM in the context of NPD. In this final chapter, we draw conclusions 
from the three studies that comprise this thesis. We then identify a number of open 
research questions with respect to management of knowledge for NPD. 
5.1 Knowledge Management Strategies for Product and Process Design Teams 
In Chapter 2, a normative model is developed to aid the manager of an NPD 
project determine her KM strategy for the product and process design teams. The timing 
and extent of knowledge embedded by each team during the development project 
determine the features, functionality, and manufacturing efficiency of the product and 
process. Thus, the manager's KM strategy drives the net revenue earned when the 
product is launched. The manager impacts the knowledge levels of the product and 
process design teams through knowledge creation. The manager determines the optimal 
rates of KA for each team and the rates of KT between teams. Also, the manager may 
determine the optimal product launch time, which reflects the tradeoff between early 
market benefits versus the development of superior product and process features. 
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5.1.1 The Delay or Front-Loading Strategies 
Two possible strategies that the NPD manager may follow when pursuing KA for 
each team or KT between teams are introduced. First, in the front-loading strategy the 
manager pursues KA or KT at an initially high rate that decreases throughout the 
remainder of the NPD project. In particular, the front-loading strategy occurs when the 
effectiveness of KA or KT is high at the outset of the NPD project. This situation may 
arise if the levels of knowledge of the product or process design teams are relatively 
large at the initial time, if there is limited technical or market uncertainty early in the 
development project, or if the returns to KA or KT are considerable. The rate of KA or KT 
decreases over time for several reasons. First, further additions to the level of product or 
process design team knowledge are more difficult to realize as a result of diminishing 
returns. Second, as time passes, less time remains in the NPD project to accrue the 
benefits from an increase in the level of product design team knowledge. Third, since the 
level of knowledge of the product or process team increases over time, the manager's 
ability to leverage LBD increases.   
Second, the delay strategy occurs when the effectiveness of KA or KT is small 
early in the development project. A low level of effectiveness may occur if the initial level 
of product and process design team knowledge is small, if there is considerable 
technical or market uncertainty early in the NPD project, or if the returns to KA or KT are 
small. Due to the limited effectiveness, the manager pursues KA or KT at a relatively 
small but increasing rate early in the development project. The rate increases for two 
reasons. First, over time, the levels of product and process design team knowledge 
increase through LBD and knowledge creation. Second, technical and market 
uncertainty are resolved over time. As a result, the effectiveness of KA or KT increases 
early in the development project. Eventually, the rate of KA or KT reaches a peak and 
declines thereafter. The decline occurs for several reasons. First, the level of product or 
process team knowledge reaches a point where additional gains are difficult to achieve 
(diminishing returns). Second, over time less of the NPD project remains to accrue the 
benefits KA or KT. Third, over time the manager is better able to increase knowledge by 
leveraging LBD which is free. Basically, in the delay strategy, the manager optimally 
delays her peak investment in KA or KT until a later time when the investment is more 
effective.    
The above analytic results are extended numerically (details not given here) to 
observe how the delay versus front loading strategy impact the optimal product launch 
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time and profit. If the initial levels of knowledge of both teams are small, the manager 
optimally pursues the delay strategy for KT or KA. As the initial levels of knowledge 
increase, the peak rate of KT or KA occurs earlier. Eventually, when the initial levels of 
knowledge are sufficiently large, the manager optimally switches and pursues the front-
loading strategy for KT or KA. Moreover, we find that as the initial levels of product and 
process team knowledge increase, the manager launches a superior product earlier and 
earns higher profit. In addition, the rates of return on KA or KT also drive the levels of 
effectiveness. Lastly, the effectiveness of knowledge creation is impacted by the rates of 
technical and market uncertainty. Analogous results are obtained for the other drivers of 
effectiveness of KA or KT. 
The above insights are particularly important since the manager has some 
control over the of effectiveness of knowledge creation and on the technical and market 
uncertainty. Specific actions that may be pursued by the manager to increase the 
effectiveness of KA and KT and reduce the impact of uncertainty are depicted in Chapter 
2. 
5.1.2 Complementary Relationships 
Another important insight from the model is that the manager should consider 
key complementary relationships among the KA and KT strategies and the impact of 
these strategies on the optimal product launch time. If KT in either direction or KA for 
either team is higher, the manager pursues higher rates of knowledge creation for both 
teams. The higher rates of KA and KT enable the design teams to embed more 
knowledge into the development project over time. Thus, the manager optimally 
launches the product earlier. A larger rate of KA or KT optimally occurs if the 
effectiveness is larger or the cost is smaller.  
Analytically, we show that if the rate of LBD for either team is larger, then the 
manager optimally pursues more KA for both teams and more KT in both directions. 
Numerically we show that if the rate of LBD of either team is larger, then the manager 
earns higher profit by releasing a superior product at an earlier time. Therefore, a high 
rate of LBD reduces the tradeoff between time-to-market benefits and developing a 
superior product and process. Clearly, we show that LBD is a key source of competitive 
advantage.  
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5.1.3 Uncertainty Resolution 
We analyze the effect of uncertainty resolution that occurs during the 
development project. The rate of technical and market uncertainty is exogenous 
reflecting external market conditions and technology change. Analytic results are 
obtained demonstrating that if uncertainty is relatively small early in the development 
project or if uncertainty is resolved quickly over time then the manager pursues higher 
rates of KA and KT for both teams. As a result, higher levels of design team knowledge 
are embedded in the development project over time and an earlier product launch 
occurs resulting in a higher profit. Alternatively, suppose the extent of uncertainty is large 
early in the development project or decreases slowly. As a result, KA and KT are less 
effective and are pursued at lesser rates. However, we also find that by undertaking 
more KA and KT, and thereby increasing the levels of product and process design 
knowledge, the manager may endogenously reduce the impact of technical and market 
uncertainty. Therefore, the extent to which the manager reduces her pursuit of KA or KT 
is moderated by the ability of the product and process design teams to apply their 
knowledge to reduce uncertainty. 
5.1.4 Synergy or Conflict  
We analyze the impact of costs due to conflict or benefits from synergy when KT 
between the product and process design teams occurs simultaneously. Our results 
reveal that the benefits related to synergy lead to higher rates of KT in both directions. 
Due to the complementary relationships, this gives us higher rates of KA for both teams. 
With higher levels of product and process design knowledge embedded in the 
development project, the manager realizes an earlier launch of the product, although the 
product may not always be superior. Beyond these analytic results, numerical results 
show that synergy leads to higher profit.  
In contrast, there are two possible outcomes if additional costs occur due to 
conflict when the transfer of knowledge for both teams occurs simultaneously. First, the 
conflict may cause the manager to pursue less KT in both directions, which leads to less 
KA over time. Moreover, product and process design knowledge are embedded in the 
development project at a slower rate and the product launch time is delayed. Second, 
the manager may undertake a higher rate of KT in one direction and a lower rate in the 
other. In this case, the levels of knowledge embedded by the design teams may be 
larger or smaller so we do not know whether the product launch is earlier or delayed. 
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Beyond these analytic results, numerically we find that conflict always leads to lower 
profit.  
5.2 Stochastic Analysis of the Management of Knowledge for Product and Process 
Design Teams 
In Chapter 3, we develop a stochastic model to aid the manager of an NPD 
project determine her KM strategy for the product and process design teams. The timing 
and extent of knowledge embedded by each team during the development project 
determine the features, functionality, and manufacturing efficiency of the product and 
process. The manager determines the optimal rate and timing of knowledge creation, 
which includes KD for the design team and KT between the product and process design 
teams. The optimal dynamic rates of knowledge creation are obtained to maximize the 
expected profit, which consists of the expected net revenue when the product is 
released less the costs for knowledge creation during development.  
 
5.2.1 The Delay or Front-Loading Strategies 
Similar to the results of the model introduced in Chapter 2, the results we obtain 
for the stochastic model introduced in Chapter 3 reveals that front-loading and delay 
strategies are the two possible strategies the manager may pursue for knowledge 
creation. However, in chapter 3 we identify drivers of front-loading or delays strategies 
for KD and KT that are different from the ones we have obtained in Chapter 2. For 
example, the effectiveness of KD is high if the initial level of product design knowledge is 
large, or if the extent of errors detected while pursuing KD is small. Also, KD is front-
loaded if the manager estimates that the cumulative level of useful product design 
knowledge substantially enhances the probability of a successful product launch. 
Moreover, what is not obvious is that KD is front-loaded when the cumulative level of 
useful process design knowledge is not a key driver of net revenue. In this situation, the 
manager focuses on developing product design knowledge as a means of maximizing 
expected net revenue.  
Similarly, KT to the product (process) design team is front-loaded if the initial 
level of process (product) team knowledge is large, or if the rate of errors detected by KT 
to the product (process) design team is small. In addition, if the ability of process design 
knowledge to drive net revenue is large (small) early in the NPD project, the manager 
follows front-loading strategy for KT to the product (process) design team. Lastly, in a 
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result that is not so apparent, the manager front-loads KT to the product design team if 
the cumulative product design knowledge is not a key driver of the probability of 
successful launch of the new product early in the NPD project. Under this condition, the 
manager accelerates the increase in the product design knowledge to increase the 
probability of developing a successful product. 
The manager pursues delay strategy for KD or KT if the effectiveness of KD or 
KT is small at the initial time. The conditions that drive the delay strategy are the 
opposite from those that lead to the front-loading strategy.   
We discuss two of the six combinations of KM solutions that can occur. First, 
suppose the initial knowledge level of the product design team is large, the initial 
knowledge level of the process design team is small, and the effectiveness of KT to the 
product design team is larger than the effectiveness of KT in the other direction. Under 
these conditions the manager is driven to pursue a product oriented development 
strategy whereby the KD for the product design team and the KT to the process design 
team is front-loaded and the KT to the product design team is delayed. Second, suppose 
the above conditions are reversed. Here, the manager is driven to pursue a process 
oriented development strategy, in which the manager is driven to front-load KT to the 
product design team and delay KD for the product design team and the KT to the 
process design team. Third, suppose that initial levels of knowledge of both product and 
process design teams are large. This condition drives the manager to purpose a front-
loaded development strategy, where all the knowledge creation efforts follow a front-
loading strategy. 
The KM strategies that are given above are driven by the initial knowledge levels 
of the product and process design teams. Suppose the initial levels of the product and 
process design teams are small. The manager’s strategy for under these conditions is 
driven by two other factors: (i) the extent of errors uncovered by KD for the product 
design team and KT between the teams and (ii) the drivers of expected net revenue.  
5.2.2 The Impact of Errors Detected during Knowledge Creation 
We analyze the impact of errors that are detected by KD or KT activities on the 
KM strategy of the manager. We show that if the extent of design changes triggered by 
KD for the product design team, then the manager pursues KD at a smaller rate 
throughout the development project. Analogous results hold for the pursuit of KT in 
either direction.  
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In addition, our results reveal three key insights with respect to the impact of 
errors uncovered on the timing of KD and KT.  First, if the extent of errors uncovered by 
KD for the product design team is large, then the manager is driven to pursue product 
oriented development strategy (strategy depicted at the first quadrant of Figure 3.4). 
Second, the manager is driven to pursue process oriented development strategy if the 
extent of errors uncovered by KT to the product design team is large. Finally, if KT to the 
process design team uncovered large extent of errors, then the manager is driven to 
pursue front-loaded product development strategy. According to this strategy, the 
manager front-loads the KD and KT to the product design team and delays KT to the 
process design team. Thus, the manager accelerates the increase in the knowledge 
level of the product design team and transfers knowledge related to the attributes and 
features of the product later in the project. Thus, more effective KT to the process design 
team mediates the impact of the errors uncovered by KT from the product design team.  
The extent of errors uncovered by KD and KT during the project is may be 
related to the complexity of the NPD project. In addition, the types of processes and 
activities undertaken by the manager for KD or KT also drive the extent of errors 
uncovered by knowledge creation. The actions that may be taken by the manager to 
reduce the impact of errors uncovered by the knowledge creation are given in Chapter 3.  
 
5.2.3 The Impact of Drivers of expected net revenue 
We analyze the impact of drivers of expected net revenue on the manager’s KD 
and KT strategies. We find that if the product design knowledge substantially increases 
the probability of releasing a successful product early in the development project, then 
the manager pursues larger rates of KD for the product design team and larger rates of 
KT to both the product and process design teams. Similarly, the rates of knowledge 
creation for both teams are pursued at a larger rate if the process design knowledge 
substantially increases the net revenue generated by the new product early in the 
project, or the impact of time-based-competition in the market is large. Therefore, with 
respect to these drivers of expected net revenue, we observe a complementary 
relationship between the KD and KT. 
Our results also reveal that the drivers of expected revenue impact the timing of 
the knowledge creation for the product and the process design teams. Specifically, we 
show that if the product design knowledge significantly increases the probability of 
developing a successful product, or the time-based competition in the marketplace is 
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large, then the manager is driven to pursue product oriented development strategy. 
Meanwhile the manager is driven to pursue process oriented development strategy if the 
ability of the process design knowledge to enhance net revenue is large. These results 
demonstrate that the manager should carefully assess the drivers of expected net 
revenue due to their impact on the manager’s KM strategy, and take actions to influence 
them to the extent possible.  
 
5.3 Knowledge Management Strategies for New Product Development: 
Competition versus Joint Development 
In this Chapter 4, we provide a framework for analyzing the knowledge flow 
between two competing firms engaged in cooperative agreements. We introduce two 
two-period game theoretical models that explore KM strategies that drive NPD for two 
profit-maximizing firms. Knowledge management strategies include the KT or KS 
between firms and the KD pursued either by each firm independent of its competitor, or 
jointly. Furthermore, we examine two mechanisms of cooperation between the 
competitors: CD and JD agreements. We develop analytical models that examine the 
KM strategies for two firms that cooperate through the CD or JD mechanism. We extend 
the results of analytical analysis by developing numerical examples. Our results provide 
insights to the factors that drive each firm’s KM decisions including the effects of firm 
and market-specific characteristics. 
5.3.1 Competitive Development 
Key analytical insights are obtained demonstrating the interactions between each 
firm’s period one KT decisions. In a surprising result, we find that if firm 1 charges a 
lower price for its knowledge, firm 2 may purchase either a larger or smaller amount of 
knowledge. For example, if the valuation of knowledge by firm 2’s customers is small, a 
lower price set by firm 1 drives firm 2 to purchase a smaller amount of knowledge, 
driving firm 2 to refrain from focusing on KT although the price set by firm 1 may be 
lower.   
Additional analytic results are obtained under the modest simplifying assumption 
that the rate of diminishing returns to KD associated with each firm’s level of knowledge 
equals one-half. We find that if the expected capability of firm 2 to integrate  knowledge 
transferred from firm 1 is large, then firm 2 purchases a larger amount of knowledge in 
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period 1 and pursues more KD in period 2. This result highlights the complementary 
relationship between the two means of knowledge creation for firm 2.  
 We obtain insights on the impact of direct competition between firms 1 and 2 by 
exploring the customers’ valuation of the difference between the knowledge each firm 
embeds into their product (switching customers). Thus, if the level of direct competition 
is high, firm 1’s strategy is to increase its expected revenue by driving firm 2 to purchase 
a larger amount of knowledge; whereas firm 2 focuses on increasing expected net 
revenue by embedding more knowledge into the product offered in the marketplace. This 
result occurs since gains due to developing a superior product is outweighed by the 
gains through KT, firm 1 focuses on earning revenue from knowledge sold to firm 2. 
 Beyond the analytic results reported above, numerical results are obtained on the 
effect of the probability that firm 1 successfully develops the new product. As the 
probability of firm 1 succeeding in its NPD project increases, firm 1 pursues a more 
aggressive KD strategy in period 2 and firm 2 is driven to an inferior competitive position 
overall. Meanwhile, if the probability that firm 2 successfully develops the new product is 
large, firm 2 sets a smaller price in period one, driving firm 2 to purchase more 
knowledge. In addition, firm 2 pursues more KD in the second period, and thus, is driven 
to focus on developing a superior product.  
 Numerical results are obtained that illustrate the impact of the cost of KD pursued 
by firm 2. We find that if the cost is high, firm 2 offers an inferior product to the 
marketplace at the end of period 2; firm 1’s product features do not change. Although the 
revenue generated from the lower amount of KT reduces firm 1’s profit, firm 1’s expected 
net revenue due to switching customers increases. As a result, the expected profit of 
firm 1 is larger while the expected profit of firm 2 is smaller.  
 Based on extensive numerical experimentation, we explore the impact of 
uncertainty associated with the valuation of knowledge by firm 1’s switching customers. 
Assuming the distribution for uncertainty is symmetric around the mean, with a high 
degree of uncertainty; uncertainty regarding switching customers’ valuation of firm 1 
drives firm 1 to focus on earning revenue from KT, however, loss in expected net 
revenue outweighs the gains of selling knowledge to firm 2. Meanwhile, due to the 
inferior product developed by firm 1, the expected net revenue earned by firm 2 due to 
direct competition is larger. The impact of the uncertainty associated with the switching 
customers’ valuation of firm 2 knowledge is similar to the results for uncertainty 
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associated with the switching customers’ valuation of firm 2 knowledge in terms of firms 
KM strategies.  
Similarly, we obtain insights on the effect of uncertainty regarding the integration 
capability of firm 2 using numerical methods. If uncertainty is symmetric around the 
mean, then more uncertainty drives firm 2 to purchase a larger amount of knowledge 
from firm 1 in period one and pursue a larger amount of KD in period two, which leads to 
better quality products for the marketplace. The expected profit of both firms is larger if 
the uncertainty associated with integration capability of firm 2 is larger.  
The above insights show that there are many parameters that impact the KM 
strategies of firms that are in the same market and have the opportunity to cooperate 
through a CD agreement. Our results extend the literature in multiple dimensions. First, 
while past literature, such as D’Aspremont et al (2000), Arora and Fosfuri (2003) have 
identified that competition in the marketplace plays an important role in firms KM 
strategies, our results reveal that different market characteristics may drive significantly 
different KM strategies for the firms. While past literature have focused on firms that race 
to develop a new product first to reap benefits in the marketplace, we show that the 
features and functionality of the product and the valuation of the quality of the product in 
the marketplace drive firms to pursue unique KT and KD strategies. In particular, the 
impact of the valuation of loyal customers and the valuation of customers if one firm is 
the sole developer of the new product on the firms KM strategies and expected profits 
differ significantly from the impact of direct competition. 
Second, while past literature (Kutikala and Lin 2006, Fosfuri 2006) have focused 
on KT decisions of firms, particularly in terms of decisions regarding licensing, we have 
complex relationships we capture on the evolution of knowledge in NPD projects. 
Specifically, we recognize the two means of knowledge creation, KT and KD pursued by 
the firms to increase their knowledge levels. We develop analytical and numerical 
insights on the impact of market and firm characteristics on each firm’s KT and KD 
strategies. 
Third, our analysis captures the impact of the absorptive capacity of the firm that 
is the recipient of knowledge on the firms’ decisions regarding knowledge creation, and 
expected profits. Unlike past literature that have considered the beneficial impact of 
tapping into an outside source for knowledge, we capture the impact of the expected 
absorptive capacity and the expected integration capability of the recipient firm on both 
firms KM strategies and decisions. Our results show that the components of expected 
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absorptive capacity, such as the initial relevant knowledge of the firms, expected 
integration capability, and the amount of knowledge transferred have significant impact 
of firms knowledge creation decisions. In addition, the uncertainty regarding the 
integration capability should be carefully assessed by the firms, since the expected 
profits of the firms can be significantly affected by this factor. 
5.3.2 Joint Development 
Our analytical results reveal important insights regarding the interaction effects 
between the firms’ period one KS decisions. According to these results, if firm 1 
dedicates a large amount of knowledge to the JD project, firm 2 may dedicate larger or 
smaller amount of knowledge. If the probability of jointly developing a successful product 
or the customer’s valuation of joint knowledge or higher effectiveness of KS is small, 
then larger (smaller) amount of knowledge shared by firm 1 drives firm 2 to dedicate a 
smaller (larger) portion of its knowledge into the JD project. In addition, if the drivers of 
expected profit for one firm are small, the firms pursue a “compensation strategy,” where 
smaller level of knowledge dedicated by one firm is compensated by the larger level of 
knowledge dedicated by the other firm.  
Additional analytic results are obtained under the modest simplifying assumption 
that the rate of diminishing returns to KD associated with joint level of knowledge equals 
one-half. We find that the initial decision in period one, the portion of expected profit 
allocated to firm 1 (and, therefore, firm 2), is dependent only on the rate of returns to KS 
of the knowledge dedicated by firm 2. As the effectiveness of knowledge shared by firm 
2 increases, the portion of expected profit allocated to firm 1 also increases. By following 
this strategy, firm 1 aims to increase its gains from the knowledge shared by firm 2.  
Meanwhile, according to the numerical analysis, large rate of return to KS of the 
knowledge dedicated by firm 2 may drive firm 2 to dedicate either a larger or smaller 
amount of knowledge. For smaller values of the rate of returns of knowledge dedicated 
by firm 2, the amount of knowledge shared by the firms, and the joint amount of KD, as 
well as expected profit for the firms, increases as the effectiveness of knowledge shared 
by firm 2 increases. However, for larger values of the returns of knowledge dedicated by 
firm 2, the amount of KS and KD pursued by the firms decreases as the effectiveness of 
knowledge shared by firm 2 increases. This result occurs since firm 1, who is leader, 
claims a larger portion of the expected profit for larger values of the returns of KS by firm 
2. Similarly, for smaller values of rate of returns of knowledge shared by firm 2, the 
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expected profit of firms 1 and 2 increase as rate of returns increase, while for larger 
values of rate of returns, the expected profits of the firms decrease as rate of returns 
increase. In addition, firm 1 (2) prefers to develop the new product individually if the rate 
of returns of knowledge shared by firm 2 is small (large). Thus, for the firms there is a 
range of values for rate of returns of knowledge shared by firm 2 where firms cooperate 
through JD.  
Based on extensive numerical experimentation, we explore the impact of 
uncertainty associated with the firms’ customer’s valuation of joint knowledge. Assuming 
the distribution for uncertainty is symmetric around the mean, with a high degree of 
uncertainty; the firms dedicate larger amounts of knowledge in the first period, and 
pursue larger amount of KD in the second period. However, the expected profit under 
the JD agreement is lower for both firms if uncertainty regarding customer valuation is 
large. This result indicates that uncertainty drives the firms to develop a superior product 
by pursuing knowledge creation at a large amount, while the gains in the marketplace 
from developing a superior product is outweighed by costs of knowledge creation. The 
impact of the uncertainty associated with the integration capability of the firms is similar 
to the results for uncertainty associated with the customers’ valuation of joint knowledge 
in terms of firms KM strategies. However, the expected profit for the firms if they 
cooperate through JD mechanism is smaller.  
The insights regarding the KM strategies and expected profits of firms enhances 
the current understanding of cooperation through JD mechanism. First, many market 
and firm characteristics impact the KS and KD decisions of the firms. While he 
effectiveness of KS overall is critical for the firms, it is important for the firms to assess 
the individual drivers of effectiveness of KS. Past literature, including Samaddar and 
Kadiyala (2006), have identified the initial relevant NPD knowledge of the firms as an 
important component of effectiveness of KS. However, we identify that the rate of returns 
to KS of knowledge shared by each firm, and the expected integration capability of the 
firms, each impact the KS and KD strategies of the firms differently. In addition, the 
market characteristics, such as the customers’ valuation of knowledge significantly 
impact the firms KM strategies, and the expected gains of each firm at the end of the JD 
project. 
Second, engaging in JD projects create value for the firms if the firms can 
develop viable KS and KD strategies. Many studies, such as Anand and Khanna 
(2000a), Cassiman and Veugeler (2006) have examined the KS among firms through 
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empirical analysis, and considerable research exists on the normative analysis of 
cooperation through JD mechanism (Appleyard (1996), Atallah (2005)). However, 
through viewing cooperation via JD mechanism as games between firms that operate in 
the same market, we provide a viable theoretical lens to understand the decision making 
process regarding KM strategies of the firms. Moreover, this study contributes to the 
literature in terms of adding insights regarding uncertainty associated with the customers 
valuation of knowledge (market) and the firms’ capability to integrate the knowledge 
dedicated to the JD project. 
Third, we build on the past literature in examining the dynamic relationship 
between two forms of knowledge creation, namely KS and KD, for JD mechanism. Our 
findings reveal that there exists a complementary relationship between the joint 
knowledge dedicated by the firms to the JD project, and the KD efforts. Meanwhile, we 
show that the amount of knowledge dedicated by each firm may constitute complements 
or substitutes for each other, and this relationship is driven by various firm and market 
characteristics.    
Finally, the insights depicted in this chapter provide a framework on the drivers of 
firms’ decisions regarding whether or not to enter JD agreements. For example, our 
results regarding the range of values for rate of returns to KS of knowledge shared by 
the follower firm illustrate that firms may not choose to cooperate if the effectiveness of 
KS is significantly large or significantly small. Hence, the ability of firms to identify, 
absorb, and improve on knowledge shared by another firm does not necessarily imply 
that these firms are well positioned to profit from NPD projects that are built on the KS 
process. It is crucial for firms to identify the drivers of effectiveness of the KS process.    
5.4 Open Research Questions 
We believe this thesis is an important step in understanding the KM strategies in 
the NPD domain at different decision making levels of the firm. Based on our analysis, 
we outline a number of fruitful avenues for future research. 
 The research that focuses on the KM strategies for NPD projects should extend 
the analysis to understand the incentive and motivation structure associated with 
decision making. In particular, decision makers at different levels of organizational 
hierarchy may have different incentives regarding the success, failure, and progress of 
the development of a new product. For example, in Chapters 2 and 3, the manager of 
the product and process design teams that work on the development of a new product 
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and the associated new process, is the decision maker, and directs the KM activities of 
the teams. However, product and process design teams that have individual incentives 
to develop superior product or process designs, may follow different KD and especially 
different KT strategies if they had a motivation to keep their respective knowledge 
proprietary. Thus, capturing the impact of motivation and incentives on the strategies of 
the decision makers would increase our understanding of the KM in NPD projects. 
 Research opportunities are plentiful with respect to the analysis of knowledge 
flow between the NPD projects within a firm. For example, in this thesis, we examine the 
KM strategies for NPD projects for the development of a single product. However, it is 
common that there are KT and KS among projects that work on the development of 
multiple products, which may be substitutable in the marketplace. Thus, research that 
analyzes the knowledge flow among development projects has the potential to derive 
interesting insights. 
 Finally, modeling the effect of uncertainty on the KM decisions at different 
decision making levels is a promising area of research. Although some of the drivers of 
uncertainty and risk with respect to evolution of knowledge and NPD projects are 
captured in this thesis, the uncertainty regarding the successful develop of a product, the 
launch time of a new product, the value earned from the product, and the effectiveness 
of efforts pursued for KM are multi dimensional. Research that examines the multiple 
drivers of uncertainty, the interaction effects among uncertainty regarding KM and NPD, 
and the managerial perspectives on risks and benefits associated with KM for NPD 
projects has the potential to make a valuable contribution to the field. 
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APPENDIX A 
Section A.1 provides the Hamiltonian to be maximized for the model presented in 
Chapter 2. Sections A.2 and A.3 includes the proofs for the Theorems and Corollaries 
presented in Chapter 2. The details of the numerical examples from Chapter 3 are 
provided in Section A.4.  
Table A.1 Model notation 
Notation Definition 
T Time; t∈[0,T]; T is time the product is launched to the market. 
D(t), (M(t)) Level of knowledge embedded in the product (process) design at 
time t; D(0)=D0≥0, (M(0)=M0≥0); (state variable). 
α, (a) Measure of the rate of LBD associated with the level of product 
(process) design knowledge at time t, α≥0 (a≥0); (exogenous). 
β(t), (b(t)) Rate of KT at time t from the process (product) to the product 
(process) design team, β(t)≥0, (b(t)≥0); (control variable). 
γ(t), (g(t)) Rate of KA for the product (process) design team at time t, γ(t)≥0, 
(g(t)≥0); (control variable). 
δ1(t), (δ2(t)) Extent of technical or market uncertainty resolution associated with 
product (process) development efforts at time t, respectively, 
0≤δ1(t), δ2(t)≤1; (exogenous). 
X(t), (Y(t)) Cumulative level of useful knowledge embedded in the product 
(process) design at time t of the NPD project; (state variable). 
V[X(T),Y(T),T] Net revenue expressed as a function of the product launch time and 
the cumulative useful levels of product and process knowledge 
deployed during the NPD project. 
C1[β(t)], 
(C2[b(t)]) 
Cost of efforts to increase the product (process) design team 
knowledge through KT from the process (product) design at time t, 
C1[β(t)]≥0, (C2[b(t)]≥0). 
C3[β(t),b(t)]) Addition (reduction) in the cost of KT due to conflict (synergy) when 
KT occurs simultaneously in both directions, C3[β(t),b(t)]>0, 
(C3[β(t),b(t)]<0). 
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C4[γ(t)], 
(C5[g(t)])  
Cost of pursuing KA to increase the level of product (process) 
design team knowledge at time t, C4[γ(t)]≥0, (C5[g(t)]≥0). 
λ1(t), (λ2(t)) Marginal value of an additional unit of product (process) design 
team knowledge at time t; (adjoint variable). 
λ3(t), (λ4(t)) Marginal value of an additional unit of cumulative useful product 
(process) design knowledge at time t; (adjoint variable).   
 
A.1 The Hamiltonian 
The Hamiltonian to be maximized appears below. 
 
H = –  C1[β]  – C2[b] – C3[β,b] – C4[γ]  – C5[g] + λ1{αDρ1 + d1βMρ2Dρ3 + d2γDρ4} 
       + λ2{aMr1 + m1bDr2M r3 + m2gMr4} + λ3δ1D + λ4δ2M   (A.1) 
The proofs of the theorems and corollaries that follow are based on the first order 
conditions for optimality of the control, state, and adjoint variables. Also, we know the 
objective is concave in the control and state variables and the right sides of the state 
variable equations are concave with respect to the state variables and linear with respect 
to the control variables. Therefore, sufficiency is satisfied. 
A.2 Proofs of Theorems and Corollaries 
Proof of Theorem 1 
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from the optimality conditions of the adjoint variables 
given below. 
 
λ1t*=-λ1{αρ1Dρ1-1+d1βρ3Mρ2 Dρ3-1+ d2γρ4Dρ4-1}-m1λ2br2Dr2-1Mr3-λ3δ1,  λ1(T) = 0.   
                                                                                                   (A.2)  
λ2t* = -λ2{ar1Mr1-1+m1br3Dr2Mr3-1+m2gr3Mr4-1}–d1λ1β2Mρ2-1Dρ3– λ4δ2, λ2(T) = 0.   
(A.3) 
λ3t* = 0 and λ3(T) = VX(T)                                                        (A.4)  
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λ4t* = 0 and λ4(T) = VY(T)     (A.5)  
 
Recall that α, D, d1, β, M, d2, γ, m1, b, δ1, and VX(T) ≥ 0 and 0≤ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4, r1, r2, r3≤1. 
Then, from the optimality conditions given in Equations (A.2)-(A.5), λ1t*≤0 for t∈[0,T]. 
The proof is analogous for λ2t*≤0 for t∈[0,T]. Therefore, given the terminal time 
conditions, we know that the marginal values of product and process design knowledge 
are non-negative over the entire NPD project (λ1≥0, λ2≥0 for t∈[0,T]). Lastly, the 
solutions for λ3*(t) and λ4*(t) follow directly from (A.4) and (A.5). Q.e.d. 
 Proof of Theorem 2 
This proof follows directly from Equations (2.6)-(2.9) in Section 2.4. Q.e.d. 
Proof of Corollary 1 
We know 0<r2, ρ2, r3, ρ3<1; Mt, M, Dt, D, λ1, λ2≥0; and λ1t, λ2t≤0. From Equations (2.10) 
and (2.11), we have 
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If we equate the rights hand sides of Equations (A.6) and (A.7), we derive:   
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To simplify, we introduce: 
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β* satisfies Case (i) under the following conditions. For t∈[0,tβ), we have ψφ ∗ ≥0 and 
βt*≥0. At t=tβ, we have ψφ ∗ =0 and βt*=0. For t∈(tβ,T], we have ψφ ∗ ≤0 and βt*≤0. 
Finally, at t=T, we know β(T)*=0. β* satisfies Case (ii) under the following conditions. For 
t∈[0,T],  we have ψφ ∗ ≤0 and βt*≤0. We know that at t=T, β(T)*=0. Analogous 
conditions hold for b*. 
Next, we elaborate on a possible scenario that leads to a Case (ii) solution for β*. 
Suppose 2321 bbb CCC βββ ≥ , then φ ≥0. For t∈[0, T], we know ψφ ∗ ≤0 holds if ψ ≤0. We 
obtain ψ ≤0 under one of the following conditions for t∈[0, T]:  
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Then, for t∈[0,T], we have ψφ ∗ ≤0 and βt*≤0. Since β(T)* =0, we obtain a Case (ii) 
solution for β*. Analogous results hold for b*. 
To obtain a Case (i) or (ii) solution for γ* consider the following. From Equations 
(2.12) and (2.13): 
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To simplify, let:  θ := 
D
Dtt
4
1
1 ρλ
λ
+ . We obtain a Case (i) solution for γ* if the following 
conditions hold. For t∈[0,tγ) we have θ≥0 and γt*≥0. At t=tγ, we have θ=0 and γt*=0. For 
t∈(tγ,T], we have θ≤0  and γt*≤0. We know γ(T)* =0. In contrast, γ* satisfies Case (ii) if 
the following conditions hold. For t∈[0,T], we have θ≤0 and γt*≤0. Again, we know 
γ(T)*=0.   
The proofs for g* are analogous for Cases (i) and (ii).     Q.e.d. 
 
The solutions described in Corollary 1 are illustrated in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, 
respectively. Note that these figures are given for illustrative purposes only. 2  
Proof of Corollary 2 
Assume that γt(tγ)=0. Then we know that 
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2
 For example, the solution in Case (i) may begin convex increasing, become concave increasing, and then 
is concave decreasing by T. Or, the solution in Case (ii) may start convex decreasing and change to 
concave decreasing by T.  
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Therefore, β is either increasing or at its maximum value at t=tγ, as stated in Corollary 2. 
Q.e.d. 
Proof of Corollary 3 
If D0 is large, then γt*(0)=[d2λ1t(0)D(0)ρ4+d2λ1(0)ρ4D(0)ρ4-1Dt(0)]/C4γγ(0) is relatively small. 
For t∈[0,T],  we know that ρ4
D
Dt ≤–
1
t1
λ
λ
 and γt*≤0. Also, we know γ[T]=0. It follows that 
γ*(0) is relatively large. However, since M0 is small, we know that ρ2
M
M t +ρ3
D
D t ≥–
1
t1
λ
λ
and βt*≥0 for t∈[0,tβ). Therefore, we have the Case (i) solution for β*. At t=tβ, ρ2
M
M t +ρ3
D
D t
= –
1
t1
λ
λ
and βt*=0. For t∈(tβ,T], we have ρ2
M
M t +ρ3
D
D t ≤ –
1
t1
λ
λ
and βt*≤0. Q.e.d. 
Proof of Corollary 4 
The proof of Corollary 4 is analogous to Corollary 3 and is omitted. Q.e.d. 
Proof of Corollary 5 
From Equation (2.7), we have C2b[b*]= –C3b[β*]+m1λ2Dr2M r3. Also, recall that C3βb>0. If 
C3[β,b]<0, then C3b[β,b]<0. Here, larger β* results in smaller C3b[β,b]. This means that –
C3b[β,b] is larger so that C2b[b] is larger. Since C2bb[b]≥0, we know b* is larger. 
Alternatively, if C3[β,b]>0, then C3b[β,b]>0. Thus, larger β* results in larger C3b[β,b] giving 
us smaller C2b[b]. Finally, since C2bb[b]≥0, we know b* is smaller. Q.e.d. 
Proof of Corollary 6 
From Theorem 1, we know λ1≥0, λ2≥0 and λ1t*, λ2t*≤0 for t∈[0,T]. Moreover, we have α, 
ρ1, D, β, M, ρ2, γ, ρ3, λ2, b, r2, VX(T), δ1, Dt and Mt≥0. In Figure A.1, we illustrate the impact 
of α and a
 
on the marginal value of an additional unit of product (process) design 
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knowledge. 3 The proof follows from Equations (2.6)-(2.9). Analogous proofs lead to the 
remaining results in Corollary 6. Q.e.d. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1 The marginal value of an additional unit of product or process design 
knowledge 
 
Proof of Corollaries 7 and 8 
The proofs of Corollaries 7 and 8 are analogous to Corollary 6 and therefore are omitted. 
Q.e.d. 
 
A.3 Optimal Product Launch Time 
Proof of Theorem 3 
From the terminal time transversality condition H(T)+∂V[X(T),Y(T),T]/∂T = 0, we have: 
 
– C1[β(T)] – C2[b(T)] – C3[γ(T)] – C4[g(T)]  
+ λ1(T){α[D(T)]ρ1 + d1β(T)[M(T)]ρ2[D(T)]ρ3 + d2γ(T)D(T)ρ4} 
+ λ2(T){a[M(T)]r1 + m1b(T)[D(T)]r2[M(T)] r3 + m2g(T)[M(T)]r4}  
+ λ3(T)δ1(T)D(T) +λ4(T)δ2(T)M(T) +VT = 0       
                                                 
 
 
3
 λ1(t) and λ2(t) can be convex or concave for t∈[0,T), but are convex at T. 
time 
Base value for α or a 
 
Relatively larger α or a 
 
Relatively smaller α or a 
0 
 
T 
 
λ1, λ2 
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LHS
 
 
Marginal 
value of 
launch 
Optimal 
product 
launch time 
 
T* T1* T2* 
We know  
C1[β(T)]=C2[b(T)]=C3[γ(T)]=C4[g(T)]=λ1(T)=λ2(T)=λ3(T)=λ4(T)=β(T)=b(T)=γ(T)=g(T)=0. 
Therefore, VX(T)(δ1(T)D(T))+VY(T)(δ2(T)M(T))+VT =0. Q.e.d. 
 
 
                               
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure A.2 The optimal launch time4 
 
Proof of Corollary 9 
The proof follows from Figure A.2 and the discussion preceding Corollary 9. Q.e.d. 
                                                 
 
 
4
 To obtain a non-trivial solution (T*>0), we require δ1(T)D(T)VX(T)+δ2(T)M(T)VY(T)>VT for T=0.  
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A.4 Numerical Examples 
We assume net revenue is a separable linear function of the cumulative levels of 
knowledge of the product and process design teams and the terminal time of the NPD 
project. (Similar assumptions appear in Carrillo and Gaimon 2000, Krishnan and Gupta 
2001, and Moorthy and Png 1992.) We assume the costs for KA and KT (excluding the 
effect of simultaneous transfer) are quadratic reflecting the disproportionately large 
disruption that occurs at any single instant of time. Again, this assumption is common in 
the literature (see Carrillo and Gaimon 2000 and Lapre and Wassenhove 2001). The 
cost or benefit associated with the simultaneous transfer of knowledge between teams is 
multiplicative in β and b (i.e., β>0 and b>0 must hold for this cost to occur). 
 
 
The particular functional forms employed in the numerical analysis are as follows: 
 
V[X(T),Y(T), T] = VX(T)X (T)+ VY(T)Y(T) + VTT 
δ1(t) = φ1(t/T)ϕ1        δ2(t) = φ2(t/T)ϕ2 C1[β(t)] = c1[β(t)]2        C2[b(t)] = c2[b(t)]2
 C4[γ(t)] = c1[γ(t)]2                 C5[g(t)] = c1[g(t)]2                C3[β(t),b(t)] = c3β(t)b(t)  
 
If C3[β(t),b(t)]=0, then 
 β(t)* = 
1
32
11
2
)]([)]()[(
c
tDtMtd ρρλ
  (A.8) 
If C3[β(t),b(t)]≠0, then 
 β(t)* = 
2
321
3r2r
223
3ρ2ρ
112
c-cc4
)]t(M[)]t(D)[t(λdc-)]t(D[)]t(M)[t(λdc2
       (A.9) 
        
The functional forms for b(t)* are analogous and are omitted. Numerical solutions are 
obtained with EXCEL using the ordinary shooting method for a discrete approximation of 
the continuous model.  
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Table A.2 Inputs common to Example 1 and variations 
Parameter Value  Parameter Value  Parameter Value  Parameter Value 
D(0) = D0 8  ρ2 0.01  r3 0.8  VX(T) 2 
M(0) = M0 8  ρ3 0.8  r4 0.01  VY(T) 2 
α = a 0.1  ρ4 0.02  c1 = c2 = c4 
= c5  
2  VT -1500 
d1= d2 = m1 
= m2 
0.2  r1 0.01  φ1 = φ2 0.785  T 10 
ρ1 0.01  r2 0.05  ϕ1 = ϕ2 0.1    
 
 
Table A.3 Summary of results for Example 1 and variations 
 Example 2 Example 2a Example 2b Example 2c 
T Given: 10 Optimized: 8.7 Optimized: 9.2 Optimized: 7.8 
Profit $12,023 $13,460 $12,001 $14,718 
c3 0 0 0.5 - 0.5 
 
 
Table A.4 Inputs common to Example 2 and variations 
Parameter Value  Parameter Value  Parameter Value  Parameter Value 
D(0) = D0 0.01  ρ2 0.01  r3 0.8  VX(T) 10 
M(0) = M0 0.01  ρ3 0.8  r4 0.01  VY(T) 20 
α = a 0.1  ρ4 0.02  c1 = c2 = c4 
= c5  
2  VT -7 
d1= d2 = m1 
= m2 
0.2  r1 0.01  φ1 = φ2 0.785  T 3 
ρ1 0.01  r2 0.05  ϕ1 = ϕ2 0.1    
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Table A.5 Summary of results for Example 2 and variations 
 Example 2 Example 2a Example 2b Example 2c 
T 
Given: 3 
Optimized: 
2.8 
Optimized: 2.6 Optimized: 2.4 
Profit $5,909 $6,431 $6,956 $7,559 
c3 0.5 0.5 0 -0.5 
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APPENDIX B 
Section B.1 provides the Hamiltonian and the Lagrangian to be maximized for the 
model presented in Chapter 3. Sections B.2 and A.3 includes the proofs for the 
Theorems and Corollaries presented in Chapter 3. 
Table B.1 Model notation 
Notation Definition 
T Time; t∈[0,T]; 0 is the start of the development project; by T the end of 
the product life cycle has been reached. 
D(t), (M(t)) Level of knowledge of the product (process) design team at time t; 
D(0)=D0≥0, (M(0)=M0≥0); (state variable). 
γ(t) Rate of knowledge development (KD) efforts for the product design 
team at time t, γ(t)≥0; (control variable). 
β(t), (b(t)) 
 
Rate of knowledge transfer (KT) efforts at time t from the process 
(product) to the product (process) design team, β(t)≥0, (b(t)≥0); (control 
variable). 
 
ρ1 
 
Indicates rate of returns from KD efforts of the product design team, 
0≤ρ1≤1. 
 
ρ2, ρ3 (r1, r2) Indicates rate of returns from KT efforts to the product (process) design 
team, 0≤ρ2, ρ3≤1 (0≤r1, r2≤1) 
X(t) (Y(t)) Cumulative level of useful knowledge of product (process) design team 
through time t; X(0)=X0≥0, (Y(0)=Y0≥0); (state variable). 
θ1 Extent of errors uncovered by KD efforts of the product design team, 
θ1≥0. 
θ2, θ3 Extent of errors uncovered by KT efforts to the product (process) design 
team, θ2, θ3≥0. 
R[Y(t),t] Net revenue earned by the product released at time t; R≥0. 
F[X(t)] Probability the new product is successfully released by time t; F∈[0,1]. 
C1[γ(t)] Cost of KD efforts at time t, C1≥0. 
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C2[β(t)], 
(C3[b(t)]) 
Φ1  (Φ2 ) 
Cost of KT efforts to the product (process) design team at time t, C2≥0, 
(C3≥0). 
Marginal value of an additional unit of cumulative useful product 
(process) design knowledge for future NPD projects; Φ1, Φ1≥0. 
λ1(t), (λ2(t)) Marginal value of an additional unit of product (process) design team 
knowledge at time t; λ1(T)=0 (λ2(T)=0); (adjoint variable). 
λ3(t), (λ4(t)) Marginal value of an additional unit of cumulative useful product 
(process) design knowledge at time t; λ3(T)=Φ1 (λ4(T)=Φ2); (adjoint 
variable).   
η1(t) (η2(t)) Lagrange multipliers for the non-negativity of X(t) and Y(t) at time t, η1, 
η2≥0. 
 
B.1 The Hamiltonian and The Lagrangian 
The Hamiltonian (H) to be maximized appears in Equation (B.1). The Lagrangian (L) and 
the associated  complementary slackness conditions that arise due to the non-negativity 
constraints on X(t) and Y(t) are given in Equations (B.2), (B.3) and (B.4). Functional 
notation is suppressed whenever possible. The superscript “*” denotes an optimal 
solution. 
 
H = FR –  C1(γ)  – C2(β) – C3(b)] + λ1[γDρ1 + βMρ2Dρ3]+ λ2[bDr1M r2]  (B.1) 
 
L = H + η1(D– θ1γ – θ2β) + η2(M – θ3b) (B.2) 
 
∂L/∂η1 = D – θ1γ – θ2β ≥ 0;       η1≥0;       η1(D – θ1γ – θ2β) = 0  (B.3) 
 
∂L/∂η2 = M – θ3b ≥ 0;                η2≥0;      η2(M – θ3b) = 0  (B.4) 
 
The proofs of the theorems and corollaries that follow are based on the first order 
conditions for optimality of the control, state, and adjoint variables. Sufficiency is 
satisfied since the objective is concave in the control and state variables and the right 
sides of the state variable equations are concave with respect to the state variables and 
linear with respect to the control variables. 
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B.2 Proofs of Theorems and Corollaries 
Proof of Theorem 1 
The proof follows from the optimality conditions of the adjoint variables given below. 
 
– ∂L/∂D = λ1t = – λ1[γρ1Dρ1–1 + βρ3Mρ2 Dρ3–1] – λ2br1Dr1–1Mr3 – λ3– η1, λ1(T) = 0  
(B.5)  
– ∂L/∂M = λ2t = – λ2br2Dr1Mr2–1 – λ1βλ2Mρ2–1Dρ3 – λ4 – η2,     λ2(T) = 0     (B.6) 
 
– ∂L/∂X = λ3t = – FXR,      λ3(T) = Φ1               (B.7) 
 
– ∂L/∂Y = λ4t = – FRY,      λ4(T) = Φ2                                                             (B.8) 
 
Recall γ, D, β, M, b, Φ1, Φ2 FX, RY, η1 and η2≥ 0 and 0≤ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4, r1, r2, r3≤1. The 
solutions for λ3*(t) and λ4*(t) follow directly from Equations (B.7) and (B.8). From the 
optimality conditions in Equations (B.2)-(B.5), we have λ1t≤0 for t∈[0,T]. The proof is 
analogous for λ2t≤0 with t∈[0,T]. Given the terminal time conditions, we obtain λ1≥0, and 
λ2≥0 for t∈[0,T]. Q.e.d.  
B.2.1 Optimal KD and KT Solutions  
Equations (A.9)-(A.11) and γ, β, and b≥0 are the optimality conditions for the rate of KD 
for the product design team and the rates of KT to both the product and process design 
teams.  
 
∂H/∂γ = – C1γ + λ1Dρ1 – (λ3+η1)θ1 = 0                                                                (B.9) 
∂H/∂β = – C2β + λ1Mρ2Dρ3 – (λ3+η1)θ2 = 0                                                      (B.10) 
∂H/∂b = – C3b + λ2Dr1Mr2 – (λ4η2)θ3 = 0                                                          (B.11) 
 
The implications of the complementary slackness conditions on the optimal 
solutions for γ, β and b are as follows: From Equation (A.3), when the non-negativity 
constraint for the cumulative level of useful product design knowledge is tight: (i) γ*=(D–
θ2β)/θ1 and (ii) β*= (D–θ1γ)θ2. Similarly, when the non-negativity constraint for the 
cumulative level of useful process design knowledge is tight, b*=M/θ3. Therefore, a 
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positive value of η1 (η2) decreases the rates of γ and β (b) and thereby ensures the non-
negativity of X (Y). 
The non-negativity constraints on γ, β, and b offer additional insights. From 
Equation (A.9), we know λ1Dρ1–(λ3+η1)θ1≥0 giving us θ1≤λ1Dρ1/(λ3+η1). Since η1≥0 we 
obtain  θ1<λ1Dρ1/(λ3+η1) must hold. This inequality provides an upper bound on the 
extent of errors may be uncovered by KD. (For example, at t=0 if 
θ1≥λ1(0)D0ρ1/(Φ1+  +η1), then γ(0)=0.) Similarly, from Equations (A.10) and (A.11) 
we find θ2≤λ1Mρ2Dρ3/(λ3+η1) and θ3≤λ2Dr1Mr2/(λ4η2) hold. To interpret the upper bound on 
θ1 we employ analytic sensitivity analysis. If D0 is large, then KD is more effective at 
increasing the level of product design knowledge and thereby increasing the cumulative 
level of useful product design knowledge. As a result, the upper bound on θ1 is larger. 
Thus, large D0 compensates for the loss in the cumulative level of useful product design 
knowledge due to KD that uncovers errors. Similar interpretations can be developed to 
describe the impact on θ1 due to other factors such as the initial levels of product or 
process design knowledge. Finally, analytic sensitivity analysis can also be applied to θ2 
and θ3 (the extent of errors uncovered by KT to the product and process design teams, 
respectively). 
In the above analysis we have presented and fully interpreted the optimality 
conditions for γ, β, and b including the effects of η1 and η2. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that the manager would not optimally pursue KD or KT that drives the 
cumulative level of useful product or process design team knowledge to zero. Therefore, 
for simplicity hereafter in the Appendix and in the chapter, we assume the non-negativity 
constraints on X and Y hold in an optimal solution so that and η1=η2=0.  
Proof of Theorem 2 
This proof follows directly from Equations (B.9)-(B.11) in Section 4. Q.e.d. 
Proof of Corollary 1 
Recall 0<ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, r1, r2<1; Mt, M, Dt, D, λ1, λ2≥0; and λ1t, λ2t≤0. From Equations (3.12) 
and (3.14), we obtain Equations (B.12a)-(B.14b). 
 
γt = [λ1tDρ1 + ρ1λ1Dρ1–1Dt + FXRθ1]/C1γγ  (B.12a) 
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γt = [(ρ1 – ρ3)λ1βMρ2Dρ3+ρ1–1 – r1λ2bDr1+ρ1–1Mr2 – (Φ1 +  )Dρ1 + FXRθ1]/C1γγ  
(B.12b) 
 
βt = [λ1tMρ2Dρ3 + ρ2λ1Mρ2–1MtDρ3 + ρ3λ1Mρ2Dρ3–1Dt + FXRθ2]/C2ββ   (B.13a) 
  
βt = [(ρ3 – ρ1)λ1γDρ1+ρ3–1Mρ2 + (λ1ρ2/M – λ2r1/D)bDr1+ρ3Mr2+ρ3  
   – (Φ1 +  )Mρ2Dρ1 + FXRθ2]/C2ββ  (B.13b) 
bt = [λ2tDr1Mr2 + r1λ2tDr1–1DtMr2 + r2λ2tDr1Mr2–1Mt + FRYθ3]/C3bb  (B.14a) 
 
bt = [r1λ2γDr1+ρ1–1Mr2 + (λ2r1/D – λ1ρ2/M)βDr1+ρ3Mr2+ρ2 
  – (Φ2 +   )Dr1Mr2 + FRYθ3]/C2ββ  (B.14b)  
 
From Equations (B.12)-(B.14), we know: 
 
γt ≤ 0 if λ1tDρ1 + ρ1λ1Dρ1–1D + FXRθ1 ≤ 0 and 
 
γt > 0 if λ1tDρ1 + ρ1λ1Dρ1–1D + FXRθ1 > 0; 
 
βt ≤ 0 if λ1tMρ2Dρ3 + ρ2λ1Mρ2–1MtDρ3 + ρ3λ1Mρ2Dρ3–1Dt + FXRθ2  ≤ 0 and  
 
βt > 0 if λ1tMρ2Dρ3 + ρ2λ1Mρ2–1MtDρ3 + ρ3λ1Mρ2Dρ3–1Dt + FXRθ2 > 0; 
 
bt ≤ 0 if λ2tDr1Mr2 + r1λ2tDr1–1DtMr2 + r2λ2tDr1Mr2–1Mt + FRYθ3 ≤ 0 and  
 
bt > 0 if λ2tDr1Mr2 + r1λ2tDr1–1DtMr2 + r2λ2tDr1Mr2–1Mt + FRYθ3 > 0.  
 
Under the following conditions γ*
 
satisfies Case (i) of Corollary 1. For t∈[0,T], we have 
λ1tDρ1+ρ1λ1Dρ1–1Dt+FXRθ1≤0 and γt≤0. Since γ(T)*=0, we obtain the Case (i) solution for 
γ*. In contrast, we obtain the Case (ii) solution in Corollary 1 for γ* under the following 
conditions. For t∈[0,tγ), we have λ1tDρ1+ρ1λ1Dρ1–1D+FXRθ1>0 and γt>0. At t=tγ, we have 
λ1tDρ1+ρ1λ1Dρ1–1D+FXRθ1=0. For t∈[tγ,T], we have λ1tDρ1+ρ1λ1Dρ1–1D+FXRθ1≤0 and γt≤0. 
Finally, at t=T, we know that γ*(T)=0. Analogous results hold for β* and b*.   
Next, we introduce the inverse functions C1γ–1[⋅] = f1[⋅],  C1β–1[⋅] = f2[⋅],  and C3b–1[⋅] 
= f3[⋅]. From Equations (B.9)-(B.11), we have:  
 
γ* = f1[λ1Dρ1 – λ3θ1]  =  f1[λ1Dρ1 – (Φ1 +  )θ1] (B.15) 
 
β* = f2[λ1Mρ2Dρ3 – λ3θ2] = f2[λ1Mρ2Dρ3 – (Φ1 +  )θ2] (B.16) 
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b* = f3[λ2Dr1Mr2 – λ4θ3] = f3[λ2Dr1Mr2 – (Φ2 +   )θ3] (B.17) 
 
Note that ∂f1/∂λ1, ∂f1/∂D, ∂f1/∂ρ1≥0 and ∂f1/∂Φ1, ∂f1/∂FX, ∂f1/∂R, ∂f1/∂θ1≤0. In addition, 
∂f2/∂λ1, ∂f2/∂M, ∂f2/∂D, ∂f2/∂ρ2, ∂f2/∂ρ3≥0, ∂f2/∂Φ1, ∂f2/∂FX, ∂f2/∂R, ∂f2/∂θ2≤0, ∂f3/∂λ2, ∂f3/∂D, 
∂f3/∂M, ∂f3/∂r1, ∂f3/∂r2≥0, and ∂f3/∂Φ2, ∂f3/∂F, ∂f3/∂RY, ∂f3/∂θ3≤0. From Equations (B.12)-
(B.14), we have: 
 
γt(0) = {(ρ1 – ρ3)λ1(0)β(0)M0ρ2D0ρ3+ρ1–1 – r1λ2(0)b(0)D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2  
                
– (Φ1 +  )D0ρ1 + FX(0)R(0)θ1}/C1γγ(0)  (B.18a) 
γt(0) = {(ρ1 – ρ3)λ1(0)f2[λ1(0)M0ρ2D0ρ3 – (Φ1 +  )θ2]M0ρ2D0ρ3+ρ1–1 
      – r1λ2(0)f3[λ2(0)D0r1M0r2 – Φ2 +   )θ3]D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2 
     – (Φ1 +   )D0ρ1 + FX(0)R(0)θ1}/C1γγ(0)  (B.18b) 
βt(0) = {(ρ3 – ρ1)λ1(0)γ(0)D0ρ1+ρ3–1M0ρ2  
 + [λ1(0)ρ2/M0 – λ2(0)r1/D0]b(0)D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ3  – (Φ1 +   ) M0ρ2D0ρ1 +  
 FX(0)R(0)θ2}/C2ββ(0)                  (B.19a)  
βt(0) = {(ρ3 – ρ1)λ1(0)f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +   )θ1]D0ρ1+ρ3–1M0ρ2  
     + [λ1(0)ρ2/M0 – λ2(0)r1/D0]f3[λ2(0)D0r1M0r2  
     – (Φ2 +   )θ3]D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ3  
     – (Φ1+   )M0ρ2D0ρ1 + FX(0)R(0)θ2}/C2ββ(0)  (B.19b)  
bt(0) = {r1λ2(0)γ(0)D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2 + [λ2(0)r1/D0 – λ1(0)ρ2/M0]β(0)D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ2  
      – (Φ2 +   )D0r1M0r2 + FX(0)R(0)θ2}/C2ββ(0)   (B.20a)  
bt(0) = {r1λ2(0)f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +   )θ1]D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2 
     +[λ2(0)r1/D0 – λ1(0)ρ2/M0]f2[λ1(0)M0ρ2D0ρ3–(Φ1+  )θ2]D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ2 
– (Φ2 +   )D0r1M0r2 + FX(0)R(0)θ2}/C2ββ(0)      (B.20b)  
 
If we know the sign of γt(0), βt(0) or bt(0), we also know whether γ*, β* or b* 
satisfy Case (i) or Case (ii). Recall that ρ1>ρ3 and λ1(0), λ2(0), D0, M0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, r1, r2≥0. 
First, from Equation (B.12b), we know γ* satisfies Case (i) if γt(0)≤0. From Equation 
(B.15b), we obtain γt(0)≤0 if the following holds: 
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(ρ1 – ρ3)λ1(0)f2[λ1(0)M0ρ2D0ρ3 – (Φ1 +   )θ2]M0ρ2D0ρ3+ρ1–1  
– r1λ2(0)f3[λ2(0)D0r1M0r2 – (Φ2 +   )θ3]D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2   
– (Φ1 +   )D0ρ1  + FX(0)R(0)θ1 ≤ 0.  
 
In contrast, γ* satisfies Case (ii) if the direction of the inequality above is reversed giving 
us γt(0)>0. Similarly, β* satisfies Case (i) if βt(0)≤0. From Equation (B.10b), we obtain 
βt(0)≤0 if the following condition holds:  
 
(ρ3 – ρ1)λ1(0)f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +   )θ1]D0ρ1+ρ3–1M0ρ2  
+ [λ1(0)ρ2/M0 – λ2(0)r1/D0]f3[λ2(0)D0r1M0r2 – (Φ2 +   )θ3]D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ3 
– (Φ1 +   )M0ρ2D0ρ1 + FX(0)R(0)θ2 ≤ 0.  
 
In contrast, β* satisfies Case (ii) if the above inequality sign is reversed giving us βt(0)>0. 
Finally, from Equation (B.14b), we know b* satisfies Case (i) if bt(0)≤0 which occurs if the 
following condition holds:  
 
r1λ2(0)f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +   )θ1]D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2 
+ [λ2(0)r1/D0 – λ1(0)ρ2/M0]f2[λ1(0)M0ρ2D0ρ3 – (Φ1 +   )θ2]D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ 
– (Φ2 +   )D0r1M0r2 + FX(0)R(0)θ2 ≤ 0.  
 
From Equation (B.20b), if the above inequality is reversed we know b* satisfies Case (ii) 
giving us bt(0)>0.   Q.e.d.  
 
The solutions described in Corollary 1 are illustrated in Figures A.2 and A.3, 
respectively. These figures are given for illustrative purposes only. At some time t∈[0,T) 
the optimal solution in Case (i) may be either convex or concave decreasing. We do 
know, however, that the optimal solution is concave decreasing at T. Similarly, the 
optimal solution in Case (ii) may be convex or concave increasing early in the 
development project and convex or concave decreasing later. However, we do know that 
the optimal solution is concave at the maximum value and concave decreasing at T. 
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B.2.2 The Delay and Front Loading Strategies 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.1    Case (i) Delay strategy and Case (ii) Front-loading strategy 
 
Proof of Corollary 2 
From Equations (B.10) and (B.4), we know (  )M0ρ2D0ρ1>FX(0)R(0)θ2. From 
Equations (B.19a) and (B.19b), we have β* satisfies Case (ii) (delay strategy) if βt(0)>0. 
Therefore, Case (ii) holds if and only if the following inequality holds:  
 
 λ1(0)ρ2/M0–λ2(0)r1/D0>0(λ2(0)r1/D0–λ1(0)ρ2/M0<0.  
 
Similarly, from Equations (B.11) and (B.5), we know Φ2+  )D0r1M0r2>FX(0)R(0)θ2 
holds. It follows that b* satisfies Case (i) (front-loading strategy) if bt(0)≤0. From 
Equations (B.20a)-(B.20b), if λ1(0)ρ2/M0–λ2(0)r1/D0>0(λ2(0)r1/D0–λ1(0)ρ2/M0<0 holds, then  
 
r1λ2(0) f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1–(Φ1 +   )θ1]D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2  
 
is relatively small compared to  
 
(λ2(0)r1/D0–λ1(0)ρ2/M0)f2[λ1(0)M0ρ2D0ρ3–(Φ1 +   )θ2]D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ2  
 
giving us bt(0)≤0.     Q.e.d. 
     time  
 
β, b,  
or γ 
 
0 
 
T 
 
tmax 
β, b,  
or γ 
 
0 
 
T 
 
     time  
 
 177 
Proof of Corollary 3 
The optimal solutions already given for γ and β hold and we now have β* =0 for t∈[0,T]. 
The rates of change in γ* and b* satisfy Equations (B.21) and (B.22), below 
 
γt = [– r1λ2bDr1+ρ1–1Mr2  – (Φ1 +   )Dρ1 + FXRθ1]/C1γγ           (B.21) 
bt = [r1λ2γDr1+ρ1–1Mr2  – (Φ2 +   )Dr1Mr2 + FRYθ3]/C2ββ  (B.22) 
 
We know 0<ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, r1, r2<1; and M, D, λ1, λ2, Φ1, Φ2 , FX, R, F, Ry, θ1 , θ3 ,C1γγ, C2ββ≥0. 
From Equation (B.18), it follows that γt≤0 for t∈[0,T]. Since γ(T)=0, we know γ* satisfies 
Case (i).   
From Equation (B.22), we know the following: 
 
bt≤0 if r1λ2γDr1+ρ1–1Mr2  – (Φ2 +   )Dr1Mr2 + FRYθ3≤ 0 and  
bt>0 if r1λ2γDr1+ρ1–1Mr2  – (Φ2 +   )Dr1Mr2 + FRYθ3>0.  
 
Using the inverse functions C1γ–1[⋅] = f1[⋅],  C1β–1[⋅] = f2[⋅],  and C3b–1[⋅] = f3[⋅], from 
Equations (B.21) and (B.22), we have  
 
bt(0) = {r1λ2(0)f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +   )θ1]D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2  
– (Φ2 +   )D0r1M0r2 + FX(0)R(0)θ2}/C2ββ(0)   (B.23)  
 
If the following condition holds, then bt(0)≤0 so that b* satisfies Case (i). 
 
r1λ2(0)f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +   )θ1]D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2 – (Φ2 +   )D0r1M0r2 + 
FX(0)R(0)θ2 ≤ 0  
 
If the inequality above is reversed, then bt(0)>0 giving us b* satisfies Case (ii).    Q.e.d. 
 
 
 178 
Proof of Corollaries 4a and 4b 
If D0 is large, M0 is small and ρ2>r1 then λ1(0)ρ2/M0–λ2(0)r1/D0>0. In addition, Equation 
(B.24) is relatively large compared to Equation (B.25). 
 
(λ1(0)ρ2/M0 – λ2(0)r1/D0)f3[λ2(0)D0r1M0r2 – (Φ2 +   )θ3]D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ3     
(B.24) 
 (Φ1 +   )M0ρ2D0ρ1 –  FX(0)R(0)θ2 
– (ρ3  – ρ1)λ1(0)f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +   )θ1]D0ρ1+ρ3–1M0ρ2      (B.25) 
 
From Equation (B.19b), we know the following is relatively large: 
 
βt(0) = {(ρ3 – ρ1)λ1(0)f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +   )θ1]D0ρ1+ρ3–1M0ρ2  
    + (λ1(0)ρ2/M0–λ2(0)r1/D0)f3[λ2(0)D0r1M0r2–(Φ2+   )θ3]D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ3  
   – (Φ1 +  )M0ρ2D0ρ1 + FX(0)R(0)θ2}/C2ββ(0)  
 
To summarize, for t∈[0,tβ]  we have  βt>0. For t∈[tβ,T], we have βt≤0 and we know that 
β(T)=0. Thus, β * is driven to follow Case (ii).   
Similarly, due to large D0, small M0 and ρ2>r1, we have λ2(0)r1/D0–λ1(0)ρ2/M0<0 
making     r1λ2(0) f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +   )θ1]D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2 relatively large. From 
Equation (B.20b), we obtain Equation (B.26) which we know is relatively large. 
 
bt(0) = {r1λ2(0)f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +  )θ1]D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2 
    +[λ2(0)r1/D0–λ1(0)ρ2/M0]f2[λ1(0)M0ρ2D0ρ3–(Φ1+  )θ2]D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ2 
    – (Φ2 +   )D0r1M0r2 + FX(0)R(0)θ2}/C2ββ(0)   (B.26)  
 
For t∈[0,T], we know  bt≤0, b(T)=0 and the following inequality holds giving us b* 
satisfies Case (i). 
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r1λ2f1[λ1Dρ1 – (Φ1 +  )θ1]Dr1+ρ1–1Mr2 < (Φ2 +   )Dr1Mr2 – FXRθ2 – 
[λ2r1/D – λ1ρ2/M]f2[λ1Mρ2Dρ – (Φ1 +   )θ2]Dr1+ρ3Mr2+ρ2 
 
Finally, recall ρ1>ρ3. With D0 is large, M0 is small, ρ2>r1 and b*(0) relatively large, from 
Equation (B.17a), we have (ρ1–ρ3)λ1(0)β(0)M0ρ2D0ρ3+ρ1–1 is relatively large compared to  
 
r1λ2(0)b(0)D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2–(Φ1 +   )D0ρ1–FX(0)R(0)θ1.  
 
It follows that γt(0) is relatively large giving us γt≤0 for t∈[0,T]. Since, γ(T)=0, we conclude 
γ* is driven to follow Case (i). 
Proof of Corollaries 5a and 5b 
The proofs of Corollaries 5a and 5b are analogous to Corollaries 4a and 4b and are 
omitted. Q.e.d. 
 
The solutions described in Corollaries 4a-4b (5a-5b) are illustrated in Figure 4 
(5). Note that these figures are given for illustrative purposes only.  
Proof of Corollary 6a 
From Theorem 1, we know λ1≥0, λ2≥0 and λ1t, λ2t≤0 for t∈[0,T]. Moreover, recall 0<ρ1, 
ρ2, ρ3, r1, r2<1; Mt, and M, Dt, D, λ1, λ2, Φ1, Φ2 FX, RY, θ1, θ2, θ3≥0. From Equations (B.5), 
(B.9), (B.10) and (B.11), we have   
 
λ1t = – λ1{f1[λ1Dρ1 – (Φ1 +   )θ1]ρ1Dρ1–1  
         +  f2[λ1Mρ2Dρ3 – (Φ1 +   )θ2]ρ3Mρ2Dρ3–1}  
        – λ2f3[λ2Dr1Mr2 – (Φ2 +   )θ3]r1Dr1–1Mr3 – λ3.  
 
Since ∂f1/∂θ1≤0, larger θ1 results in smaller f1[⋅] and larger λ1t(0). With λ1(T)=0, we know 
that for larger θ1 then λ1 is smaller. Thus, from Equations (B.9) and (B.10), larger θ1 
drives smaller γ*. Proofs of the remaining results in Corollary 5a are analogous.      
Q.e.d. 
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Proof of Corollary 6b 
From Corollary 6a, we know if θ1 is large, then γ* is relatively small. From Equations 
(B.5)-(B.8) and (B.16)-(B.18) and Corollary 6a, we know that larger θ1 results in smaller 
λ1 and λ2 (and smaller β* and b*). However, from Equation (B.5)-(B.8) and (B.15)-(A.17), 
we see θ1 has both a direct (first order) effect on λ1 and an indirect (second order) effect 
through λ2. We reasonably assume that the first order effect dominates the second order 
effect. Since ρ1>ρ3,  from Equation (B.18b), we know the following expression is relatively 
large:  
 
{(ρ1 – ρ3)λ1(0)f2[λ1(0)M0ρ2D0ρ3 – (Φ1 +   )θ2]M0ρ2D0ρ3+ρ1–1 
– r1λ2(0) f3[λ2(0)D0r1M0r2 – (Φ2 +   )θ3]D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2. 
 
In addition, if θ1 is large the last term of Equation (B.18a) is large, which gives us a 
relatively small γt(0).  Thus for t∈[0,tγ), γt>0 and for t∈[tγ, T] γt≤0. Since we know γ(T)=0, 
we find γ* is driven to follow Case (ii).  
If θ1 is large, then from Equation (B.19b), we know the value of Equation (B.27) is 
relatively small. In addition, assuming the direct effects of θ1 on λ1 dominates the indirect 
effect observed through λ2, we know large θ1 results in small λ1(0)ρ2/M0–
λ2(0)r1/D0)b(0)D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ3 so that βt(0) is relatively small. It follows that for t∈[0,T],  βt≤0 
holds. Since we know β(T)=0, we see that β* is driven to follow Case (i).  
 
{(ρ3 – ρ1)λ1(0)f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +  )θ1]D0ρ1+ρ3–1M0ρ2  (B.27) 
 
Alternatively, if θ1 is large, from Equation (B.20b), we know the value of Equation (B.28) 
is relatively large. Assuming the direct effects dominate the indirect effects (λ2(0)r1/D0–
λ1(0)ρ2/M0)β(0)D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ2 is also relatively large so that bt(0) is relative large. Thus for 
t∈[0,tb), we have bt>0 and for t∈[tb,T] we have bt≤0. Since we know b(T)=0, we have b* 
is driven to follow Case (ii). 
 
 r1λ2(0)f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +   )θ1]D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2    (B.28) 
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The proof under the supposition that θ1 is small is analogous and is omitted. Q.e.d. 
Proof of Corollary 6c 
The proof of Corollary 6c is analogous to Corollary 6b and is omitted. Q.e.d. 
Proof of Corollary 6d 
The proof of Corollary 6d is analogous to Corollary 6b and is omitted. Q.e.d. 
Proof of Corollary 7a 
From Theorem 1, we know λ1≥0, λ2≥0 and λ1t, λ2t≤0 for t∈[0,T]. Moreover, we have 0<ρ1, 
ρ2, ρ3, r1, r2<1; and Mt, M, Dt, D, λ1, λ2, Φ1, Φ2 FX, RY, θ1, θ2, θ3≥0. From Equations (B.5) 
and (B.7), we see that if FX is larger, then λ1t(0) is larger. Since λ1(T)=0, if FX is larger we 
have λ1 is larger. From Equations (B.9) and (B.10), larger FX results in larger γ* and β*. 
In addition, from Equation (B.6) and (B.8), if FX is larger then λ2t(0) is larger. Since 
λ2(T)=0, we know that if FX is larger then λ2 is larger. From Equation (B.11), larger FX 
results in larger b*. Analogous proofs lead to the remaining results in Corollary 7a. Q.e.d. 
Proof of Corollary 7b 
From Corollary 7a, we know that if FX(0) is large, then γ* is relatively large. From 
Equations (B.5)-(B.8), (B.16)-(B.18) and Corollary 6a, we know that larger FX(0) results 
in larger λ1 and λ2 (and larger β* and b*). From Equation (B.18b), this means that the 
value of Equation (B.29) is relatively small. 
 
(ρ1 – ρ3)λ1(0)f2[λ1(0)M0ρ2D0ρ3 – (Φ1 +   )θ2]M0ρ2D0ρ3+ρ1–1  
– r1λ2(0)f3[λ2(0)D0r1M0r2 – (Φ2 +    )θ3]D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2      (B.29) 
 
Larger FX results in smaller –(Φ1+ ∫
T
X RdF
0
τ )D0ρ1. The impact of large FX(0) on γt(0) as 
observed through large λ1(0) and λ2(0) dominates the impact observed through larger 
FX(0)R(0)θ1. We know this because large FX(0) drives large λ1(0) and λ2(0) through 
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∫
T
X RdF
0
τ  and from the proof of Corollary 2, we have ∫
T
X RdF
0
τ >FX(0)R(0)θ1. As a result, 
γt(0) is relatively small. It follows that γt≤0 for t∈[0,T]. Since γ(T)=0, we see that γ* is 
driven to follow the solution in Case (i).  
If FX is large, then from Equation (B.19b), the value of Equation (B.30) is 
relatively large. In addition, due to large FX(0) the following inequality is likely to hold: 
λ1(0)ρ2/M0 –λ2(0)r1/D0>0. Since ∂F/∂X≥0 and ∂2F/∂X2≤0, f3[λ2(0)D0r1M0r2– (Φ2+   )θ3] is relatively large. As a result, the value of Equation (B.31) is relatively 
large, as well. 
 
{(ρ3 – ρ1)λ1(0)f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +   )θ1]D0ρ1+ρ3–1M0ρ2   (B.30) 
 
(λ1(0)ρ2/M0 – λ2(0)r1/D0)f3[λ2(0)D0r1M0r2 – (Φ2 +   )θ3]D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ3    
(B.31) 
 
It follows that βt(0) is relatively large. Thus for t∈[0,tβ), we obtain βt>0 and for t∈[tβ,T] we 
have βt≤0. Since we know β(T)=0, we know that β* is driven to follow Case (ii). In 
contrast, if FX(0) is large, from Equation (B.17b), we know Equation (B.32) is relatively 
small in value. In addition, we know that large FX(0) drives large λ1(0) through ∫
T
X RdF
0
τ
 
 
and  drives large λ2(0) through large λ1(0). Thus, the impact of FX(0) on λ2(0) is a second 
order effect. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that first order effect dominate the second 
order effect, giving us: λ2(0)r1/D0–λ1(0)ρ2/M0 <0 so that the value of Equation (B.33) is 
relatively small. 
 
r1λ2(0)f1[λ1(0)D0ρ1 – (Φ1 +   )θ1]D0r1+ρ1–1M0r2 (B.32) 
 (λ2(0)r1/D0 – λ1(0)ρ2/M0)f2[λ1(0)M0ρ2D0ρ3 – (Φ1 +   )θ2]D0r1+ρ3M0r2+ρ2  
(B.33) 
 
Finally, recall ∂F/∂X≥0 and ∂2F/∂X2≤0. If Fx(0) is larger, then the value of the following 
inequality is relatively small so that bt(0) is relatively small. 
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– (Φ2 +   )D0r1M0r2 + F(0)RY(0)θ2  
 
Thus for t∈[0,T], we have bt<0. Again, since b(T)=0, we see that b* is driven to follow 
Case (i). 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C.1 Model notation 
 
Competitive Development 
Notation Definition 
Kij Level of knowledge applied for NPD project by firm i at time j; i∈{1,2}, 
j∈{0,1,2}, Ki0≥0. 
KTi Period one change in the level of knowledge of firm i due to knowledge 
transfer. 
KDi Period two change in the level of knowledge of firm i due to knowledge 
development. 
Q Amount of knowledge firm 2 buys from firm 1 in period one (decision 
variable). 
βP[K10,K20] Firms’ prediction of the portion of the knowledge transfer that firm 2 will 
be able to integrate with its own knowledge resources for NPD. 
βP[K10,K20] satisfies the probability density function Φ(z) with mean  and 
standard deviation σ, where ∂/∂K10, ∂/∂K20≥0 and ∂2/∂K102, ∂2/∂K202≤0, 
∂σ/∂K10, ∂σ/∂K20≤0 and ∂2σ/K102, ∂2σ/∂K202≥0. 
(0<βP [K10,K20]<1). 
θ1, θ2 Indicates rate of diminishing returns from firm 2’s own level of knowledge 
and the level of KT to firm 2, respectively (0≤θ1, θ2≤1). 
γi Period two efforts undertaken by firm i for knowledge development 
(decision variable). 
µi Indicates the rate of diminishing returns from knowledge development 
efforts of the firm i (0≤µi ≤1). 
δi Probability that the new product developed by firm i will have the features 
and functionality making it successful in the marketplace (0≤δi≤1). 
δ2N Probability that the new product developed by firm 2 will have the 
features and functionality making it successful in the marketplace, if firm 2 
does not cooperate with firm 1 in the first period (0≤δ2N≤1, δ2N≤δ2). 
 185 
vi Loyal customers’ valuation of the knowledge embedded by firm i into the 
new product (vi≥0). 
wi
P
 Firm i’s prediction of switching customers’ valuation of the knowledge 
embedded by firm i relative to the knowledge embedded by firm k into 
each firm’s new product (wiP≥0). 
zi Customers’ valuation of the knowledge embedded by firm i into the new 
product under the condition that only firm i is able to successfully develop 
a new product (zi≥0). 
ci Marginal cost of KD pursued by firm i in the second period (ci≥0). 
G[KTi] Period two revenue earned or cost incurred due to knowledge transfer or 
sharing between firms. 
P Price charged by firm 1 (leader) for knowledge it sells to firm 2 in period 
one (decision variable). 
m1 Marginal cost incurred by firm 1 due to loss of proprietary knowledge for 
sharing knowledge (m1≥0). 
 
Joint Development 
Notation Definition 
Kij Level of knowledge applied for NPD project by firm i at time j; i∈{1,2}, 
j∈{0,1,2}, Ki0≥0. 
KJDj Level of knowledge applied for NPD project by the firms jointly  at time j; 
j∈{1,2}. 
βP[K10,K20] Firms’ prediction of the extent that knowledge resources shared by one 
firm can be integrated with the knowledge resources shared by the other 
firm. βP[K10,K20] satisfies the probability density function Φ(z) with mean  
and standard deviation σ, where ∂/∂K10, ∂/∂K20≥0 and ∂2/∂K102, 
∂2/∂K202≤0, ∂σ/∂K10, ∂σ/∂K20≤0 and ∂2σ/K102, ∂2σ/∂K202≥0. 
(0<βP [K10,K20]<1). 
Qi Amount of knowledge contributed by firm i to the joint development 
project, where i∈{1,2} (decision variable). 
γJD Extent of efforts to be jointly allocated to knowledge development in 
period two (decision variable). 
µJD Indicates the rate of diminishing returns from joint knowledge 
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development efforts (0≤µJD ≤1). 
θ1, θ2 Indicates rate of diminishing returns to joint knowledge level at the end of 
period one from the amount of knowledge shared by firm 1 and firm 2, 
respectively (0≤θ1, θ2≤1). 
δJD Probability that the new product developed jointly by the firms will have 
the features and functionality making it successful in the marketplace 
(0≤δJD≤1). 
vJD
P Customers’ valuation of the knowledge embedded jointly by the firms into 
the new product (vJDP≥0). 
λ, 1-λ Portions of net expected revenue earned at the end of period two, by firm 
1 and firm 2, respectively (decision variable). (0≤λ≤1). 
cJD Marginal cost of KD pursued jointly by the firms in the second period 
(cJD≥0). 
mi
 Marginal cost incurred by firm i due to loss of proprietary knowledge for 
sharing knowledge (mi≥0). 
 
C.1 Competitive Development 
C.1.1 Analytical Solutions and Sensitivity Analysis 
Proof of Proposition 1 
In order to determine T, firm 1 maximizes the expected profit function in Equation (4.9): 
 vw(  017+ / 00+237+ 4 7++ / 01 4 0+7+ / x7yz	 4 .T+ 4D: 
             017 /7< T / 00+237 / 7< T 4 7+ / 7+<#T+(  
               /01 4 0+7 / 7< T / C: 4 .T+ 4D: {vw({γ  01 / 00+23 / 01 4 0+(7< 4 2cγ  0 
Thus, γ   ! "#$ %"&#' ()  * +, . In order to ensure concavity, ~# (~γ #  42c  0.  
 
Similarly, in order to determine T+, , firm 2 maximizes the expected profit function in 
Equation (4.10): vw+(  0+1+7++ / 00+2+37++ 4 7+ / 0+1 4 0+7++ 4 C: 4 .+T++ 
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 0+1+7+ / 7+<#T+ / 00+2+37+ / 7+<#T+ 4 7 / 7< T( 
              / 0+1 4 0+7+ /7+<#T+ 4 C: 4 .+T++ 
   {vw+(/{γ+  0+1+ / 00+2+3 / 0+1 4 0+(7+<# 4 2c+γ+  0 
Thus, γ+  #!#" $#%"& '#()# *#+,# . In order to ensure concavity, ~##(~γ##  4 2c+  0. 
Q.e.d. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
In order to determine :, firm 2 maximizes the expected profit function in Equation 
(4.10): vw+(  0+1+7++ / 00+2+37++ 4 7+ / 0+1 4 0+7++ 4 C: 4 .+T++      
            0+1+7+ / 7+<#T+ / 00+2+37+ / 7+<#T+ 4 7 / 7< T( 
              / 0+1 4 0+7+ /7+<#T+ 4 C: 4 .+T++ 
            0+1+ / 00+2+3 / 0+1 4 0+ 7+ / 7+<# J#!#" $#%"& '#()# *#+,# M 
               4 00+2+3 J7 / 7<  ! "#$ %"&#' ()  * +, M 
               4 C: 4 .+#!#" $#%"& '#()# *#+,# + 
              0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+67+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9#; 
              / 0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+(+ )#?">%) ?,)#?	)#?@ A@##*#I=#  
              4 00+2+37 4  0+0+2+31 / 0+231 4 0+ ) ?#* += 4 C: {vw+(/{Q   0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+837, 7+	7+9 m+:9#&  
                                   
/  #!#" $#%"& '#(#<#)#?">%) ?,)#?	)#?@ A@##*#B >%) ?,)#?	)#?@ 9#A@#B +=#  
                       4C  0 
Thus, : satisfies  
2.+ /  0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+(5+67+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9#;+<#&    
                                     +=#3 #!#" $#%"& '#(>%) ?,)#?	)#?@ A@#B    
In order to ensure concavity,  
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{+vw+({Q+ m+ 4 10+1+ / 02+3
/ 1 4 0+(837, 7+	7+9 m+:9#&+ 2.+ / 5+7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9#+<#&(2.+  /0+1+ / 02+3 /1 4 0+837, 7+	m+(+7+9 ":9# <#+<#&)#?">%) ?,)#?	)#?@ A@##*#B#+=# <0. Q.e.d. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
In order to ensure that firms 1 and 2 will cooperate through CD mechanism rather than 
pursuing NPD project individually, the expected profit that each firm receives at the end 
of second period if it cooperates through CD mechanism must be greater than or equal 
to the value for the case that it doesn’t cooperate. Let vwzG(denote the expected profit 
for firm i if the firms are non-cooperative during the NPD process. Similarly, let γiN denote 
the optimal rate of knowledge development pursued by firm i if the firms are non-
cooperative. The expected profit function of firms 1 and 2 if they do not cooperate are: vwG(  017+ / 00+G237+ 4 7++ / 01 4 0+G7+ 4 .TG+ 
   017 / 7< TG / 00+G237 / 7< TG 4 7+ / 7+<#T+G( 
    / 01 4 0+G7 / 7< TG 4 .TG+ 
 vw+G(  0+1+7++ / 00+G2+37++ 4 7+ / 0+G1 4 0+7++ 4 .+T+G+ 
   0+1+7+ / 7+<#T+G / 00+G2+37+ / 7+<#T+G 4 7 / 7< TG( 
    / 0+G1 4 0+7+ / 7+<#T+G 4 .+T+G+ 
 
And if solve for TG and T+G, we obtain: 
vwG(  061 / 0+G23 / 61 4 0+G;;7 / 061 / 0+G23 / 61 4 0+G;;(+7+< 4.  
    4 00+G23 J7+ /  #H!#" $#%"& '#()#?#*#+=# M 
 
vw+G(  0+G1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+7+ / 0+G1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+(+7++<#4.+  
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    4 00+2+3 J7 /  ! "#H$ %"&#H' () ?#* += M 
 
When we substitute T and T+ from Equation (4.16), we obtain the expected profit 
functions of firms 1 and 2 if the cooperate through CD mechanism: 
vw(  01 / 0+23 / 1 4 0+7 / 01 / 0+23 / 1 4 0+(+7+< 4.  
   
4 00+23 J7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9# / #!#" $#%"& '#()#?">%) ?,)#?	)#?@ A@#(#*#+=# M 
     / C 4 D: vw+(  0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9# 
    / #6!#" $#%"& '#;(#)#?">%) ?,)#?	)#?@ A@##*#I=#  
    4 00+2+3 N7 /  6! "#$ %"&#' ;) ?#* += O 4 C: 
  
Thus, the expected profit functions of firms 1 and 2 must satisfy:  vw( ≥ vwG(, or, 
01 / 0+23 / 1 4 0+7 / 01 / 0+23 / 1 4 0+(+7+< 4.  
4 00+23 q7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9#
/ 0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+(7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9#(+<#2.+ r 
/ C 4 D: ≥ 061 / 0+G23 / 61 4 0+G;;7 /  N! "#H$ %"N&#HO' O(#) ?#* I=  
              4 00+G23 J7+ /  #H!#" $#%"& '#()#?#*#+=# M. 
Thus, 
C 4 D: E FG 4 F7 / FG+ 4 F+(7+< 4. / 02360+ 4 0+G;7+ 
                        / 00+23 J8K7, 7+	7+9 :9# / )#?">L) ?,)#?	)#?@ A@##*#+=# M 
                        4 00+G23 NH)#?#*#+=# O 
where F  01 / 0+23 / 1 4 0+ 
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          P  0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+ 
          FG  061 / 0+G23 / 61 4 0+G;; 
          PG  0+G1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+. 
 
Also, w+(≥ vw+G(, or,  0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9# 
/ 0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+(+7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9#+<#4.+  
 4 00+2+3 N7 /  6! "#$ %"&#' ;) ?#* += O 4 C: ≥ 0+G1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+7+ 
 / #H6!#" $#%"& '#;(#)#?#*#I=# 4  00+G2+3 J7 /  ! "#H$ %"&#H' () ?#* += M.  
 
Thus, 
C: E PG7+ / PG7++<#4.+ 4 00+G2+3 q7 / FG7+< 2. r 4 P67+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9#;
/ P+7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9#+<#4.+ 4 00+2+3 q7 / F7+< 2. r 
where F  01 / 0+23 / 1 4 0+ 
          P  0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+ 
          FG  061 / 0+G23 / 61 4 0+G;; 
          PG  0+G1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+. 
 
Thus, 
C: ≥ 0+G1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+7+ / #H6!#" $#%"& '#;(#)#?#*#I=#  
        4 00+G2+3 J7 /  ! "#H$ %"&#H' () ?#* += M4 0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 40+7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9# 
         4 #6!#" $#%"& '#;(#)#?">%) ?,)#?	)#?@ A@##*#I=#  
        / 00+2+3 N7 /  6! "#$ %"&#' ;) ?#* += O. Q.e.d. 
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Proof of Proposition 4 
If 5  5+  +, then γ   6! "#$ %"&#' ;   /#+,  and γ+  #6!#" $#%"& '#;#  /#+,#  
from Equation (4.16). 
Let F  01 / 0+23 / 1 4 0+ 
      P  0+1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+ 
Thus, in order to determine :, firm 2 maximizes the expected profit function:  
vw+(  P4.+ / P7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9#4.+ 4 00+2+32. / F72. 4 C: 
 {vw+({:  P4.+ / P7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 m+:9#&4.+ 4 C  0 
 
Thus, :  R I=#3I=#">%) ?,)#?	)#?@ 9#S  @#B  
 
In order to ensure concavity,  
~##(~#  I=#")#?">%) ?,)#?	)#?@ 9#9#&A@#B#I=# <0. 
 
If 5  5+  +, in order to determine C, firm 1 maximizes the expected profit function: 
vw(  F4. / F72. 4 00+232.+ / P7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 :9#2.+ / C 4D: 
Let   R I=#I=#">%) ?,)#?	)#?@ 9#S  @#B . Then :  C  @#B . If we substitute : into the 
expected profit function for firm 1, we get:  
vw(  F4. / F72. 4 00+232.+ / P7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 9#C
9#9#&2.+ / C 9#9#&
4DC 9#& 
Firm 1 determines C that maximizes the above profit function: 
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{vw({C  400+2
32.+ / P7+ / 837, 7+	7+9 9# N m+m+ 4 1OC 9#&2.+
/ J m+m+ 4 1MC 9#& 4DJ 1m+ 4 1MC+&9#9#&  0 
Thus, C  +=#Q 9#+=#& #$ %+=#">%) ?,)#?	)#?@ @#B ( , or 
          C  Q I=#"9#I=#"&+ #$ %+=#" 
 
In order to ensure concavity,  
{+vw({C+  400+2
32.+ / P837, 7+	7+9 9# N m+m+ 4 1O N 1m+ 4 1OC+&9#9#&2.+  
        /  N 9#9#&O N 9#&OC#B@#@#B 4DN 9#&O N+&9#9#&OCB#@#@#B  <0. 
Thus, C  Q +&9#=#9#+=#& #$ %+=#">%) ?,)#?	)#?@ @#B ( 
 
In addition, we know that :  7. Thus, C  @#B  7. If we substitute  into this 
inequality and rearrange: 
C  ) ?@#B 6I=#"!#"$#%;!#"$#%>%)#?@ 9#+=# . 
 
Through substituting C into the : Equation, we obtain: 
 :  R I=#Q >%) ?,)#?	)#?@ 9#9#I=#"&+ #$ %+=#"(S  @#B  
 
And finally, through substituting : into the T and T+ equation, we obtain: T= ) ? /#+=  
T+= V)#?"W
 X%Y ?,Y#?	Y#?@ J Z[#\ @#]Z[#^]B#_ _#` %#[#^]M@#a
 @#B b
 /#
+=#  
 
Note that when we substitute C, :, Tand T+ into the vw( and vw+( equations, we 
obtain: 
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vw(  F2. / F72. 4 F+72.  
               4  #$ %+=#"I=## 7+ / i >%) ?,)#?	)#?@ N I=#Q 9#I=#"&+ #$ %+=#"O9#j
 @#B  
             /N I=#Q >L) ?,)#?	)#?@ O  @#B Q I=#"&9#"+9#  $ %+=#"(9#I=#"&+9#  $ %I=#"( @#@#B  
 
 vw+(  +=#"+=# 7+ / i >%) ?,)#?	)#?@ N I=#Q 9#I=#"&+ #$ %+=#"O9#j
 @#B  4  #$#%) ?+=  
               4 #V)#?"W
 X%Y ?,Y#?	Y#?@ J Z[#\ @#]Z[#^]B#_ _#` %#[#^]M@#a
 @#B b
I=#  
           4 P4.+ / P N I=#>%) ?,)#?	)#?@ 9#O N Q 9#I=#"&+  $ %+=#"O9#
 @#B 
 
 
Suppose 5  5+  +. Firm 1 enters into a cooperative agreement if the following 
inequality holds:  
C 4 D:9# E 6H&;I= "6H;#&#S) ?I= 4 00+23 N+=#"+=# O837, 7+	7+9 :9#  
                           / 023 qN#&#HO+=#"+=# r7+ 
and 
Note that, when 5  5+  +, the expected profit function of firms 1 and 2 if they do not 
cooperate are: 
vwG(  FG4. / FG74. 4 00+G23 2.+ / PG7+2.+  
vw+G(  PG4.+ / PG7+4.+ 4 00+G2+3 2. / FG72.  
 
where FG  061 / 0+G23 / 61 4 0+G;; 
          PG  0+G1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+. Q.e.d. 
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Proof of Proposition 5 
This proof follows directly from Equation (4.21).  
Proof of Proposition 6 
This proof follows directly from Equation (4.22).  
Proof of Proposition 7 
This proof follows directly from Equation (4.23).  
Proof of Proposition 8 
This proof follows directly from Equation (4.24).  
 
C.1.2 Numerical Examples: Example 1 and Its Variations 
For the numerical analysis introduced in Section 4.5.1.2, we assume µ1=µ2=½. 
As noted βP[K10,K20] satisfies the probability density function Φ(z) with mean  and 
standard deviation σ,   is a function of K10 and K20. We assume the functional form 
below for . For the numerical analysis included in Chapter 4 no functional form the 
relationship between σ and K10 and K20 was necessary. All the other functional forms 
employed are derived from Equations (4.21)-(4.24). Numerical solutions are obtained 
with EXCEL.  
  &) ?")#? 
 
Table C.2 Input values for Example 1 
Parameter Value  Parameter Value Parameter Value  
K10 100  δ2N 0.4 v2 100  
K10 80  θ1 0.5 w2P 20  
βP[K10,K20] 0.593  θ2 0.5 z2 10  
ϕ 0.005  v1 100 c1 100  
δ1 0.5  w1P 20 c2 100  
δ2 0.5  z1 10 m1 40  
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Table C.3 Summary of results for Example 1 
 
P Q  γ1 γ2 E{pi1} E{pi2} E{pi1N} E{pi2 N } 
96.95
 
3.08  2.88 2.72 6187.47
 
4930.29 6099.88 3589.21 
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C.1.2.1 Impact of w2P 
                
 
                
 
 Figure C.1a  P* with respect to w2P Figure C.1b Q* with respect to w2P 
                              
               Figure C.1c      γ1* and γ2* with respect to w2P 
                           
        Figure C.1d           E{pi1}* and E{pi1N}* with respect to w2P 
                 
          Figure C.1e      E{pi2}* and E{pi2N}* with respect to w2P 
 
Figure C.1   KT and KD decisions and the expected profits of firms 1 and 2 with respect 
to w2P 
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C.1.2.2 Impact of z2 
                
 
                
 
 Figure C.2a  P* with respect to z2 Figure C.2b Q* with respect to z2 
                              
               Figure C.2c      γ1* and γ2* with respect to z2 
                           
        Figure C.2d           E{pi1}* and E{pi1N}* with respect to z2 
                 
          Figure C.2e      E{pi2}* and E{pi2N}* with respect to z2 
 
Figure C.2 KT and KD decisions and the expected profits of firms 1 and 2 with respect 
to z2 
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C.1.3 Experimental Analysis of Impact of Uncertainty 
For the experimental analysis introduced in Section 4.5.1.3, we assume 
µ1=µ2=½. As noted for w1P and βP[K10,K20] we assume a triangular distribution, where the 
mean of the distribution of βP[K10,K20],  ,  is a function of K10 and K20. These values and 
other relevant data are given in Table C.4. All the other functional forms employed are 
derived from Equations (4.21)-(4.24). Numerical solutions are obtained with EXCEL.  
  &) ?")#? 
 
Table C.4 Triangular distribution settings for w1P and w2P 
Triangular 
distribution 
Low 
uncertainty 
 High uncertainty 
symmetric 
High uncertainty 
skewed 
Lower value
 
19  15 14 
Upper value
 
21  25 28 
Mode 20  20 18 
Mean 20  20
 
20 
Standard deviation 0.41  2.04 2.95 
 
Table C.5 Summary of results for the experimental analysis of uncertainty 
associated with w1P and w2P 
 
(a) Summary of results for the experimental analysis of uncertainty associated with 
w1
P
 
P Q
 
 γ1 γ2 E{pi1} E{pi2} E{pi1N} E{pi2 N }  
Low uncertainty 
96.95 3.08  2.88 2.72 6187.47 4930.29 6099.88 3589.21  
High uncertainty symmetric 
97.04 3.08  2.86 2.72 6148.64 4935.68 6097.95 3589.23  
High uncertainty skewed 
97.21 3.07  2.91 2.71 6259.73 4921.72 6101.45 3589.15  
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(b) Summary of results for the experimental analysis of uncertainty associated with 
w2
P
 
P Q
 
 γ1 γ2 E{pi1} E{pi2} E{pi1N} E{pi2 N }  
Low uncertainty 
96.97 3.08  2.88 2.72 6177.07 4931.81 6100.24 3589.38  
High uncertainty symmetric 
96.99 3.07  2.88 2.71 6176.92 4919.59 6100.31 3583.33  
High uncertainty skewed 
97.03 3.06  2.88 2.71 6176.06 4936.15 6100.45 3590.31  
 
Table C.6 Triangular distribution settings for βP[K10,K20] 
Triangular 
distribution 
Low 
uncertainty 
 High uncertainty 
symmetric 
High uncertainty 
skewed 
Lower value
 
0.591  0.356 0.292 
Upper value
 
0.595  0.836 0.987 
Mode 0.593  0.593 0.500 
Mean 0.593  0.593 0.593 
Standard deviation 0.000  0.42 0.62 
 
Table C.7 Summary of results for the experimental analysis of uncertainty 
associated with βP[K10,K20] 
 
P Q
 
 γ1 γ2 E{pi1} E{pi2} E{pi1N} E{pi2 N }  
Low uncertainty 
96.13 3.08  2.88 2.72 6174.34 4933.67 6100.25 3210.29  
High uncertainty symmetric 
96.13 3.47  2.88 2.74 6189.10 4984.88 6100.25 3210.89  
High uncertainty skewed 
96.13 3.25  2.88 2.71 6177.03 4918.43 6100.25 3210.02  
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C.2 Joint Development 
C.2.1 Analytical Solutions and Sensitivity Analysis 
Proof of Proposition 9 
In order to determine γ, the firms maximize the total expected profit function of the 
system (vpi():  vpi  0cd1cd37cd+ 4 .cdTcd+  1cd367cd / 7cd<efTcd; 4 .cdTcd+ ~pi~γ  0cd1cd37cd<ef 4 2.cdTcd  0. 
Thus, Tcd  0cd1cd37cd<ef/2.cd. In order to ensure concavity, ~#pi~γ#  42.cd  0.  
Since 7cd  837, 7+	:9 :+9#, we can conclude that  
Tcd  ef!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A @ A#@#*ef+=ef . Q.e.d. 
Proof of Proposition 10 
In order to determine :+, firm 2 maximizes the profit function in Equation (4.14): vw+(  1 4 h0cd1cd37cd+ 4 .cdTcd+( 4 D+:+ 
            1 4 h0cd1cd3 i837, 7+	:9 :+9# / ef!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A @ A#@##*ef  +=ef j            
                    4 ef!ef%#N>%) ?,)#?	A @ A#@#O#*efI=ef ( 4 D+:+ 
              1 4 h0cd1cd3 i837, 7+	:9 :+9# / ef!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A @ A#@##*ef  I=ef j 4 D+:+ 
~#(~#  1 4 h0cd1cd3837, 7+	:9 m+:+9#& i1 / <ef!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A @ A#@##*efB +=ef j 4 D+  0.                  
Thus, :+ satisfies: 
1 / <efef!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A @ A#@##*efB +=ef  Q#&gef!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A @ 9#A#@#B . 
In order to ensure concavity,  {+vw+({Q++  1 4 h0cd1cd3837, 7+	:9 m+m+ 4 1:+9#&+ 
            / &gef!ef%#>%) ?,)#?	A @ #*ef9#<ef+9#<ef&A##@#*efB +=ef <0. Q.e.d. 
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Proof of Proposition 11 
In order to ensure that firms 1 and 2 will cooperate through CD mechanism rather than 
pursuing NPD project individually, the expected profit that each firm receives at the end 
of second period, if it cooperates through JD mechanism, must be greater than or equal 
to the value for the case that it doesn’t cooperate. Let E{piiN}denote the expected profit 
for firm i if the firms are non-cooperative during the NPD process. Similarly, let γiN denote 
the optimal rate of knowledge development pursued by firm i if the firms are non-
cooperative. From the proof of Proposition 1, the expected profit function of firms 1 and 2 
if they do not cooperate are: 
vwG(  FG7 / FG+7+< 4. 4 00+G23 q7+ / PG7++<#2.+ r 
vw+G(  PG7+ / PG+7++<#4.+ 4 00+G2+3 q7 / FG7+< 2. r 
Where FG  061 / 0+G23 / 61 4 0+G;; 
           PG  0+G1+ / 02+3 / 1 4 0+. 
 
From the proof of Proposition 5, the expected profit functions of firms 1 and 2 if they 
cooperate through the JD mechanism are: vw(  h0cd1cd37cd+ 4 .cdTcd+( 4 D: 
              h0cd1cd3 i837, 7+	:9 :+9# / ef!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A @ A#@##*ef  I=ef j 4 D: 
 vw+(  1 4 h0cd1cd37cd+ 4 .cdTcd+( 4 D+:+ 
             1 4 h0cd1cd3 i837, 7+	:9 :+9# / ef!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A @ A#@##*ef  I=ef j 4 D+:+ 
 
Thus, firms to enter into a joint development agreement, the expected profit functions of 
firms 1 and 2 must satisfy:  vw( E vwG(, or, 
h0cd1cd3 p837, 7+	:9 :+9# / 0cd1cd3837, 7+	:9 :+9#+<ef  4.cd u 4 D: 
 E FG7 / H#) ?#* I= 4 00+G23 N7+ / H)#?#*#+=# O 
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Also, vw+( E vw+G(, or, 
1 4 h0cd1cd3 p837, 7+	:9 :+9# / 0cd1cd3837, 7+	:9 :+9#+<ef  4.cd u 4D+:+ 
 E PG7+ / H#)#?#*#I=# 4 00+G2+3 N7 / H) ?#* += O . Q.e.d. 
Proof of Proposition 12 
If 5  5+  +, then Tcd  ef!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A @ A#@# /#+=ef . Thus, in order to determine :+, 
firm 2 maximizes the profit function:  
vw+(  1 4 h0cd1cd 64.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	:9 :+9#4.cd 4D+:+ {vw+({:+  1 4 h0cd1cd 64.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	:9 m+:+9#&4.cd 4D+  0 
Thus, :+  i IQ#=ef&gef!efI=ef"!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A @ 9#j
 @#B 
. 
In order to ensure concavity,  
~##(~##  1 4 h0cd1cd 6I=ef"ef!ef%;>%) ?,)#?	A @ 9#9#&A#@#B#I=ef  0. 
 
In addition, we know that :  7. If we rearrange the solution for :+, we obtain 
:+  i IQ#=ef&gef!ef%I=ef"!ef%>%) ?,)#?	) ?@ 9#j
 @#B 
. 
 
Next, in order to determine :, firm 1 maximizes the profit function: 
vw(  h0cd1cd3 64.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	:9 :+9#4.cd 4D: 
Let ∆  i IQ#=ef&gef!ef%I=ef"!ef%>%) ?,)#?	9#j
 @#B 
. Then :+  ∆: B@ @#B . If we substitute :+ 
into the expected profit function for firm 1, we get:  
vw(  h0cd1cd3 64.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	: &9 9#&∆9#4.cd 4D: 
Firm 1 determines :  that maximizes the above profit function: 
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~ (~  h0cd1cd3 6I=ef"ef!ef%;>%) ?,)#?	∆@#I=ef N &9 9#&O: B@ B@#@#B 4D  0. 
Thus, :  i IQ =ef&9#gef!ef%6I=ef"ef!ef%;>%) ?,)#?	∆@#9 j
@#B  B@ B@#
 , or 
:  k0cd1cd364.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	4.cd J hmD1 4 m+M&9# J1 4 hm+D+ M9#o
&9 &9#
 
In order to ensure concavity,  
~##(~##  h0cd1cd3 6I=ef"ef!ef%;>%) ?,)#?	∆@#I=ef N &9 9#&O N&9 &9#9#& O:#B@ B#@#@#B  0. 
Thus, 1 4 m4m+  0 and m/m+  1.  
 
Since :+  ∆: B@ @#B , if we substitute ∆ and : into the solution of :+, we obtain:  
:+  k0cd1cd34.cd / 0cd1cd3837, 7+	4.cd J1 4 hm+D+ M&9 J hmD1 4 m+M9 o
&9 &9#
 
 
We know that Tcd  ef!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A @ A#@# /#+=ef . If we substitute : and :+ solutions 
into the from Tcd solution, we obtain:  
Tcd  pq0cd1cd3.cd r
+&9 &9# 4.cd
/ 0cd1cd39 "9# J hmD1 4 m+M9 J1 4 hm+D+ M9# 837, 7+	4 o
+&9 &9#
 
Firm 1 determines h that maximizes vw(: 
vw(  h0cd1cd3 64.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	: &9 9#&∆9#4.cd 4D: 
If we substitute the : and :+ solutions, we obtain: vw(  1 4 h9#h&9#	 4 1 4 h9#h&9#	 
where  
  0cd1cd34.cd / 0cd1cd3837, 7+	m+4.cdD+ J mD1 4 m+M9  
  0cd1cd34.cd / 0cd1cd3837, 7+	m+9#4.cdD9 D+9# J m1 4 m+M&9# 
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  11 4 m 4 m+ 
Then {vw({h  4 m+1 4 h9#&h&9# / 1 4 h9#1 4 m+h&9#& 
                 / m+1 4 h9#&h&9# 4  1 4 h9#1 4 m+h&9#&  0. 
Thus, 
h  2m+ 4 11 4 m+  
When we substitute the λ solution into the :, :+ and Tcd equations, we obtain: 
:  k0cd1cd364.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	4.cd1 4 m++&9# J2m+ 4 1mD M
&9# J2 4 3m+m+D+ M9#o
&9 &9#
 
 
:+  k0cd1cd34.cd / 0cd1cd3837, 7+	4.cd1 4 m+9 " J2m+ 4 1mD M
9 J2 4 3m+m+D+ M&9 o
&9 &9#
 
 Tcd
 pq0cd1cd3.cd r
+&9 &9# 837, 7+	4.cd / 0cd1cd39 "9#4 1 4 m++9 "9# J2m+ 4 1mD M
9 J2 4 3m+m+D+ M9#u
+&9 &9#
 
 
Note that when we substitute h, :, : and Tcd into the vw(, vw+( and vwcd 
equations, we obtain: 
vw(  k837, 7+	0cd1cd34.cd / 0cd1cd34.cd1 4 m+9 " 2m+ 4 1&9#m9 D9 J2 4 3m+m+D+ M
9#o &9 &9# 
              4ief!ef%6I=ef"ef!ef%;>%) ?,)#?	I=ef&9##B@# +9#&9 ( B@#Q @ N+&9#9#Q# O9#j
  B@ B@#
 
 
vw+(  k837, 7+	0cd1cd34.cd / 0cd1cd34.cd1 4 m+9 " J2m+ 4 1mD M
9 243m+&9 m+9#D+9# o
&9 &9#
 
              4ief!ef%6I=ef"ef!ef%;>%) ?,)#?	I=ef&9#@ ^ Q#@# N+9#&9 Q O9 N+&9#9#Q# O&9 j
  B@ B@#
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vwcd  k837, 7+	0cd1cd34.cd / 0cd1cd34 1 4 m++9 "9# J2m+ 4 1mD M
9 J2 4 3m+m+D+ M9#o
&9 &9#
 
 
Suppose 5  5+  +. the expected profit function of firms 1 and 2 if they do not 
cooperate are: 
vwG(  FG7 / FG+7+< 4. 4 00+G23 q7+ / PG7++<#2.+ r vw+G(  PG7+ / H#)#?#*#I=# 4 00+G2+3 N7 / H) ?#* += O.  Q.e.d. 
Proof of Proposition 13 
This proof follows directly from Equation (4.29).  
Proof of Proposition 14 
This proof follows directly from Equations (4.30), (4.31) and (4.32).  
 
C.2.2 Numerical Examples: Example 2 and Its Variations 
For the numerical analysis introduced in Section 4.5.2.2, we assume µ1=µ2=½. 
As noted βP[K10,K20] satisfies the probability density function Φ(z) with mean  and 
standard deviation σ,   is a function of K10 and K20. We assume the functional form 
below for . For the numerical analysis included in Chapter 4 no functional form the 
relationship between σ and K10 and K20 was necessary. All the other functional forms 
employed are derived from Equations (4.21)-(4.24). Numerical solutions are obtained 
with EXCEL.  
  &) ?")#? 
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Table C.8 Input values for Example 2 
Parameter Value  Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value  
K10 100  δJD 0.8 δ2N 0.4 z2 10  
K10 80  vJD 400 v1 100 c1 100  
βP[K10,K20] 0.59  cJD 100 w1P 20 c2 100  
ϕ 0.005  m1 40 z1 10    
θ1 0.2  m2 40 v2 100    
θ2 0.62  δ1 0.5 w2P 20    
 
Table C.9 Summary of results for Example 2 
 
λ Q1  Q2 γJD E{pi1} E{pi2} E{pi1N} E{pi2 N } E{piJD} 
0.63 79.90  61.55 27.59 17902.79 6053.52 6100.25 3589.2 18294.31 
 
 
C.2.3 Experimental Analysis of Impact of Uncertainty 
For the experimental analysis introduced in Section 4.5.2.3, we assume 
µ1=µ2=½. As noted for w1P and βP[K10,K20] we assume a triangular distribution, where the 
mean of the distribution of βP[K10,K20],  ,  is a function of K10 and K20. These values and 
other relevant data are given in Table C.10. All the other functional forms employed are 
derived from Equations (4.27)-(4.32). Numerical solutions are obtained with EXCEL.  
  &) ?")#? 
 
Table C.10 Triangular distribution settings for vJDP 
Triangular 
distribution 
Low 
uncertainty 
 High uncertainty 
symmetric 
High uncertainty 
skewed 
Lower value
 
399.9  350 330 
Upper value
 
401.1  450 500 
Mode 400  400 370 
Mean 400  400 400 
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Standard deviation 0.04  20.41 36.29 
 
Table C.11 Summary of results for the experimental analysis of uncertainty 
associated with vJDP 
 
λ Q1  Q2 γJD E{pi1} E{pi2} E{pi1N} E{pi2N }  
Low uncertainty 
0.63 79.90  61.55 27.59 17902.79 6053.52 6100.25 3589.21  
High uncertainty symmetric 
0.63 82.56  63.14 30.84 17635.81 5949.23 6100.25 3589.21  
High uncertainty skewed 
0.63 90.11  2.91 36.24 17856.32 5999.54 6100.25 3589.21  
 
 
Table C.12 Triangular distribution settings for βP[K10,K20] 
Triangular 
distribution 
Low 
uncertainty 
 High uncertainty 
symmetric 
High uncertainty 
skewed 
Lower value
 
0.591  0.356 0.292 
Upper value
 
0.595  0.836 0.987 
Mode 0.593  0.593 0.500 
Mean 0.593  0.593 0.593 
Standard deviation 0.000  0.42 0.62 
 
 
Table C.13 Summary of results for the experimental analysis of uncertainty 
associated with βP[K10,K20] 
 
λ Q1  Q2 γJD E{pi1} E{pi2} E{pi1N} E{pi2N }  
Low uncertainty 
0.63 79.90  61.55 27.59 17902.79 6053.52 6100.25 3589.21  
High uncertainty symmetric 
0.63 75.65  52.64 23.89 14526.37 5846.32 6100.25 3589.21  
High uncertainty skewed 
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0.63 77.12  54.98 25.34 18005.64 6113.95 6100.25 3589.21  
 
C.2.4 Joint Development: Simultaneous Decision Making 
 
Proof of Proposition 15 
If 5  5+  +, then Tcd  ef!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A @ A#@# /#+=ef . Thus, in order to determine :+, 
firm 2 maximizes the profit function:  
vw+(  1 4 h0cd1cd 64.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	:9 :+9#4.cd 4D+:+ {vw+({:+  1 4 h0cd1cd 64.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	:9 m+:+9#&4.cd 4D+  0 
Thus, :+  i IQ#=ef&gef!efI=ef"!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A @ 9#j
 @#B 
. 
In order to ensure concavity,  
~##(~##  1 4 h0cd1cd 6I=ef"ef!ef%;>%) ?,)#?	A @ 9#9#&A#@#B#I=ef  0. 
 
Next, in order to determine :, firm 1 maximizes the profit function: 
vw(  h0cd1cd3 64.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	:9 :+9#4.cd 4D: 
 {vw({:  h0cd1cd 64.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	:9 m+:+9#&4.cd 4D  0 
 
Thus, :  i IQ =efgef!efI=ef"!ef%>%) ?,)#?	A#@#9 j
 @ B 
. 
 
When : and :+ are solved simultaneously, we obtain: 
:  k0cd1cd364.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	4.cd JhmD M&9# J1 4 hm+D+ M9#o
&9 &9#
 
and 
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:+  k0cd1cd34.cd / 0cd1cd3837, 7+	4.cd J1 4 hm+D+ M&9 JhmD M9 o
&9 &9#
 
 
Firm 1 determines h that maximizes vw(: 
vw(  h0cd1cd3 64.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	:9 :+9#4.cd 4D: 
If we substitute the : and :+ solutions, we obtain: vw(  1 4 h9#h&9#	 4 1 4 h9#h&9#	 
where  
  0cd1cd34.cd / 0cd1cd3837, 7+	4.cd JmDM9 J m+D+M9# 
  0cd1cd34.cd / 0cd1cd3837, 7+	m+9#m&9#4.cdD9 D+9#  
  11 4 m 4 m+ 
Then {vw({h  4 m+1 4 h9#&h&9# / 1 4 h9#1 4 m+h&9#& 
                 / m+1 4 h9#&h&9# 4  1 4 h9#1 4 m+h&9#&  0. 
Thus, 
h  2m+ 4 11 4 m+  
When we substitute the λ solution into the :, :+ and Tcd equations, we obtain: 
:  k0cd1cd364.cd / 0cd1cd3;837, 7+	4.cd1 4 m+ J2m+ 4 1mD M&9# J2 4 3m+m+D+ M9#o
&9 &9#
 
 
:+  k0cd1cd34.cd / 0cd1cd3837, 7+	4.cd1 4 m+ J2m+ 4 1mD M9 J2 4 3m+m+D+ M&9 o
&9 &9#
 
 Tcd
 pq0cd1cd3.cd r
+&9 &9# 837, 7+	4.cd / 0cd1cd39 "9#4 1 4 m+ J2m+ 4 1mD M9 J2 4 3m+m+D+ M9#u
+&9 &9#
 
Q.e.d. 
 210 
REFERENCES 
 
Adams, M. E., G. S. Day, D. Dougherty. 1998. Enhancing New Product Development 
Performance: An Organizational Learning Perspective. Journal of Product 
Innovation Management 15 403-423. 
Adler P. S., K. B. Clark. 1991. Behind the learning curve: a sketch of the learning 
process. Management Science 37 267-281. 
Adler, P. S. 1995. Interdepartmental interdependence and coordination: the case of the 
design/manufacturing interface. Organization Science 6 147-167. 
Adner, R., D. Levinthal. 2001. Demand heterogeneity and technology evolution: 
implications for product and process innovation. Management Science 47 611–
628. 
Agarwal, A., R. Henderson 2002. Putting patents in context: Exploring knowledge 
transfer from MIT. Management Science 48 44-60. 
Ali, A., A, S. Seshadri. 1993. Customer Perception and Competitive Quality Strategy. 
Managerial and Decision Economics 48 235-246. 
Amaldoss, W., R.J. Meyer, J. S. Raju, A., Rapoport. 2000. Collaborating to compete. 
Marketing Science 19 105-126. 
Anand, B. N., T. Khanna. 2000a. The structure of licensing contracts. Journal of 
Industrial Economics 48 103–135. 
Anand, B. N., T. Khanna. 2000b. Do firms learn to create value? The case of alliances. 
Strategic Management Journal. 21 295-315. 
Appleyard, M. 1996. How does knowledge flow? Interfirm patterns in the semiconductor 
industry. Strategic Management Journal 17 137-154. 
Argote, L., P. Ingram. 2000. Knowledge transfer in organizations: a basis for competitive 
advantage in firms. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 82 
150-169. 
 211 
Armstrong M.J., M. Lévesque. 2002. Timing and quality decisions for entrepreneurial 
product development. European Journal of Operations Research 141 88-106. 
Arora, A. M. Ceccagnoli. 2006. Patent protection, complementary assets, and firms' 
incentives for technology licensing. Management Science 52 293-308. 
Arora, A., A. Gambardella. 1990. Complementarities and external linkages: The 
strategies of the large firms in biotechnology. The Journal of Industrial 
Economics 37 361-379. 
Arora, A. 1996. Contracting for tacit knowledge: the provision of technical services in 
technology licensing contracts. Journal of Development Economics 50 233-256. 
Arora, A., A. Fosfuri. 2003. Licensing the market for technology. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 52 277-295. 
Bhuiyan M., D. Gerwin, V. Thomson. 2004. Simulation of the new product development 
process for performance improvement. Management Science 50 1690-1703. 
Biskup, D., D. Simons. 2004. Common due date scheduling with autonomous and 
induced learning. European Journal of Operations Research 159 606-616. 
Blackburn, J., G. Hoedemaker., L. N. Van Wassenhove. 1996. Concurrent software 
engineering: prospects and pitfalls. IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management 43 179–188. 
Boone T., 2008. Knowledge acquisition and transfer among engineers: effects of 
network structure. Managerial and Decision Economics 29 459-468. 
Business Wire. 1997. New Wireless Telephone From Lucent Technologies Offers 
Access to Advanced PCS Features. September 10, 1997. 
Carrillo, J. E., R. M. Franza. 2006. Investing in product development and production 
capabilities: the crucial linkage between time-to-market and ramp-up time. 
European Journal of Operations Research 171 536-556. 
Carrillo, J., C. Gaimon. 2000. Improving manufacturing performance through process 
change and knowledge creation. Management Science 46 265-288. 
 212 
Carrillo, J., C. Gaimon. 2004. Managing knowledge-based resource capabilities under 
uncertainty. Management Science 50 1504-1518. 
Casadesus-Masanell, R., D. B. Yoffie. 2007. Wintel: Cooperation and Conflict. 
Management Science 53 584-598. 
Cassiman, B. R. Veugelers. 2006. In search of complementarity in innovation strategy: 
Internal R&D and external knowledge acquisition. Management Science 52 68-
82. 
Chand S., H. Moskowitz, A. Novak, R. Ishpal, G. Sorger. 1996. Capacity allocation for 
dynamic process improvement with quality and demand considerations. 
Operations Research 44 964-975. 
Christensen, C., M. E. Raynor. 2003a. Creating a killer product. Forbes 172 82-84. 
Christensen, C., M. E. Raynor. 2003b. The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining 
Successful Growth. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA. 
Clark, K. B., T. Fujimoto. 1991. Product Development Performance: Strategy, 
Organization and Management in the World Auto Industry. Harvard Business 
School Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Clark, K.B., S. C. Wheelwright. 1992. Managing New Product and Process 
Development. The Free Press, New York, NY. 
Cohen, M. A., J. Eliashberg, T-H. Ho. 1996. New product development: the performance 
and time-to-market tradeoff. Management Science 42 173-186. 
Cummings, J. L., B-S. Teng. 2003. Transferring R&D knowledge: the key factors 
affecting knowledge transfer success. Journal of Engineering and Technology 
Management 2 39-68. 
Darr, E., L. Argote, D. Epple. 1995. The acquisition, transfer, and depreciation of 
knowledge in service organizations: productivity in franchises. Management 
Science 41 1750-1762. 
d’Aspremont, C., S. Bhattacharya, L-A. Gerard-Varet. 2000. Bargaining and sharing 
innovative knowledge. The Review of Economic Studies 67 255-271. 
 213 
Davenport, T. H., D. W. De Long, M. C. Beers. 1998.  Successful knowledge 
management projects. Sloan Management Review 39 43-58. 
Davenport, T. H., L. Prusak. 1998. Working knowledge: how organizations manage what 
they know. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA. 
Deeds, D. L., C. W. L. Hill. 1996. Strategic alliances and the rate of new product 
development: An empirical study of entrepreneurial biotechnology firms.  Journal 
of Business Venturing 11 41-55.   
DeTar, J. 1997. K6 chief Vinod Dham leaving AMD. Electronic News 43 20-21. 
Dhebar, A. 1996. Speeding High-Tech Producer, Meet the Balking Consumer. Sloan 
Management Review 37 37-49. 
Dinur, A., A. C. Inkpen, R. D. Hamilton. 1998. Knowledge transfer in the multinational 
corporation. Working Paper. Vienna, Austria. 
Dorroh, J. R., T. R. Gulledge, N. K. Womer. 1994. Investment in knowledge: a 
generalization of learning by experience. Management Science 40 947-958. 
Döös, M., L. Wilhelmson, T. Backlund, N. Dixon. 2005. Functioning at the edge of 
knowledge: a study of learning processes in new product development. Journal 
of Workplace Learning 17 481-492. 
Dorroh, J. R., T. R. Gulledge, N. K. Womer. 1994. Investment in knowledge: a 
generalization of learning by experience. Management Science 40 947-958. 
Eppinger, S. D. 2001. A decision support tool for predicting the impact of development 
process improvements. Journal of Engineering Design 12 177-199. 
Epple, D., L. Argote, K. Murphy. 1996. An empirical investigation of the microstructure of 
knowledge acquisition and transfer through learning by doing. Operations 
Research 44 77-86. 
Erat, S., S. Kavadias, C. Gaimon. 2006. Licensing of component technologies. Working 
paper. Rady School of Management, University of California at San Diego, CA. 
Fine, C. H. 1998. Clockspeed. Perseus Books, New York, NY. 
 214 
Fisher, M., K. Ramdas, K. Ulrich. 1999. Component sharing in the management of 
product variety: a study of automotive braking systems. Management Science 45 
297-315. 
Freire, A. P., Y. Richell, C. Erutku. 2005. Licensing Innovations with Exclusive Contracts. 
Working Paper. JEL Classification Numbers: D45. D´epartement de sciences 
´economiques, Universit´e de Montr´eal, QC, Canada.  
Fosfuri, A. T. 2006. The licensing dilemma: Understanding the determinants of the rate 
of technology licensing. Strategic Management Journal 27 1141-1158. 
Fosfuri, A., T. Rønde. 2004. High-tech clusters, technology spillovers, and trade secret 
laws. International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 45– 65. 
Gaimon, C. J. C. Ho. 1994. Uncertainty and the acquisition of capacity: A Competitive 
Analysis. Computers and Operations Research 21 1073-1088. 
Gambardella, A., B. H. Hall. 2006. Proprietary versus public domain licensing of software 
and research products. Research Policy 35 875-892. 
Gans, J. S., D. H. Hsu, S. Sten. 2008. The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property. 
Management Science 54 982-997. 
Green, J. R., S. Scotchmer. 1995. On the division of profit in sequential innovation. The 
Rand Journal of Economics 26 20-33. 
Grishagin, V. A., Ya. D. Sergeyev, D. B. Silipo, 2001. Firms R&D decisions under 
incomplete decisions. European Journal of Operations Research 129 414-433. 
Ha, A. Y., E. L. Porteus. 1995. Optimal timing for reviews in concurrent design for 
manufacturability. Management Science 41 1431-1447. 
Hansen, M. T. 1999. Knowledge networks: explaining effective knowledge sharing in 
multiunit companies. Organization Science 13 232-248. 
Hargadon A., A. Fanelli. 2002. Action and Possibility: Reconciling Dual Perspectives of 
Knowledge in Organizations. Organization Science 13 290-302. 
 215 
Hatch, N. W., J. T. Macher. 2005. Mitigating the tradeoff between time-to-market and 
manufacturing performance: knowledge management in developing new 
technologies. Working paper Marriott School, Birmingham Young University, UT.  
Hatch, N. W., D. C. Mowery. 1998. Process innovation and LBD in semiconductor 
manufacturing. Management Science 44 1461-1477. 
Hug, D. 2005. Olympus and Panasonic Sign Joint Development Agreement. JCNN 
News Summaries - Japan Corporate News Network, Jan 13, 2005.    
Hendricks, K. B., V. R. Singhal. 1997. Delays in new product introductions and the 
market value of the firm: the consequences of being late to the market. 
Management Science 43 422-437. 
Iansiti, M. K. Clark. 1994. Integration and dynamic capability: evidence from product 
development in automobiles and mainframe computers. Industrial and Corporate 
Change. 3 557-605. 
Ittner, C. D., V. Nagar, M. V. Rajan. 2001. An empirical examination of dynamic quality-
based learning models. Management Science 47 563-578. 
Jacobs, B. 2006. Personal communications, manager at Saturn Corp., General Motors 
Corp., Spring Hill, TN. 
Joglekar, N. R., A. A. Yassine, S. D. Eppinger, D. E. Whitney. 2001. Performance of 
coupled product development activities with a deadline. Management Science 47 
1605-1620. 
Katila, R., G. Ahuja. 2002. Something old, something new: A longitudinal study of search 
behavior and new product innovation. Academy of Management Journal 45 
1183-1194. 
Keyhani, S. M. Diener-West, N. Powe. 2006. Are development time for pharmaceuticals 
increasing or decreasing? Health Affairs 25 461-468. 
Kim, B. 1998. Optimal development of production technology when autonomous and 
induced learning are present. International Journal of Production Economics 55 
39-52. 
 216 
Kim, Y., N. S. Vonortas. 2003. Technology Licensing Under Competitive Pressure. 
Working paper. Department of Economics, The George Washington University, 
D.C.  
Klastorin, T. W. Tsai. 2004. New product introduction: Timing, design and pricing. 
Manufacturing and Service Operations Management 6 302-320. 
Kogut, B. 1988. Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives. Strategic 
Management Journal 9 319-332. 
Krishnan, V., S. D. Eppinger, D. E. Whitney. 1997. A model-based framework to overlap 
product development activities. Management Science 43 437–451. 
Krishnan, V., S. Gupta. 2001. Appropriateness and Impact of Platform-Based Product 
Development. Management Science 47 52-68. 
Krishnan, V., K. T. Ulrich. 2001. Product development decisions: A review of literature. 
Management Science 47 1-21. 
Krishnan, V., W. Zhu. 2006. Designing a Family of Development-Intensive Products. 
Management Science 52 813-825. 
Kulatikala N. L. Lin. 2006. Impact of licensing on investment and financing of technology 
development. Management Science 52 1824-1837. 
Lado, A. A., N. G. Boyd, S. C. Hanlon. 1997. Competition, cooperation, and the search 
for economic rents: a syncretic model. Academy of Management Review 22 110–
41. 
Lapre, M. A., L. N. Van Wassenhove. 2001. Creating and transferring knowledge for 
productivity improvement in factories. Management Science 47 1311-1325. 
Leonard-Barton, D., H. K. Bowen, K. B. Clark, C. A. Holloway, S. C. Wheelwright. 1994. 
How to integrate work and deepen experience. Harvard Business Review 72 
121-131. 
Lichtenstein, D. R., S. Burton. 1989. The relationship between perceived and objective 
price quality. Journal of Marketing Research 26 429-443. 
 217 
Liebeskind, J. P. 1996. Knowledge, strategy, and the theory of the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal 17 93-109. 
Loch, C. H., C. Terwiesch. 1996. Jalopy sports car development: managing concurrent 
engineering projects. INSEAD, Fountainebleau, France. 
Loch, C. H., C. Terwiesch. 1998. Communication and uncertainty in concurrent 
engineering. Management Science 44 1033-1048. 
Loch, C. H., C. Terwiesch, S. Thomke. 2001. Parallel and sequential testing of design 
alternatives. Management Science 45 663-678. 
Loebecke, C., P. C. Van Fenema, P. Powell. 1999. Co-Opetition and knowledge 
transfer. Database for Advances in Information Systems 30 14-25. 
Luo, X., R. J. Slotegraaf, X. Pan. 2006. Cross-functional “coopetition”: the simultaneous 
role of cooperation and competition within firms. Journal of Marketing 70 67-80. 
Lynn, G. S., R. R. Reilly, A. E. Akgun. 2000. Knowledge management in new product 
development teams: practices and outcomes. IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management 47 221-231. 
Lynn, G. S., R. R. Reily. 2002. Growing the top line through innovation. The Chief 
Executive Aug-Sep 17-20. 
Macher, J. T., D. C. Mowery. 2003. Managing LBD: an empirical study in semiconductor 
manufacturing. Journal of Production and Innovation Management 20 391-410. 
Macher, J. T., 2006. Technological development and the boundaries of the firm: A 
knowledge-based examination in semiconductor manufacturing. Management 
Science 52 826-843. 
Magnusson, T., C. Berggren. 2001. Environmental innovation in auto development 
managing technological uncertainty within strict time limits. International Journal 
of Vehicle Design 26 101-115.  
Mansfield, E. 1986. Patents and Innovation: An empirical study. Management Science 
32 173-181. 
 218 
Mihm, J., C. H. Loch, A. Huchzermeier. 2003. Problem-solving oscillations in complex 
engineering projects. Management Science 46 733–750. 
Mitchell, V. L., B. R. Nault. 2007. Cooperative planning, uncertainty, and managerial 
control in concurrent design. Management Science 53 375-389. 
Moenaert, R. K., D. Deschoolmeester, A. de Meyer, W. E. Souder. 1992. Information 
Styles of Marketing and R&D Personnel during Technological Product Innovation 
Projects. R&D Management 22 21-39.  
Moorthy, S. 1988. Product and price competition in a duopoly. Marketing Science 7 141–
168.  
Moorthy, K.S., I. S. Png. 1992. Market segmentation, cannibalization, and the timing of 
product introductions. Management Science 38 345–359. 
Morrison, G., J. DeTar. 1998. Multimedia will drive the 1998 market. Electronic News 44 
16-22. 
Mowery, D. C. 1988. International Collaborative Ventures in US Manufacturing. Ballinger 
Publishing, Cambridge, MA.  
Nonaka, I. 1994. A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation. Organization 
Science 5 14-38. 
Nonaka, I. and V. Peltokorpi. 2006. Knowledge-based view of radical innovation: Toyota 
Prius case. In Hage, J. T., M. Meenus, Innovation and Knowledge Growth. 
Oxford University Press. Oxford, UK. 
Nonaka, I., H. Takeuchi. 1995. The Knowledge Creating Company. Oxford University 
Press, New York, NY. 
Ottoz, E. 2005. Technological spillover and the time distribution of licenses. Economics 
Bulletin 15 1-10. 
Pacheco-de-Almeida, G., P. Zemsky. 2007. The timing of resource development and 
sustainable competitive advantage. Management Science 53 651-666. 
Pisano, G. P. 1990. The R&D boundaries of the firm: An empirical analysis. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 35 153-176.  
 219 
Pisano, G. P., 1994. Knowledge integration and the locus of learning: an empirical 
analysis of process development. Strategic Management Journal 15 85-100. 
Pisano, G. P., R. M. J. Bohmer, A. C. Edmondson. 2001. Organizational differences in 
rates of learning: evidence from the adoption of minimally invasive cardiac 
surgery. Management Science 47 752-768. 
Pitt, M., J. MacVaugh. 2008. Knowledge management for new product development. 
Journal of Knowledge Management 12 101-116. 
Rigby D, C. Zook 2002. Open-market innovation. Harvard Business Review 80 5–12. 
Ritchie, T. Chemoinformatics: manipulating chemical information to facilitate decision-
making in drug discovery. Drug Discovery Today 6 813-814. 
Roemer, T. A., R. H. Ahmadi, R. H. Wang. 2000. Time-cost trade-offs in overlapped 
product development. Operations Research 48 858–865. 
Rogers, G. C., C. Christensen. 1998. Hewlett-Packard: the flight of the Kittyhawk. 
Harvard Business School Case Number: 9-697-060.  
Rothaermel, F. T., D. L. Deeds. 2004. Exploration and exploitation alliances in 
biotechnology: A system of new product development. Strategic Management 
Journal 25 201-221.  
Samaddar, S., S. S. Kadiyala. An analysis of interorganizational resource sharing 
decisions in collaborative knowledge creation. European Journal of Operations 
Research 170 192-210. 
Santiago, L. P., P. Vakili. 2005. On the flexibility in R&D project. Management Science 
51 1206-1218. 
Saracho, A. I. 2005. The relationship between patent licensing and competitive behavior. 
The Manchester School 73 563–581. 
Schilling M. A., P. Vidal, R. E. Ployhart, A. Marangoni. 2003. Learning-by-doing 
something else: variation, relatedness, and the learning curve. Management 
Science 49 39-56. 
 220 
Sethi S. P., G. L. Thompson. 2000. Optimal Control Theory: Applications to 
Management Science and Economics. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 
MA. 
Shane, S. 2000. Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Organization Science 11 448-466. 
Smith, R. P., S. D. Eppinger. 1997a. A predictive model of sequential iteration in 
engineering design. Management Science 43 1104-1121.  
Smith, R. P., S. D. Eppinger. 1997b. Identifying controlling features of engineering 
design. Management Science 43 276-294. 
Smith, P. G., Reinertsen, D. G. 1998. Developing products in half the time: new rules, 
new tools.  John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY. 
Soderquist, K.E. 2006. Organising knowledge management and dissemination in new 
product development. Long Range Planning 39 497-523. 
Sony Corporation. 1998. Hitachi and Sony Reach Agreement on Licensing of SuperH 
RISC CPU Cores. Press Release March, 31 1998 
www.sony.net/News/Press_Archive (Accessed August 2, 2008). 
Sorenson, O., J. W. Rivkin, L. Fleming. 2005. Informational complexity and the flow of 
knowledge across social boundaries. Working paper. Utrecht University, PEEG 
No. 0511.  
Sosa, M. E., S. D. Eppinger, C. M. Rowles. 2004. The misalignment of product 
architecture and organizational structure in complex product development. 
Management Science 50 1674-1689. 
Spiegel, Y. 2007. Licensing interim R&D knowledge. Working Paper. CSIO #0088. 
Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration, Tel Aviv University, Tel 
Aviv, Israel. 
Szulanski, G. 1996. Exploring internal stickiness: impediments to the transfer of best 
practice within the firm. Strategic Management Journal 17 27–43. 
Takahashi, D. 1997. Intel plans deeper price cuts on chips in an effort to ward off 
competitors. Wall Street Journal B2 April 11, 1997. 
 221 
Taylor III, A. 2006. Toyota: The birth of the Prius. Fortune 4 111-119. 
Teece, D.J. 1986. Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, 
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy. Research Policy 15 285-306. 
Terwiesch, C., R. Bohn. 2001. Learning and process improvement during production 
ramp-up. International Journal of Production Economics 70 1-19. 
Terwiesch, C., C. H. Loch. 1999. Measuring effectiveness of overlapping development 
activities. Management Science 45 455–465. 
Terwiesch, C., C. H. Loch, A. De Meyer. 2002. Exchanging preliminary information in 
concurrent engineering: alternative coordination strategies. Organization Science 
13 402-419. 
Terwiesch, C., Y. Xu. 2004. The copy-exactly ramp-up strategy: Trading-off learning with 
process change. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 51 70-84. 
Thomke, S. H. 1998. Managing Experimentation in the design of new products. 
Management Science 44 743-762. 
Thomke, S. H., T. Fujimoto. 2000. The effect of “front-loading” problem-solving on 
product development performance. Journal of Production and Innovation 
Management 17 128-142. 
Tilin, A. 2005. The smartest company of the year: and the winner is…Toyota hot cars. 
Hot brands. Hot technology. Here’s how Japan’s largest automaker keeps firing 
on all cylinders. Business 2.0 6 65-66. 
Ulrich K. T., S. D. Eppinger. 2003. Product Design and Development. Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 
Boston, MA.  
Von Hippel, E. 1994. Sticky information” and the Locus of problem solving: implications 
for innovation. Management Science 40 429-439. 
Wall Street Journal, The. 1996. Procter & Gamble Co.: Glaxo to pay license fees on 
ulcer-therapy patents. (Nov 26) B6. 
 222 
Ward, A., J. K. Liker, J.J. Cristiano, D. K. Sobek. 1995. The second Toyota paradox - 
how delaying decisions can make better cars faster. Sloan Management Review 
36 43-61. 
Weber, A. 2006. The Hybrid Challenge. Assembly Magazine June 1, 2006 
www.assemblymag.com (Accessed August 15, 2008). 
Webber, A. M. 1993. What's so new about the new economy. Harvard Business Review 
71 24-33. 
Wilson, R. 1996. AMD renews Intel battle with K6 CPU. Electronic Eng. Times 11 4-5.  
Willcox, J. K. 1999. Chip makers geared up for year-end battle. TWICE 14 36-37. 
Wright, T. P. 1936. Factors affecting the costs of airplanes. Journal of Aeronautical 
Science 3 122-128. 
Yassine, A. A., K. R. Chelst, D. R. Falkenburg. 1999. A decision analytic framework for 
evaluating concurrent engineering. IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management 46 144-157. 
Yassine, A. A., S. S. Ramavarapu, J. Zhu. 2008. Managing the exchange of information 
in product development. European Journal of Operations Research 184 311-326. 
Zellmer-Bruhn, M. 2003. Interruptive events and team knowledge acquisition. 
Management Science 49 514-528. 
 223 
 VITA 
GÜLRU F. ÖZKAN 
 
 
Özkan is a Ph.D. student in the College of Management at the Georgia Institute 
of Technology.  Özkan received a Master of Business Administration from Georgia State 
University, Atlanta, Georgia in 2003 and a Bachelors of Science in Environmental 
Engineering from Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey in 2001. On the 
completion of her doctoral studies, Özkan will join the faculty of Clemson University as 
an Assistant Professor in College of Business and Behavioral Sciences. 
